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i 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUGGESTION OF DEATH FILED BY THE LAW FIRM ON 
DECEMBER 28,1998 WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW TO TRIGGER THE 90-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD IN 
WHICH TO MOVE FOR SUBSTITUTION. 
A. The Plain Language of Rule 25 Makes Clear a Suggestion of 
Death Must 1) Be Filed by a Party or Successor or 
Representative of the Deceased Party, 2) Be Served on 
Nonparties, and 3) Identify the Person Who May Be Substituted 
in Order to Trigger the 90-day Period. 
When interpreting a statute or rule, the plain language of that statute or rule is 
controlling. Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff. 945 P.2d 113, 116 (Utah App. 1997). Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 25(a)(1) states: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, 
together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for 
the service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later 
than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a 
statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the 
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. 
(Emphasis added.) The rule clearly states that the suggestion of death must be served 
"as provided herein for the service of the motion." Id Looking above to the 
requirements for the motion for substitution, it is obvious that only a party or 
successor or representative of the deceased may make the motion for substitution and 
that the motion must be served on parties and interested nonparties. Id Therefore, 
1 
the sujiigesfioi! of clculli mii'.i .ilkm lie siTirdl mi 11 iilii ' iiiill ii<iii|iiHliirs liiiii niiis onlv 
be filed by parties or by successors or representatives of the deceased.1 
Additionally, because the suggestion of death must be served on interested 
nonparties, Kiile 2S unpin i(l\ ii»(|iiur> lint suggestion of death to identify the party 
who may be substituted for the deceased party. Fehrenbachei v Ouackenbush ~fc • • 
F. Supp. 1516,1519 (D. Kan. 1991). While not binding on this court, Form 30 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports this interpretation. This form—based upon 
1
 This interpretation of Rule 25(a)(1) is also supported by Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure Rule 38(a), which limits the entities who can file a suggestion 
of death once a notice of appeal has been filed; 
If a party dies after a notice of appeal is filed or while a proceeding is 
otherwise pending in the court, the personal representative of the deceased 
party may be substituted as a party on motion filed by the representative or 
by any party. The motion of a party shall be served upon the representative 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 21. If the deceased party has no 
representative, any party may suggest the death on the record and 
proceedings shall then be had as the court may direct 
(Emphasis added.) Appellate Rule 38 states that only parties to the action, or 
implicitly the decedent's personal representative, may suggest death upon the 
record. 
Significantly, Appellate Rule 38—like Rule 25—does not authorize a 
deceased party's attorney to suggest the death. Appellate Rule 38 only authorizes 
a deceased party's attorney to file a notice of appeal if there is no personal 
representative when a party dies before filing a notice of appeal. This is consistent 
with public policy because there is no requirement that a final order be served on 
nonparties, and nonparty representatives of the deceased party (whether a plaintiff 
or defendant) may not know of the need to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of 
the final order. In contrast, Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be served "as 
provided herein for the service of the motion," which means that a suggestion of 
death must be served on parties and nonparties. If the drafters of Rule 25 had 
intended to authorize a deceased party's attorney to suggest the death upon the 
record and limit the time in which to move for substitution to 90 days, they would 
have expressly done so. 
Federal Rule 25, which is identical to Utah Rule 25—requires that the suggestion of 
death identify the person who may be substituted for the deceased party. Rende v. 
Kav. 415 F.2d 983, 985-986 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
This interpretation of Rule 25 is supported by the vast majority of the federal 
circuits which have addressed this issue. Of the six circuits which have had to 
determine what makes a suggestion of death valid to trigger the 90-day period, five 
have required that the suggestion of death meet the same requirements as the motion 
for substitution. See Bass v. AttardL 868 F.2d 45, 50 n. 12 (3rd Cir. 1989); Fariss v. 
Lynchburg. 769 F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985); National Labor Relations Board v. 
International Measurement and Control Company. 978 F.2d 334, 338-339 (7th Cir. 
1992) (basing its decision on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(a), which is the 
appellate substitution rule, but citing McSurelv v. McClellan. 753 F.2d 88, 97-99 
(D.C. Cir. 1985), which is based on Federal Rule 25(a)(1), for support); Barlow v. 
Ground. 39 F.3d 231, 233-234 (9th Cir. 1994); Grandbouche v. Lovell. 913 F.2d 835 
(10th Cir. 1990); and McSurelv v. McClellan. 753 F.2d 88, 97-99 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
The majority requires a suggestion of death to be filed by a party or representative of 
the deceased, served on parties and nonparties, and identify the person who may be 
substituted in order to limit the time in which to move for substitution to 90 days. 
The Second Circuit stands alone among the federal circuits in declining to 
require the suggestion of death to identify the party who may be substituted. Unicom 
Tales. Inc. v. Baneriee. 138 F.3d 467 (2nd Cir. 1998). However, Unicorn Tales is 
easily distinguished from the present case and appears to be consistent with the 
majority construction. In Unicorn Tales, the widow of the deceased party—not the 
deceased party's attorney—filed the suggestion of death. Id at 469. Therefore, she 
was a successor and/or representative of the deceased and was a proper person to file 
the suggestion of death. Moreover, because the widow filed the suggestion of death, 
the suggestion of death identified who could be substituted as a party. Thus, the 
suggestion of death in Unicorn Tales satisfied the criteria the other federal circuits 
require for a suggestion of death to trigger the 90-day limitation period. 
Numerous state courts with substitution rules similar to Federal Rule 25 have 
adopted the interpretation of the majority of the federal circuits. Hoffman v, Cohen, 
538 A.2d 1096,1099 (Del. 1988); Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc., 725 
P.2d 836, 839 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); Barto v. Weishaar, 692 P.2d 498, 499 (Nev. 
1985): Campbell v. Campbell, 878 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Okla. 1994); Varela v. Roman, 
753P.2dl66,168 (Ariz. App. 1987): Wick v. Waterman, 421N. W.2d 872,873 (Wis. 
App. 1988). 
Most of the state court cases that the law firm cites to support its interpretation 
of Rule 25 distinguish themselves from Rende, the principal case of the majority's 
interpretation of the rule. In LesCarbeau v. Rodrigues. 286 A.2d 246, 247 (R.I. 
1972), the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that the holding in Rende was not 
applicable because Rhode Island's Rule 25 did not contain a 90- day "trigger" for 
dismissal as does Federal Rule 25. 
We have no quarrel with the court's finding [in Rende] relative to the 
termination of the attorney's agency. We do believe, however, that the 
conclusion reached in Rende stems from a provision present in Federal Rule 
25(a)(1) which is not found in our rule. 
Id (italics in original). The court continued to explain that a suggestion of death 
made in a Rhode Island Superior Court "triggers nothing except to alert the court that 
rigor mortis may be setting in on a case which has a pending status."2 Id. 
Likewise, the case Holmes v. Arbeitman, 857 S.W.2d 442 (Mo.App.E.D. 1993) is 
distinguishable since Missourri Rule 25 differs substantially from Federal Rule 25: 
We note that the federal rules upon which the federal decisions are based 
differ from those of Missourri... [T]he federal rules specify with particularity 
who may make the suggestion of death, limiting those persons to 'any party or 
. . . the successors or representatives of the deceased party . . .' Our rule 
authorizes the suggestion of death to be made by 'any party or person in 
interest ' 
Id at 443 (italics added) (citations omitted). See also Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.2d 
748,750 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (distinguishing itself on the grounds that Georgia's rule 
differs from the Federal rule by allowing 180 days to move for substitution); King v. 
Twee's of Tampa. Inc.. 315 So.2d 538, 539-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
(distinguishing itself from Rende on the facts, as the plaintiffs counsel in King never 
sought an extension of time); Brown v. Wheeler, 437 So.2d 521, 523 (Ala. 1983) 
(basing its decision on the Alabama Rules' Advisory Committee notes, which are 
different than the Federal Advisory Committee notes; also Alabama Rule 25 has a six 
month limitation period). 
2
 A more detailed reading of the holding in LesCarbeau reveals that the 
plaintiffs case was dismissed essentially for failure to prosecute. 
The only case the law firms cites which is not easily distinguished from the 
present case is Farmers Insurance Group v. District Court of the Second Judicial 
District 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973). However, the reasoning of Farmers Insurance 
is faulty. In holding that the deceased party's attorney could file the suggestion of 
death and that there is no requirement that the suggestion of death identify the party 
to be substituted, the Colorado Supreme Court relied on the duty that an attorney has 
to notify the court of a party's death and on the fact that the Colorado rule makes no 
mention of an identification requirement. As discussed below in section LB.3., 
however, the attorney's duty to notify the court of his or her client's death does not 
give that attorney the authority to make motions on behalf of a deceased person that 
the attorney no longer and as a matter of law can no longer represent. Nor should the 
attorney's ethical duty give him or her authority to take actions which could clearly 
prejudice the rights of persons to whom the attorney has no relationship. Campbell 
878 P.2d at 1043. Additionally, as explained above, the language of Rule 25 limits 
those who may file a suggestion of death to those who may move for substitution and 
implies that the suggestion of death must identify the party to be substituted. 
B. Adopting the Federal Construction of Rule 25 Is in the Interest of 
Public Policy and Is Consistent with the Purpose of Rule 25, as Set 
Forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1963 Amendment. 
"Utah courts 'may look to the federal advisory committee notes as well as 
federal court interpretation of the federal rules to aid in interpreting the Utah rules.'" 
State v.Kinross, 906 P.2d 320, 324 n.2 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Statev.Cude. 784 
P.2d 1197, 1200 n.3 (Utah 1989)). Even if this Court finds that the language of Rule 
25 is ambiguous and looks to other sources to determine the meaning of the rule, the 
federal advisory committee notes to Rule 25 make clear that the majority construction 
of Rule 25 as explained above in section LA. is the interpretation intended by those 
who drafted the rules. Because Utah Rule 25 and Federal Rule 25 are nearly 
identical, the logical reasoning and arguments of the federal advisory committee notes 
and the cases cited by Plaintiff Donahue should persuade this Court to adopt the 
majority interpretation of the requirements under Rule 25 for a suggestion of death. 
1. Rule 25 is intended to allow more flexibility in substituting 
parties—not to require dismissal for failure to substitute 
within 90 days of the death of a party. 
Prior to the adoption of the 1963 amendment, Federal Rule 25 required 
dismissal if substitution was not made within two years of the death of a party. To 
avoid "the hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement," the 1963 
amendments to rule 25 sought to make the substitution requirements less rigid, 
making clear that the rule "was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious 
actions." Fed.R.Civ.P. 25, Advisory Committee's Note (1963 amendment); 
Continental Bank. N.A. v. Mever. 10 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993). 
The amended rule measures the time for substitution not from the time of 
death, but from the time of the filing and service of the suggestion of death. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a)(1). In keeping with the advisory committee's goal to make 
substitution after the death of a party more easily accomplished, there are restrictions 
on how a suggestion of death must be filed in order to limit the time period in which 
to move for substitution to 90 days. These requirements for a valid suggestion of 
death insure that substitution is not overly burdensome, and that otherwise 
meritorious claims can continue despite a party's death. 
The law firm would construe Rule 25 to require that Plaintiff's Complaint be 
dismissed for failure to substitute within 90 days of the death of Defendant 
Smith—even though Defendant Smith's successors and representatives were never 
served with the suggestion of death, and even though there was no person to be 
substituted for Defendant Smith.3 Such a construction is not consistent with Rule 
25's intended purpose—to make the substitution of parties more flexible. 
2. The purpose of a suggestion of death is to give notice of the 
death of a party and to alert parties and nonparties of the 
need to act. Therefore, the plain language of Rule 25 
requires a suggestion of death to be served on parties and 
nonparties. 
The Tenth Circuit in Grandbouche v. Lovell. 913 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1990) and 
the Ninth Circuit in Barlow v. Ground. 39 F.3d 231, 233-234 (9th Cir. 1994), among 
other courts, have held that Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death to be served on the 
decedent's personal representative or successors pursuant to Rule 4 for the service of 
summons in order to trigger the 90-day limitation period under Rule 25. This is 
because it is quite possible that a representative or successor to the deceased party 
may have a valid claim against the surviving party that will be barred by res judicata 
if the original claim is dismissed. Without service, the representative or successor 
may never know of the need to make the motion to substitute. 
3
 Defendant Smith's personal representative was not appointed until 161 days 
after his death. 
In the present case, the trial court—while noting that Rule 25 required the 
motion for substitution to be served upon parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon 
persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of 
summons—expressly declined to follow the above cases and held that a suggestion 
of death does not need to be served on parties and nonparties. The trial court 
reasoned that the purpose of requiring service of the motion for substitution was to 
give the personal representative notice of a potential claim against the decedent's 
estate, or of a potential cause of action to pursue on the decedent's behalf. 
The error in the trial court's reasoning should be apparent. Simply stated, the 
trial court overlooked the fact that the personal representative may need to file the 
motion for substitution.4 If a personal representative does not receive notice of the 
death and notice of the pending lawsuit through service of the suggestion of death, the 
representative will be unable to file a motion for substitution within 90 days of the 
suggestion of death. 
The law firm argues that the above reasoning only applies when the plaintiff 
dies, and thus, is not applicable to the present case. (Brief of Appellee at 26-27.) Not 
only does this argument assume that defendants either always lose or never have valid 
counter- or cross-claims, but it also has no foundation in the language of the rule. 
4
 Contrary to the law firm's contention, Rule 25 does not place a "burden" of 
moving for substitution upon the surviving party to the lawsuit. Rule 25 explicitly 
states that the motion for substitution "may be made by any party or by the 
successors or representatives of the deceased party." (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 25 does not make a distinction between a deceased plaintiff or defendant. Rule 
25 clearly begins "If a party dies." This is because the representatives or successors 
of either plaintiffs or defendants may want to continue a lawsuit despite the plaintiffs 
or defendant's death.5 Instead of attempting to make a distinction, which would be 
complicated and lead to inconsistent results, the drafters of Rule 25 chose to make the 
language of the rule neutral as to whether the decedent was a plaintiff or a defendant. 
3. The plain language of Rule 25 and the advisory committee 
notes reveal that Rule 25 limits the entities who may suggest 
death upon the record to those who may move for 
substitution. 
Rule 25 states that a suggestion of death is made "by service of a statement of 
the fact of death as provided herein for the sennce of the motion [for substitution]." 
(Emphasis added.) The rule limits the individuals that can make the motion for 
substitution to "any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased 
party." This indicates that the suggestion of death may also only be made by a party 
5
 It is easy to see why a deceased plaintiffs representative or successor may 
want to continue a cause of action, but the representative or successor of a 
deceased defendant may want to avoid the dismissal of a lawsuit as well. For 
example, the deceased defendant's representative or successor may have a valid 
mandatory counterclaim that cannot be brought separate from the original cause of 
action, or the representative or successor may have a valid cross-claim against 
another defendant to the action. Because of the multiple circumstances in which a 
nonparty may want to continue a cause of action after a party's death, Rule 25 
makes no attempt to differentiate between the death of a plaintiff or a defendant 
and requires that interested nonparties receive service of the suggestion of death. 
This approach is in the interest of public policy because it provides a uniform 
procedure upon the death of a party and prevents the inconsistent results that 
would occur on a case by case basis. 
or a successor or representative of the deceased. This interpretation is supported by 
the federal advisory committee notes, which state that a party or the representative of 
the deceased party are the proper entities to file a suggestion of death. Thus, a 
decedent's former counsel cannot file a suggestion of death that triggers the running 
of the 90-day period because the attorney is not a party or representative of the 
deceased since the attorney-client relationship is severed upon the death of the client. 
Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 757 F. Supp. 206,210 (W.D.N. Y. 1990); Campbell 
v. Campbell 878 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Okla. 1994); Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry. 769 
F.2d 958, 961 (4th Cir. 1985); Hilsabeck v. Lane Co.. Inc.. 168 F.R.D. 313, 314 (D. 
Kan. 1996); Hoffman v. Cohen. 538 A.2d 1096, 1099 (Del. 1988); Jones v. 
Montgomery Ward & Company. Inc.. 725 P.2d 836, 839 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); 
Rendev.Kav. 415 F.2d 983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. Planas. 151 F.R.D. 547, 
549-550 (S.D.N. Y. 1993). 
The trial court and the law firm both rely upon Farmers Insurance Group v. 
District Court of the Second Judicial District. 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973) to support 
their argument that since an attorney has a duty to notify the court of his or her 
client's death, an attorney also has the authority to file a suggestion of death. (Record 
at 152; Brief of Appellee at 16-17.) The trial court and law firm's reliance on 
Farmers Insurance is unreasonable, especially in light of the plain language of and 
committee notes to Rule 25. 
It is true that the attorney for a deceased client should notify the Court and 
other parties of his or her client's death. Such practice is consistent with ethical 
obligations. However, the attorney's duty to notify does not extend so far as to give 
the attorney authority to file a suggestion of death which triggers the 90-day limitation 
period.6 Rendev.Kav. 415 F.2d 983,985 (D.C. Or. 1969). This is because Rule 25 
intends that only a party or a representative of the deceased may file the suggestion 
of death. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25, Advisory Committee Note (1963 amendment). To allow 
an attorney who formerly represented a party to limit the time in which to move for 
substitution to 90 days is to allow the attorney to prejudice the rights of parties and 
nonparties to whom the attorney has no legal relationship. Such a construction of 
Rule 25 is inconsistent with the agency nature of the attorney-client relationship and 
would not serve public policy. 
4. Requiring a suggestion of death to identify the person who may 
be substituted as a party avoids tactical maneuvering and absurd 
results. 
"By requiring service of the suggestion of death on parties and non-parties, 
[Rule 25] implicitly allocates the burden of identifying the substitute party to the 
party making the suggestion of death." Fehrenbacher v. Ouackenbush. 759 F. Supp. 
1516, 1519 (D. Kan. 1991). This identification requirement does not arise out of 
Federal Form 30, as the law firm contends, but out of the language of Rule 25 itself, 
as pointed out by Fehrenbacher. 
The law firm argues that requiring a suggestion of death to identify the person 
who may be substituted as a party in order to trigger the 90-day limitation period 
6
 Certainly, an attorney's duty to notify the court of his or her client's death 
does not give the attorney authority to file a motion to dismiss on behalf of the 
deceased client. 
places an unduly heavy burden on the person filing the suggestion of death.7 
However, Wick v. Waterman, 421 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. App. 1988), demonstrates the 
sometimes absurd result of requiring the surviving party to move for substitution 
when no substitute is identified in a suggestion of death. In Wick, the defendant died. 
Id. at 872. The suggestion of death was mailed to the plaintiff by the defendant's 
former attorney, in his own name. The suggestion did not identify a person who 
could be substituted for the defendant. IcL The plaintiff, in order to preserve his 
claim, petitioned the court to be appointed personal representative of the defendant's 
estate. Id To avoid this ridiculous result in the future, the court held that the entity 
filing the suggestion of death must identify the individual to be substituted in the 
action. Id. at 873. 
The Wick case illustrates how allowing a suggestion of death which fails to 
identify the person who may be substituted to limit the time in which substitution may 
be made places a heavy, even impossible "burden" on the surviving party. In many 
7
 Requiring a suggestion of death to identify whom may be substituted places 
a minimal burden on a successor or representative of the deceased party when 
suggesting the death upon the record. This is because the representative of the 
deceased is often the proper party to be substituted. In contrast, some courts have 
held that the identification requirement is too heavy a burden when the suggestion 
of death is filed by z party. See In re Cardoza. 111 B.R. 906, 909 (Bkrtcy. S.D. 
Cal. 1990) (explaining that the holding in Rende requiring identification "only 
applies when the suggestion of death is filed by the representative or successor of 
the estate. No such rule binds other parties who may file and serve the suggestion 
of death."). If the law firm had been representing the personal representative when 
it filed the suggestion of death, it would have been a simple matter for the law firm 
to identify the person it purportedly represented. 
instances, and in this case specifically, such a burden requires the plaintiff to initiate 
probate proceedings. In fact, this burden could have easily lead to a result in this case 
that is similar to the silly result of Wick—the plaintiff appointing himself as the 
successor to the deceased defendant when no other substitute has been appointed. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LAW FIRM 
WAS REPRESENTING THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF 
THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE WHEN IT FILED THE SUGGESTION 
OF DEATH ON DECEMBER 28, 1998 BECAUSE THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT APPOINTED UNTIL JUNE 2,1999. 
The trial court's finding that the law firm was representing Phyllis Myers, the 
personal representative of the deceased Defendant Smith's estate, when the law firm 
filed the suggestion of death on December 28, 1998 is clearly erroneous and "against 
the clear weight of the evidence." Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999) 
(citations omitted). Simply stated, the law firm could not have represented the 
personal representative until after June 2,1999—the date on which the representative 
was appointed.8 By finding that the law firm represented the personal representative 
on December 28,1998, when the suggestion of death was filed, the trial court ignored 
undisputed court records and issued an erroneous finding based upon factual 
impossibility. See In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390 (Bkrtcy. E.D. N.Y. 1984) (holding that 
8
 It is important to note the hearing in which Phyllis Myers was appointed as 
personal representative was initiated by Plaintiff Stoddard in the companion case 
to this one. Plaintiff Stoddard had filed an Appointment of Personal 
Representative on May 12, 1999, seeking to have Clair Jaussi appointed as 
personal representative. The law firm appeared at the hearing and requested that 
Phyllis Myers be appointed as personal representative. But for Plaintiff 
Stoddard's pursuit of this matter, there would be no personal representative for the 
law firm to purportedly represent. 
a suggestion of death filed by the deceased plaintiffs attorney before he was acting 
for the deceased plaintiffs representatives was insufficient to trigger the 90-day 
period because the attorney was not a person authorized to suggest the death under 
Rule 25(a)(1)). 
Moreover, the trial court also erred by ignoring representations made by the 
law firm that explicitly indicated it did not represent the personal representative or the 
deceased Defendant's estate. In the present case, it is undisputed that the law firm 
filed papers—including the suggestion of death, the motion to dismiss and supporting 
memorandum, the notice to submit for decision, and the objection to Plaintiffs 59(e) 
motion. (Record at 50, 61, 127.) Nowhere in the record does the law firm submit or 
sign papers on behalf of the estate or on behalf of the personal representative Phyllis 
Myers. Indeed in its opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) motion filed June 14, 1999, 
the law firm unequivocally stated that it "had no idea who the successor party would 
be," that at the time of Defendant Smith's death it "was not aware of whether any 
testamentary instrument existed which named a personal representative of Mr. 
Smith's estate," and that it "did not know any details of [decedent's] estate." (Record 
at 119-120.) Indeed, the law firm even requested the Notice to Submit for Decision 
on the motion to dismiss on behalf of the deceased Defendant.9 
9
 It appears that the law firm may be judicially estopped from claiming it 
represented the estate and the personal representative after it has filed documents 
as "Attorneys for the Defendant, Seth Albert Smith." (Record at 50 and 61.) 
"[J]udicial estoppel is the doctrine which 'prevents a party from seeking judicial 
relief by offering statements inconsistent with its own sworn statement in a prior 
judicial proceeding.'" Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline. 913 P.2d 731, 734 
The evidence before the trial court clearly demonstrated that the law firm could 
not have represented the personal representative on December 28,1998, because the 
personal representative was not appointed until June 2, 1999. The evidence also 
clearly demonstrated that the law firm did not file documents on behalf of the estate 
or representative. Thus, the trial court clearly erred by finding that the law firm "was 
acting as lawyer for the deceased party and the lawyer for the estate of that party" 
when it filed the suggestion of death.10 (Record at 216.) 
III. EVEN IF THE LAW FIRM'S SUGGESTION OF DEATH HAD BEEN 
SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER THE 90-DAY LIMITATION PERIOD, 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT 
ENLARGING THE 90-DAY PERIOD FOR GOOD CAUSE AND 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
The trial court should have granted Plaintiff Donahue' s Motion to Enlarge the 
Time for Filing a Motion to Appoint a Personal Representative, even though the 
motion was made more than 90 days after the law firm filed the suggestion of death. 
This is because Plaintiff Donahue demonstrated good cause and excusable neglect for 
failing to substitute a party within the 90 days following the law firm's suggestion of 
death. 
(Utah 1995) (quoting Condas v. Condas. 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980)). 
10
 The trial court apparently relied upon the Affidavit of Phyllis Myers which 
was attached to the law firm's Notice of Authority of Appearance filed on June 30, 
1999. (Record at 134.) This reliance was not supported by the evidence because 
the affidavit is 1) inconsistent with the law firm's prior representations on June 21, 
1999 that it knew no details of the decedent's estate when it filed the suggestion of 
death, and 2) inconsistent with the court documents indicating that Phyllis Myers 
was appointed as personal representative on June 2, 1999, well after the suggestion 
of death was filed on December 28, 1998. (Record at 130-129.) 
In Dietrich v. Burrows, 164 F.R.D. 220, 222 (N.D.Ohio 1995), the court 
explained that the 90-day period under Rule 25 should have been enlarged under Rule 
6(b) because no personal representative was named until after the 90-day time period 
had run. In Dietrich, the defendants filed a suggestion of death following the 
plaintiffs death.11 Brian Dietrich, who had just recently been appointed the 
decedent's personal representative, moved to substitute himself as plaintiff 106 days 
later. Id at 221. The court explained that the motion for substitution was timely, 
even if the 90-day period had already passed, because good cause was shown to 
enlarge the Rule 25 time pursuant to Rule 6(b)—Brian was unable to move to 
substitute himself until he was appointed as the personal representative of the 
deceased party. Id. at 222. 
In the present case, a personal representative of the deceased Defendant Smith 
was not appointed until June 2, 1999—156 days after the law firm had filed the 
suggestion of death. Prior to this date, Plaintiff Donahue could not have made a 
motion to substitute Defendant Smith's personal representative since no representative 
had been named. Like the plaintiff in Dietrich. Plaintiff Donahue has shown good 
cause for an enlargement of time pursuant to Rule 6(b). 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has upheld a finding of excusable neglect for 
failure to move for substitution until eight months after a suggestion of death was 
11
 The defendants' suggestion of death was held to be insufficient to limit the 
time for substitution to 90 days because the suggestion of death did not identify 
the successor or representative of the deceased. Dietrich. 164 F.R.D. at 222. 
filed when the attorneys who had previously represented the deceased defendant 
"continued to file papers on his behalf and continued to participate in settlement 
discussions in his behalf" Continental Bank. N. A. v. Mever. 10F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th 
Cir. 1993). The court explained that the 90-day period under Rule 25 may be 
extended by Rule 6(b): "[T]he history of Rule 25(a) and Rule 6(b) makes it clear that 
the 90 day time period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious 
actions, and extensions of the period may be liberally granted." Id (quoting Tatterson 
v. Koppers Co., 104 F.R.D. 19, 20 (W.D.Pa. 1984)). 
In the present case, after Defendant Smith's death, the law firm that had 
previously represented him continued to file documents, and even moved the court 
to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint, on his behalf. Similar to the plaintiff in Continental 
Bank, Plaintiff Donahue has shown excusable neglect for an enlargement of time 
under Rule 6(b) in which to move for substitution. 
Furthermore, in support of its claim that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to enlarge time, Defendant asserts that if the 
trial court had granted Plaintiffs motion then the "Defendant would have been 
required to incur additional expenses and costs in defending against Plaintiffs 
claims." Br. of Defendant, pp. 33-34. In this case, there is no showing of legal 
prejudice. The Defendant has made no showing that it would be harder for them to 
defend the case had the motion been granted. 
Also of note, the Defendant has completely failed to respond to Plaintiffs 
argument that the lower court ened in construing the dismissal for failure to file a 
Rule 25 motion as a dismissal with prejudice, when it should have dismissed the 
action without prejudice. Br. of Plaintiff, p. 37. Accordingly, the order of dismissal 
should be vacated and the trial court should be instructed to enter a new order 
dismissing the case without prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant Donahue respectfully requests that 
the Court adopt the logical reasoning of the majority of the federal courts in 
interpreting Federal Rule 25 and hold that in order to trigger the running of the 90-day 
limitation period under Rule 25, Utah Rule 25 requires a suggestion of death 1) to be 
filed by a party or representative of the deceased, 2) to be served upon nonparties, and 
3) to identify the person who may be substituted as a party. Accordingly, Appellant 
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs 
Complaint for failure to substitute a party within the 90 days of the law firm's 
suggestion of death—which was not filed by a party or representative of the deceased, 
was not served on nonparties, and did not identify who may be substituted as a 
party—and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
Dated this JH day otJuSe, 2000. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff /Appellant 
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Current with amendments received through 
11-1-1999 
RULE 38. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES 
(a) Death of a Party. If a party dies after a 
notice of appeal is filed or while a proceeding is 
otherwise pending in the court, the personal 
representative of the deceased party may be 
substituted as a party on motion filed by the 
representative or by any party. The motion of a 
party shall be served upon the representative in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 21. If 
the deceased party has no representative, any 
party may suggest the death on the record and 
proceedings shall then be had as the court may 
direct. If a party against whom an appeal may 
be taken dies after entry of a judgment or order 
in the trial court or agency but before a notice of 
appeal is filed, an appellant may proceed as if 
death had not occurred. After the notice of 
appeal is filed, substitution shall be effected in 
accordance with this paragraph. If a party 
entitled to appeal dies before filing a notice of 
appeal, the notice of appeal may be filed by the 
deceased party's personal representative or, if 
there is no personal representative, by the 
deceased party's attorney of record. After the 
notice of appeal is filed, substitution shall be 
effected in accordance with this paragraph. 
(b) Substitution for Other Causes. If 
substitution of a party is necessary for any 
reason other than death, substitution shall be 
effected in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed in paragraph (a) of this rule. 
(c) Public Officers; Death or Separation From 
Office. 
(1) When a public officer is a party to an 
appeal or other proceeding in an official 
capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or 
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does 
not abate and the public officer's successor is 
automatically substituted as a party. 
Proceedings following the substitution shall be 
in the name of the substituted party, but any 
misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of 
the parties shall be disregarded. An order of 
substitution may be entered at any time, but the 
omission to enter such an order shall not affect 
the substitution. 
(2) When a public officer is a party to an 
appeal or other proceeding in an official 
capacity, the public officer may be described as 
a party by official title rather than by name; but 
the court may require the name to be added. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
B. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Form 30. 
APPENDIX OF FORMS Form 30 
F o r m 3 0 . Suggestion of Death Upon the Record Under Rule 
25(a)(1) 
A. B. [describe as a party, or as executor, administrator, or other 
representative or successor of C. D., the deceased party] suggests 
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), the death of C. D. 
[describe as party] during the pendency of this action. 
(Added Jan. 21, 1963, eff. July 1, 1963.) 
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C. Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
Gerhard BASS, Appellant, 
v. 
Sylvester ATTARDI, individually and as a 
member of the South Amboy Planning 
Board; H. Thomas Carr, individually 
and as a consultant to the South Am-
boy Planning Board; Alice Christina, 
individually and as a chairperson of the 
South Amboy Planning Board; Mayor 
J. Thomas Cross, individually and as 
Mayor of the City of South Amboy and 
as a member of the South Amboy Plan-
ning Board; Gregory F. Kusic, individ-
ually and as attorney for the South 
Amboy Planning Board; Robert Lev-
ins, individually and as a member of 
the South Amboy Planning Board; An-
drew Markovich, individually and as a 
member of the South Amboy Planning 
Board; Michael Marrone, individually 
and as a member of the South Amboy 
Planning Board; Councilman Thomas 
O'Brien, individually and as a member 
of the South Amboy Planning Board; 
Edward CLeary, as Chief of Police of 
South Amboy; Madeline Purcell, indi-
vidually and as a member of the South 
Amboy Planning Board; Wilbur 
Schmidt, individually and as a member 
of the South Amboy Planning Board; 
and Frederick H. Kurtz, individually 
and as a Director of the Department of 
Engineering of the City of South Am-
boy and as Code Enforcement Officer 
of the City of South Amboy. 
No. 88-5511. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Third Circuit. 
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) 
Dec. 15, 1988. 
Decided Feb. 14, 1989. 
Property owner who sought to estab-
lish methodone-maintenance treatment cen-
ter brought civil rights action against mem-
bers of municipal planning board and mu-
nicipal code enforcement officer, alleging 
that they selectively enforced municipal 
parking regulations to prevent him from 
securing certificate of occupancy. Prior to 
completion of owner's presentation of his 
case, the United States District Court for 
the District of New Jersey, Charles R. 
Weiner, J., dismissed case involuntarily on 
grounds of absolute and qualified immuni-
ty. Property owner appealed. The Court 
of Appeals held that, although dismissal of 
complaint against members of board and 
their agents in their individual capacities 
was appropriate, complaint should not have 
been dismissed against members and their 
agents in their official capacities or against 
code enforcement officer. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Federal Courts <s=>755 
Even if district court's involuntary dis-
missal of civil rights complaint prior to 
plaintiffs complete presentation of his case 
on grounds of absolute immunity was ef-
fected without any notice to plaintiff, that 
decision was subject to appellate review 
because question of defendants' absolute 
immunity was quintessential^ legal. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Civil Rights $=>13.8(3) 
Members of New Jersey municipal 
planning board were absolutely immune, in 
their individual capacities, from suit under 
§ 1983 for alleged equal protection and 
First Amendment violations arising out of 
statutory site plan review. NJ.S.A. 
40:55D-25, subd. a(2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
3. Civil Rights e=>13.8(3) 
Absolute immunity of members of 
New Jersey municipal planning board in 
§ 1983 action arising out of site plan re-
view extended to board's legal counsel and 
board's consultant in their individual capac-
ities. NJ.S.A. 40:55D-25, subd. a(2); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983; U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
4. Civil Rights <S=>13.8(3) 
Members of New Jersey municipal 
planning board were not entitled to abso-
lute immunity in their official capacities in 
§ 1983 action because board, as govern-
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mental entity, had no immunity whatsoev-
er. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
5. Federal Courts <s=*701 
District courts involuntary dismissal 
of civil rights action before plaintiff had 
completed presentation of his case, on 
ground that one defendant was entitled to 
qualified immunity, was not reviewed on 
appeal and remand was necessary because 
record was devoid of any evidence support-
ing conclusion that qualified immunity was 
available. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Susan E. Champion, Hunziker, Merrey & 
Jones, P.A., Paterson, NJ., for appellant 
James B. Smith, Metuchen, NJ., for 
Gregory Kusic and Frederick Kurtz. 
John R. Lanza, Thatcher & Lanza, Flem-
ington, NJ., for Alice Christina, Robert 
Levins, Andrew Markovich, Michael Mar-
rone and Madeline Purcell. 
James B. Convery, Convery, Convery & 
Shihar, Metuchen, N.J., for Sylvester At-
tardi, J. Thomas Cross and Thomas 
O'Brien. 
Before: GIBBONS, Chief Judge, 
HUTCHINSON and HUNTER •, Circuit 
Judges. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
PER CURIAM: 
1. Once again, we return to the much-li-
tigated struggle between plaintiff-appellant 
Gerhard Bass ("Bass") and various defend-
ant-appellee officials of the city of South 
* Judge Hunter participated in the consideration 
of this appeal but died before the entry of judg-
ment. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982). 
1. When this claim arose, defendant-appellee Al-
ice Christina chaired the Planning Board. De-
fendant-appellee J. Thomas Cross was mayor of 
South Amboy and a member of the Planning 
Board. Defendant-appellee Thomas O'Brien 
was a member of the South Amboy City Council 
and the Planning Board. Defendants-appellees 
Sylvester Attardi, Robert Levins, Andrew Mar-
kovich, Michael Marrone, Madeline Purcell, and 
Wilbur Schmidt were all members of the Plan-
ning Board. When appropriate, we will refer to 
all th#*v defendants-appellees collectively as "the 
Amboy, New Jersey, over the establish-
ment of a methadone-maintenance treat-
ment center in South Amboy. Bass con-
tends that members of the South Amboy 
Planning Board ("Planning Board"),1 their 
agents,2 and the South Amboy Code En-
forcement Officer3 violated his rights to 
equal protection and freedom of speech by 
thwarting his efforts to establish a metha-
done-maintenance treatment center at 124 
Broadway, South Amboy.4 
2. In this appeal, Bass asks us to vacate 
an order finding defendant-appellee mem-
bers of the South Amboy Planning Board 
and their agents absolutely immune from 
Bass' action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (1982) and to vacate an order grant 
ing South Amboy Code Enforcement Offi-
cer Frederick Kurtz ("Kurtz") qualified im-
munity. As a procedural matter, Bass con-
tends that the district court erroneously 
entered judgment for the defendants prior 
to the completion of his case, thus imping-
ing on his right to due process. As a 
substantive matter, Bass contends that 
none of the defendants are entitled to any 
immunity. While we hesitate to affirm a 
judgment entered prior to the completion 
of a plaintiffs case, with regard to the 
Planning Board members and their agents 
in their individual capacities we will do so 
because they are absolutely immune as a 
matter of law. On the other hand, we will 
vacate the order to the extent it dismisses 
the complaint against the members of the 
Planning Board and their agents in their 
official capacity because the Planning 
Board itself has no immunity. We will also 
vacate the order in favor of Kurtz in light 
members of the Planning Board." The Planning 
Board itself is not a defendant in this action. 
2. When this claim arose, defendant-appellee 
Gregory F. Kusic was the legal counsel for the 
Planning Board and defendant-appellee H. 
Thomas Can* was a consultant to the Planning 
Board. 
3. When this claim arose, defendant-appellee 
Frederick H. Kurtz ("Kurtz") was the Code En-
forcement Officer of the city of South Amboy. 
4. The parties agreed to the dismissal of the 
complaint against defendant Edward O'Leary, 
Chief of Police of South Amboy. 
Cite at 868 F2d 
of the incomplete record to allow Bass to 
complete the presentation of his case and 
to allow both parties to complete the 
record. 
I. 
3. Bass began his efforts to secure per-
mits necessary to establish a methadone-
maintenance treatment center in South Am-
boy in May 1981. In November 1981, Bass 
sought a use variance for 124 Broadway 
from the South Amboy Board of Adjust-
ment The site in question was located in a 
B-l zone for which business and profes-
sional offices were permitted uses under 
the South Am>oy Zoning Code. The Board 
of Adjustment denied Bass' request on 
March 10, 1982. The Board of Adjustment 
relied on Amendment 1066 of the South 
Amboy Zoning Code adopted on July 16, 
1981, which regulated the location of treat-
ment facilities. 
4. Bass appealed the decision of the 
Board of Adjustment to the New Jersey 
Superior Court. On June 17, 1983, Judge 
Stroumtsos of the Law Division ruled from 
the bench that Bass' proposed facility fell 
within the definition of a professional of-
fice and hence was a permitted use in the 
B-l general business zone in which 124 
Broadway is located. Judge Stroumtsos 
also held that Amendment 1066 was not 
applicable to Bass' project. Judge 
Stroumtsos did not, however, direct Kurtz 
to issue a certificate of occupancy. In-
stead, he held that the proposed metha-
done-maintenance treatment center must 
meet the same requirements any other 
business would have to meet in order to 
operate in a B-l zone. On June 24, 1983, 
Judge Stroumtsos entered an order reflect-
ing his decision from the bench. 
5. On June 21, 1983, Bass* applied to 
Code Enforcement Officer Kurtz for a cer-
tificate of occupancy. Near the end of 
June 1983, Bass advised Kurtz that he had 
secured parking for five cars within lk 
block of 124 Broadway. As evidence, Bass 
submitted a copy of a money order evincing 
payment, although he did not include a 
copy of his lease. 
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6. %On June 29, 1983, Kurtz refused 
Bass' request for a certificate of occupancy 
because he did not have a copy of Judge 
Stroumtsos' opinion and because Bass had 
not secured site plan approval. On July 14, 
1983, Kurtz told Bass that sanitary, heat-
ing, and air conditioning facilities were 
"presently inadequate." On August 8, 
1983, Kurtz rejected Bass' parking plan 
and raised the issue of Bass' failure to 
comply with New Jersey's Barrier Free 
Design Regulations. During the period 
May 1981 to March 1983, however, Kurtz 
issued three other certificates of occupancy 
to businesses in the immediate vicinity of 
124 Broadway in the B-l zone. 
7. On August 15, 1983, Bass filed an 
application with the Planning Board re-
questing site plan approval and a parking 
variance. The Planning Board did not 
reach Bass' application at its September 
1983 meeting. The Planning Board took 
up Bass' application at its October meeting 
where it claimed that it was not bound by 
Bass' suit against the Board of Adjust-
ment Bass, accordingly, initiated yet an-
other suit in the New Jersey Superior 
Court. The same judge who had ruled 
against the Board of Adjustment held on 
November 16, 1983, that the Planning 
Board was bound by his prior ruling in the 
Board of Adjustment case. The Planning 
Board appealed. Notwithstanding the Su-
perior Court's decision, however, the Plan-
ning Board voted to table Bass' application 
at its November 21, 1983 meeting. 
8. On December 1, 1983, Bass filed this 
section 1983 suit in the District of New 
Jersey. His principal complaint was that 
the defendants were selectively enforcing 
municipal parking regulations, thus pre-
venting him from securing a certificate of 
occupancy for the methadone-maintenance 
treatment center. Bass sought a prelimi-
nary injunction ordering the defendants to 
issue him a certificate of occupancy, as 
well as damages. 
9. On February 16, 1984, the district 
court denied Bass' claim for immediate re 
lief. Bass appealed to this court. On No-
vember 13, 1984, for reasons having no 
bearing on this appeal, we reversed and 
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remanded in Bass v. Attardi 751 F.2d 875 
(3d Cir.1984) (mem. op.) [hereinafter Bass I]. 
10. Meanwhile, on January 25, 1984, 
February 20, 1984, and March 14, 1984, the 
Planning Board finally considered Bass' ap-
plication of August 1983. On March 14, 
1984, the Planning Board denied the appli-
cation. Bass appealed that decision to the 
City Council which upheld the Planning 
Board on July 9, 1984. Bass then appealed 
to the New Jersey Superior Court, which 
dismissed his complaint on April 9, 1987. 
11. In federal court, Bass' claim for 
damages proceeded toward trial from the 
time of our remand in Bass I to July 30, 
1987.6 The docket sheet states that on 
July 30, 1987, 'TRIAL WITHOUT JURY 
MOVED BEFORE THE [district court] IN 
PHILA., PA. Minutes of non-jury trial of 
7-30-87 . . . filed." Docket Entry #50. 
The transcript of that proceeding does not 
indicate whether Bass had completed the 
presentation of his case-in-chief by the end 
of the day.6 
12. Sometime on or before August 4, 
1987, the defendants moved to dismiss the 
suit on the grounds of qualified and/or 
absolute immunity, standing, and the ab-
sence of a case or controversy. The de-
fendants also asked the district court to 
abstain from hearing the case in light of 
pending litigation in the New Jersey state 
courts.7 
13. On January 22, 1988, the district 
court entered judgment for Planning Board 
members and their agents. According to 
the district court, the Planning Board was 
5. Prior to trial, Bass abandoned his injunctive 
claim. 
6. For example, the Pre-Trial Stipulation and 
Order indicates that Bass intended to call Kurtz 
as a witness. Docket Entry # 44 at 10. Kurtz 
did not testify on July 30, 1987, however. Dock-
et Entry #50 (Minutes of Proceeding). Trial 
counsel for Christina concluded the July 30, 
1987 proceeding by stating: "I would like an 
opportunity to confer with the judge if he could 
give us some time now regarding scheduling for 
next week." Docket Entry # 52 at 39 (transcript 
of proceeding). 
7. Unfortunately, we cannot find the actual mo-
tion to dismiss from any of the defendants in 
the district court record. On the other hand, 
Bass acknowledges that such a motion was 
made. We presume, therefore, that the motion 
a quasijudicial body; as such, its members 
and agents were absolutely immune from 
suit. The district court explicitly grounded 
its order on its power under Fed.R.Civ.P. 
41(b) (involuntary dismissal). The district 
court refused, however, to extend qualified 
immunity to Code Enforcement Officer 
Kurtz and scheduled the trial to reconvene 
on February 26, 1988. 
14. The trial never reconvened. On 
May 26, 1988, the district court entered 
judgment for defendant Kurtz on the 
ground that he was entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
15. On June 24, 1988, Bass timely filed 
this appeal. We have jurisdiction to review 
this final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292. 
II. 
16. Our review of the selection, inter-
pretation, and application of legal precepts 
is plenary. See Dent v. Cunningham, 786 
F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir.1986). 
III. 
[1] 17. As an initial matter we must 
address Bass' procedural objection. Bass 
claims that the district court entered judg-
ment for the defendants without permitting 
him to complete presentation of his case. 
The district court grounded its decision 
granting absolute immunity for the mem-
bers of the Planning Boai^ and their 
relied on the grounds indicated in the notice of 
motion in limine filed by counsel for defendants-
appellees Christina, Levins, Markovich, Mar-
rone, and Purcell. Docket Entry # 48. Counsel 
for those defendants certified that he delivered 
a copy of his notice to the chambers of the judge 
sitting by designation in New Jersey, but trying 
the case in Philadelphia, on July 30, 1987, the 
first day of trial. The time stamp on the notice 
and the docket sheet, on the other hand, indi-
cate that the notice was filed with the clerk in 
the District of New Jersey on August 4, 1987. 
Docket Entry # 48 at 3. We suspect, but need 
not resolve, that this five-day discrepancy arises 
from the fact that the judge hearing the case sits 
in Philadelphia, and the clerk for the district 
court is in Trenton, New Jersey. 
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agents and involuntarily dismissing Bass' 
complaint on Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). 
18. The second sentence of that rule 
states: 
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by 
the court without a jury, has completed 
the presentation of evidence, the de-
fendant, without waiving the right to of-
fer evidence in the event the motion is 
not granted, may move for a dismissal on 
the ground that upon the facts and the 
law the plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (emphasis added). The 
plain language of this sentence states that 
a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice 
is not ripe for disposition until the plaintiff 
has had an opportunity to present evi-
dence.8 Cognizant of the district court's 
inherent authority to dispose of its own 
caseload in a prompt and efficient manner, 
we have allowed a district court to termi-
nate an action under Rule 41(b) when the 
plaintiff acknowledged that it would be 
presenting no evidence of a nature abso-
lutely essential to its case. See Lentino v. 
Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 
474, 482 (3d Cir.1979). Thus in Lentino, 
the plaintiff was given an opportunity to 
present evidence; his case was properly 
terminated, because he failed to avail him-
self of the opportunity. Id. at 482.9 Our 
interpretation of Rule 41(b) in Lentino is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's more 
recent statement in Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), that a district court can 
sua sponte enter summary judgment. Key 
to Celotex is the requirement that the dis-
trict court put the losing party on notice to 
8. Of course, there is a difference between af-
fording a party the opportunity to "present" 
evidence under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) and "admit-
ting" the evidence pursuant to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. 
9. We explicitly admonished the district court, 
however: 
As a general rule, . . . we note that the interest 
of justice will be better served if involuntary 
dismissals for failure to show right to relief 
are not ordered until the close of plaintiffs' 
case. 
45 (3rd Clr. 1989) 
bring tforth evidence. Id. at 326, 106 S.Ct. 
at 2554. 
19. In this case, Bass complains that he 
was not afforded the opportunity available 
in Lentino because the district court termi-
nated the case against the Planning Board 
members and their agents without inform-
ing Bass of its intention to do so. For the 
purpose of this discussion, we will accept 
Bass' assertion as true. Nonetheless, we 
can review the district court's decision be-
cause the question of whether the members 
of the Planning Board and their agents in 
their individual capacities acting within the 
scope of their authority are entitled to ab-
solute immunity is a quintessentially legal 
question.10 In contrast to Lentino, where 
the plaintiff was afforded the opportunity 
to present evidence and none was forth-
coming, in this case, there is no evidence 
Bass can present that will disturb our reso-
lution of this legal question. 
IV. 
20. We turn then to the substantive 
question—are the members of the Planning 
Board and their agents acting within the 
scope of their authority in their individual 
and official capacities entitled to absolute 
immunity? To answer this question, we 
must look to the governmental function 
performed by the defendants. See Forres-
ter v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 
542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); Lake Country 
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 n. 30, 99 S.Ct. 
1171, 1179 n. 30, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979). 
[2] 21. In Jodeco, Inc. v. Hann, 674 
F.Supp. 488 (D.N.J., 1987), Judge Brotman 
painstakingly addressed this very issue as 
Lentino, 611 F.2d at 482 n. 15. That admonition 
is no less true today. 
10. Contrary to Bass' assertions, the fact that the 
members of the Planning Board may have tar-
ried with Bass' application does not put their 
actions outside the scope of their authority. 
The Planning Board had 45 days to act upon 
Bass' application or else run the risk of having 
Bass' application deemed automatically ap-
proved, unless the Planning Board could subse-
quently show that Bass' application was incom-
plete. See N.J. Stat.Ann. § 40:55D-50(b) (West 
Supp.1988). 
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it relates to the members of the Planning 
Board acting within the scope of their au-
thority. Although the existence of an ab-
solute immunity to a section 1983 action is 
a question of federal, not state law, Judge 
Brotman turned to the statutorily-defined 
powers of planning boards in New Jersey 
and the decisions of the New Jersey courts 
in ascertaining the governmental functions 
performed by members of planning boards 
in New Jersey. Judge Brotman concluded 
that "the duties of planning . . . board 
members in the state of New Jersey are so 
integrally related to the judicial process as 
to warrant shielding from liability those 
individuals acting in performance of them." 
Id. at 496. 
22. We need not retravel the path fol-
lowed by Judge Brotman to simply say we 
agree.11 We therefore conclude that mem-
bers of municipal planning boards in New 
Jersey are absolutely immune in their indi-
vidual capacities from damage actions 
11. In Anastasio v. Planning Board, 209 NJ.Su-
per. 499. 507 A.2d 1194, certification denied, 107 
NJ. 46, 526 A.2d 136 (1986), Judge Greenberg, 
now of this court, noted an additional im-
portant public policy argument supporting our 
conclusion and that of Judge Brotman: 
We think that the public interest requires that 
persons serving on planning boards consider-
ing applications for development act with in-
dependence and without fear that developers, 
who will frequently have significant financial 
resources and the ability to litigate, not bring 
them into court. The possibility of facing 
expensive and aggravating litigation as a re-
sult of making a decision on an application 
for development may in a subtle way impact 
on the decision making process. 
Id at 526, 507 A.2d at 1208. 
12. To foresta)) any confusion regarding the 
members of the Planning Board, we use this 
note to tie up two loose ends. First, defendant 
Cross was formally sued in his dual capacities 
as mayor of South Amboy and as a member of 
the Planning Board. In Aitchison v. Raffiani, 
708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.1983), we noted that a may-
or can act in a nonexecutive capacity, thus enti-
tling him to absolute immunity. Id at 99. This 
litigation has proceeded solely on the theory 
that Cross' liability arises from his role as a 
member of the Planning Board. We therefore 
find it unnecessary to remand this case for 
consideration of whether Cross is only entitled 
to qualified immunity. 
Second, counsel for defendants Kusic and 
Kurtz ("Counsel") purports to continue to repre-
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleg-
ing equal protection and first amendment 
violations arising out of site plan review 
conducted pursuant to NJ.Stat.Ann. 
§ 40:55D-25(a)(2) (West Supp.1988). Con-
sequently, we will affirm the district 
court's order to the extent it relates to the 
members of the Planning Board in their 
individual capacities.12 
[3] 23. We must also consider whether 
the absolute immunity of the members of 
the Planning Board extends to their agents 
acting in their individual capacities. By 
New Jersey statute, a planning board.is 
empowered to employ counsel and experts 
"as it may deem necessary." NJ.Stat.Ann 
§ 40:55D-24 (West Supp.1988). In Aitchi-
son v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.1983), 
we held that absolute immunity accorded to 
the members of a municipal council extend-
ed to their attorney "because the borough 
attorney was acting in direct assistance of 
[the activity] entitled to absolute immuni-
sent defendant Can* in this appeal. Carr, as 
well as defendant Schmidt, evidently died dur-
ing the pendency of this litigation, more than 
three months prior to the district court's entry 
of the final order. Counsel filed separate pur-
ported suggestions of death for Can* and 
Schmidt upon which the district court failed to 
act In his submission to us, Counsel contends 
that the district court erred in failing to dismiss 
the complaint against Can: because Can* died 
and Bass failed to substitute Carr's representa-
tive or successor. 
Counsel's argument is flawed. First, Coun-
sel's attorney-client relationship with Can-
ceased at Carr's death. See United States v. 
Dwyer, 855 R2d 144, 145 (3d Cir.1988) (per 
curiam) (relying on agency principles); Chera-
mie v. Orgeron, 434 F2d 721, 724-25 (5th Cir. 
1970) (authority of defense counsel for group of 
defendants terminated as to one defendant upon 
death of that defendant to avoid conflicts of 
interest). Counsel thus lacks standing to act on 
behalf of Can* in this appeal. Second, the sug-
gestion of death in the cases of both Can* and 
Schmidt was deficient because the suggestion 
was not served on the decedents' successors or 
representatives as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 
25(a)(1). See Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986 
(D.C.Cir.1969) (expressing concern that dece-
dent's "counsel" would, as a tactical matter, file 
a suggestion of death and thus unfairly shift the 
burden to the plaintiffs to locate the decedent's 
successor or representative in 90 days). Conse-
quently, we do not list Counsel as "representing" 
Carr in the caption of this opinion, although we 
will affirm the judgments in favor of both Carr 
and Schmidt in their individual capacities. 
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ty." /<£ at 99-100. The rule in Aitchison 
is equally applicable to this case where 
Kusic, the Planning Board's legal counsel, 
and Carr, the Planning Board's consultant, 
were acting in their dealings with Bass on 
behalf of the members of the Planning 
Board. Accordingly, we will also affirm 
the order finding Kusic and Carr entitled to 
absolute immunity in their individual capac-
ities as agents of the members of the Plan-
ning Board. 
[4] 24. We cannot, however, affirm 
the district court's order dismissing the 
suit against the members of the Planning 
Board and their agents in their official 
capacity. The Supreme Court has stated: 
Official-capacity suits . . . "generally rep-
resent only another way of pleading an 
action against an entity of which an offi-
cer is an agent." As long as the govern-
ment entity receives notice and an oppor-
tunity to respond, an official-capacity 
suit is, in all respects other than name, to 
be treated as a suit against the entity. 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-
66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104-05, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 
(1985) (citations omitted). Thus in this 
case, the suit naming the members of the 
Planning Board in their official capacities 
in effect makes the Planning Board a de-
fendant. The Planning Board as a govern-
mental entity has no immunity whatsoever. 
See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 
U.S. 622, 657, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1418 (1980) 
(no immunity for municipality); Aitchison, 
708 F.2d at 100 (absolute immunity of indi-
vidual defendants does not preclude liabili-
ty of municipality); Jodeco, 674 F.Supp. at 
499 (planning board in New Jersey has no 
immunity). Consequently, we will vacate 
the order dismissing the suit against the 
members of the Planning Board and their 
agents in their official capacities. 
V. 
[5] 25. We turn next to the procedural 
context in which the district court ruled 
that Kurtz, the Code Enforcement Officer, 
is entitled to qualified immunity. Bass con-
13. A transcript of that deposition was included 
in Bass' appendix but does not appear in the 
45 (3rdClr. 1989) 
tends again that he was not given warning 
by the trial judge that he intended to enter 
summary judgment in favor of Kurtz. The 
district court's opinion relies heavily on a 
purported deposition given by Kurtz.13 Ac-
cording to the district court: 
While we find some element of purpose-
fulness in Kurtz's application of the 
parking ordinance to Bass' methadone 
clinic we also find that Kurtz had other 
nondiscriminatory bases for denying a 
certificate of occupancy. 
Memorandum Opinion of May 19, 1988. 
26. In contrast to the purely legal ques-
tion of absolute immunity, Kurtz' entitle-
ment to qualified immunity has a quasifac-
tual component. "[W]hether an official 
protected by qualified immunity may be 
held personally liable for an alleged unlaw-
ful official action generally turns on the 
'objective legal reasonableness' of the ac-
tion, assessed in light of the legal rules 
that were 'clearly established' at the time it 
was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 
523 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738-39, 
73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). We have held that 
for a right to be "clearly established," 
there must be "some, but not precise, fac-
tual correspondence" between the case at 
hand and prior decisions. See People of 
Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir.1984). 
27. Our ability to review the district 
court's analysis of this "factual correspon-
dence" is limited to the district record as 
we find it. "It is, of course, black letter 
law that a United States court of appeals 
may not consider material or purported evi-
dence which was not brought upon the 
record in the trial court." United States 
ex rel. Bradshaw v. Alldredge, 432 F.2d 
1248, 1250 (3d Cir.1970). 
28. In this case, the district court record 
is totally devoid of any papers other than 
the decision explaining why it believed that 
Kurtz was entitled to qualified immunity. 
Consequently, we cannot determine wheth-
district court record. 
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er Kurtz was entitled to qualified immuni-
ty. The fact that this evidence may exist, 
but the parties failed to file it with the 
clerk, does not help us now. 
29. The sparsity of the record also 
makes it impossible for us to determine 
whether Bass was afforded the opportunity 
to present his case to the extent required 
by Lentino.14 That shortcoming, in tan-
dem with the questions posed by the claim 
of qualified immunity, suggests that we 
stay our hand.15 We therefore decline to 
address whether the district court properly 
afforded Kurtz qualified immunity and re-
mand the case against Kurtz to the district 
court.16 
VI. 
30. For the foregoing reasons, we will 
affirm the district court's order of January 
21,1988 to the extent that the district court 
dismissed the complaint against the mem-
bers of the Planning Board and their 
agents in their individual capacities based 
on their absolute immunity. We will va-
cate that order, however, to the extent that 
the district court dismissed the complaint 
against the members of the Planning 
Board and their agents in their official 
capacities. In addition, we will vacate the 
order of May 19, 1988, in which the district 
court dismissed the complaint against Code 
Enforcement Officer Kurtz and remand the 
case against him to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
( o | «Y NUMBER SYSTEM> 
14. For that same reason, we decline to consider 
the arguments summarily advanced by Kurtz in 
defense of the judgment in his favor. For exam-
ple, Kurtz claims that Bass is barred by res 
judicata; we cannot, however, determine wheth-
er Kurtz was even named as a defendant in the 
state court suit Kurtz refers to in his submission 
to this court. See Charlie Brown of Chatham, 
Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 202 N.J.Super. 312, 
327, 495 A.2d 119, 127 (A.D.1985) (identity of 
parties is element of res judicata). 
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Reinsurer moved to confirm arbitra-
tion awards in a dispute between the rein-
surer and its re-reinsurers about retroces-
sion agreements. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, James McGirr Kelly, J., con-
firmed the award and denied the re-reinsur-
ers' motion to alter or amend the order. 
Re-reinsurers appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Seitz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
the arbitrators did not exceed their authori-
ty in reducing the re-reinsurers' partic-
ipation in the agreement by 10.8% for each 
underwriting year, rather than rescinding 
the agreements for improperly ceded risks, 
and (2) the re-reinsurers failed to demon-
strate that they were prejudiced by alleged 
ex parte contacts between the arbitrators 
and a representative of the reinsurer. 
Orders affirmed. 
15. Because both these issues concern us, we 
decline to exercise our authority under Fed.R. 
App. P. 10(e) to correct the record. 
16. Nothing in our decision today precludes 
Kurtz from immediately completing the record 
and moving for summary judgment on remand, 
if appropriate. Bass then will have notice and 
an opportunity to respond. Bass' opportunity to 
respond does not require oral argument, unless 
the district court requests it. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
78. 
D. National Labor Relations Board v. International Measurement 
and Control Company, 978 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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We reverse the district court's order and 
hold that the Retirement Board cannot be 
compelled to grant full retroactive seniority 
benefits to the plaintiffs without receiving 
full contributions from either the plaintiffs, 
or the City on their behalf. On remand, 
the district court must determine which 
party is required to provide the additional 
contributions under the consent decree. 
The court must then address whether that 
party may be equitably required to pay 
those contributions. If not, the court 
should first consider whether it can resolve 
the issue by modifying the consent decree. 
If it is unable to do so, the court may 
vacate the decree and then determine, in a 
subsequent damages trial, the amount of 
back pay and seniority credits that the City 
owes the plaintiffs in order to remedy its 
previous discrimination against them.' -The 
City clearly must provide plaintiffs, with 
the amount of back pay and seniority credit 
necessary to make them whole.. If the, 
consent decree is vacated the district court 
must determine the total amount and distri-
bution of damages owed by the City, 
whether that amount is $9 million, $10.5 
million, or some other amount, not just 
which party must pay the $1.5 million at 
issue in this appeal. Alternatively, - the 
court may permit the parties to draw up a 
new consent decree. 
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der imposing its unfair labor practices 
award previously ordered against allegedly 
liquidated employer on affiliated business 
entities and individuals. The Court of Ap-
, peals, Easterbrook, J., held that: (1) NLRB 
* > could properly award interest on its previ-
[c  ous back pay award; (2) pursuant to Illi-
ia
' nois Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
*
e
- claims could be satisfied from assets of 
iat
 family members; and (3) evidence sup-
a y ported finding that owners used their three 
l r t
 corporations and two partnerships to oper-
v e
 ate different aspects of one electronic-con-
*
e
- trols enterprise, having single pool of em-
a y ployees to whom they applied single labor-
1 
 relations policy, and, thus, supported 




h e Enforced. 
th 
lit 
h e 1. Interest *»21 
trt National Labor Relations BoarjJ 
ri- (NLRB) could properly award interest 
y , against individuals and entities which were 
>.5 related to employer on an unfair labor prac-
ist tices award for back pay, even though in-
at terest had been mounting for almost ten 
he years; fact that almost ten years had 
a passed was a reason to award interest, not 
to deny it 
2. Labor Relations $=>514 
National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) did not act too Jate when it added 
individuals and other firms and partner-
ships in unfair labor practices proceeding 
involving employer; there was no need to 
add the individuals and the other firms and 
partnerships until firm that was properly 
named as the employer was liquidated. 
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1 et seq., 
10(b), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et 
seq., 160(b). 
3. Corporations <s=>254 
Supplemental proceedings to recover 
from distributees are normal under state 
law and appropriate in labor law. 
4. Labor Relations <$=>514 
>o~+«oi*cV»inc thrpp oomora-
gle employer, then notice to one that it was 
being added to proceeding to enforce unfair 
labor practices back pay award was notice 
to all. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1 
et seq., 10(b), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 151 et seq., 160(b). 
5. Labor Relations <S=>687 
Court of Appeals would not remand to 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
for new hearing on basis that administra-
tive law judge (AU) had discussed fact 
that an individual defendant in unfair labor 
practices action might be a security prob-
lem at hearing; there was no evidence that 
the NLRB was aware of, let alone influ-
enced by, the ALTs discussion. National 
Labor Relations Act, § 10(e), as amended, 
29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e). 
6. Corporations <S=>542(1) 
Pursuant to Illinois Uniform Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act, claims of employees 
against whom employer had committed un-
fair labor practice could be satisfied from 
assets of family members to whom the 
family business' assets had been distribut-
ed. I11.S.H.A. ch. 59, 1111101-112, 103(a), 
lfoVhV 
7; Labor Relations «=»510 
National Labor Relations' Board 
ftfLRB) does not have superintendence 
WSr how corporations under common own-
ership arrange their relations. 
8. Labor Relations <3=*394 
Evidence failed to support National La-
bor Relations Board's (NLRB) finding that 
corporations and partnerships which had 
same owners could be held liable for unfair 
labor practices of one of the corporations 
on theory that they cooperated in produc-
tion and sale of electronic devices; mere 
fact that the entities all were in same line 
of business was not sufficient to hold the 
entities responsible for each others debts. 
9, Corporations e=>1.6(3) 
Affiliated firm cannot be held liable for 
each other's obligations to workers merely 
on basis that they are affiliated. 
10. Labor Relations <3=>555 
Evidence supported finding that own-
ers used their three corporations and two 
partnerships to operate different aspects of 
one electronic-controls enterprise, having 
single pool of employees to whom they 
applied single labor-relations policy, and, 
thus, supported National Labor Relations 
Board's (NLRB) finding that there was sin-
gle employer, and NLRB could enforce un-
fair labor practices award against all the 
corporations and partnerships. National 
Labor Relations Act, § 8(a), as amended, 29 
ILS.C.A.-§ 158(a). 
11. Labor Relations <s=>394 
There is no requirement that firms 
have employees to be part of single em-
ployer, but, rather, it is enough that they 
be part of common enterprise with common 
labor policy. National Labor Relations 
Act, § 8(a), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 158(a), 
Elizabeth Kinney, N.L.R.B., Region 13, 
Chicagor 111., Aileen A. Armstrong, William 
A. Baudler (argued), N.L.R.B., Appellate 
Court, Enforcement Litigation, Paul J. 
Spielberg, N.L.R.B., Litigation Branch. 
Washington; D.C.; for petitioner. 
Michael H. Moirano (argued), Kristen E. 
Crisp, Nisen & Elliott, Dennis R. Schlem-
mer, Leydig, Voit & Mayer, Chicago, 111., 
for respondents. 
Before CUDAHY and EASTERBROOK, 
Circuit Judges, and LEE, District Judge.* 
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. 
For more than twelve years the Dybel 
family business has avoided its obligations 
under the labor laws. Now it contends 
that the wronged employees cannot receive 
their remedy, because while it waged a 
rear guard action before the Board and this 
court, the corporation that had employed 
these persons distributed its assets to fami-
ly members. It even contends that its abili-
ty to string out the process is an indepen-
dent bar to enforcement. Unfazed, the 
* Hon, William C. Lee, of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation. 
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Board ordered the Dybels to pay personal-
ly. So they must 
In 1980 the International Measurement 
and Control Company ("Manufacturing"}— 
which made electronic controls and trans-
ducers invented by Frank and William Dy-
bel—fired three employees who joined a 
union and complained about working condi-
tions. One employee believed that the cat 
excrement the Dybels allowed to accumu-* 
late in the plant was making her ill. The 
Dybels closed the plant to clean it, falsely 
telling their workers that the health depart-
ment had directed this, and on reopening 
the facility did not recall the union support-
ers. In 1982 the Board concluded that in 
doing these things Manufacturing commit-
ted an unfair labor practice and must'make 
the employees whole, a remedy that in-
cludes back pay. 261 NXJ8LB71323 (1982). 
(One of the Dybels testified at the Board's 
hearing that he viewed union organizing as 
"horseshit" Wrong sentiment, wrong set-
ting, wrong species.) 
Manufacturing neither complied nor 
sought judicial review but waited for the 
Board to apply for enforcement. When it 
did so, we enforced the order without pub-
lished opinion. 732 F.2d 158 (7th Cir.l984>. 
Manufacturing next waited for the Board 
to calculate the amount of back pay that 
was due for the period before it offered 
reinstatement. In 1985 the Board fixed 
this at a little less than $50,000, plus inter-
est. 277 N.L.R.B. 962 (1985). Once again, 
Manufacturing neither complied nor sought 
judicial review but waited for the Board to 
apply for enforcement. When it did so, we 
enforced the order without published opin-
ion. 808 F.2d 837 (7th Cir.1986). 
Manufacturing did not comply with our 
order, contending that the cupboard was 
bare. In November 1984 Manufacturing 
began selling its assets and turning the 
proceeds over to members of the Dybel 
family. The process was completed in Sep-
tember 1985 (shortly before the Board's 
second order). All of these payments, 
Manufacturing contends, were on account 
of accumulated salary obligations rather 
ey, and it had deferred executive compensa-
tion. Even after liquidating all of its as-
sets, Manufacturing contends, it had not 
satisfied the debt to its managers. 
Although Manufacturing shut down, the 
Dybels continued to sell their products. 
They subcontracted the manufacture of the 
devices (Manufacturing's role in the busi-
ness) while two other corporations and two 
partnerships carried on: IMCO Sales Co. 
assembled and sold the devices; IMCO Ser-
vice Co. installed and repaired the devices; 
Zoe Enterprises owned and leased the 
premises to these two firms; Dybel Enter-
prises provided capital for these three. 
[1] Not satisfied with Manufacturing's 
explanation, the Board opened supplemen-
tal proceedings and concluded that "the 
manner in which [Manufacturing]^ assetsr 
were distributed among the other entities* 
and the individual Dybels demonstrates in-
tent to avoid backpay obligations/^ 304 
NX.R.B. No. 94 at 7-8 (1991). J t conclude^ 
that the four remaining t)ybel businesses 
and Manufacturing were a single entity, on 
a variety of theories—common employer, 
alter ego, corporate group liability—and 
that all four, plus Frank, Margaret, Wil-
liam, and Palette Dybel personally, are re-
sponsible for the back pay obligation; 
which with interest still mounting exceeds 
$130,000. For a third time, the Dybels 
neither complied nor sought judicial review 
but waited for the Board to apply for en-
forcement It has done.-so. 
Calling the interest "an enormous wind-
fall", the Dybels say that enforcing the 
award against them personally is "Funda-
mentally Unfair." That takes nerve! They 
(or their corporate creatures) could have 
paid a decade ago and cut short the accu-
mulation of interest. Interest is not some 
kind of penalty. "Prejudgment interest is 
an element of complete compensation". 
West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 
305, 310, 107 S.Ct. 702, 706, 93 L.Ed.2d 639 
(1987). See also, e.g., General Motors 
Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655-56, 
103 S.Ct 2058, 2062, 76 L.Ed.2d 211 (1983). 
It reimburses victims for the time value of 
mnnpv thp benefit of which the workers 
tion. "[T]he passage of time .. . is a rea-
son to award interest, not to deny it." In 
re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 
1279, 1334 (7th Cir.1992). Cf. NLRB v. 
Ironworkers, 466 U.S. 720, 104 S.Ct 2081, 
80 L.Ed.2d 715 (1984) (long administrative 
delay, while back pay accumulates, does 
not prevent enforcement of the Board's 
award); NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Manu-
facturing Co., 396 U.S. 258, 90 S.Ct. 417, 
24 L.Ed.2d 405 (1969) (same). The funds 
.the Dybels withdrew from Manufacturing 
have been earning a return for them since 
J984 and 1985, or, equivalently, have en-
abled the Dybels to avoid the interest they 
itfould have had to pay to borrow the same 
amount. Meanwhile the wronged employ-
ees have lacked funds that they could have 
^vested (or that would have enabled them 
to avoid the expense of borrowing). The 
Return on the money belongs to the victim, 
not the wrongdoer, and interest is the 
means by which this transfer is accom-
plished. 
[2-4] No more persuasive is the Dybels' 
contention that the Board acted too late— -
that is, beyond the six months that § 10(b) 
M the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), allows for 
^charge—in adding them, and their other 
f^rmtf and partnerehips, as parties. There 
rwaSlno need to dcT so until they liquidated 
tfie firm that' was properly named as the 
employer. Supplemental proceedings to re-
cover from the distributees are normal un-
4$r state law and entirely appropriate in 
labor law. NLRB v. C.C.C. Associates, 
fyc, 306 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.1962). See 
also, e.g., G & M Lath Plaster Co., 252 
N.L.R.B. 969, 978 (1980), enforced, 670 F.2d 
550 (5th Cir.1982). If, as the Board found, 
the two partnerships, three corporations, 
and four Dybels are but a single employer, 
then notice to one was notice to all. NLRB 
v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402, 
§0 S.Ct. 441, 443, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960). Cf. 
Central States Pension Fund v. Slotky, 
956 F.2d 1369, 1375 (7th Cir.1992). And if 
they are not, then everyone other than the 
defunct Manufacturing prevails without re-
gard to § 10(b). Either way, § 10(b) plays 
no role in the outcome. 
[5] Having told us that the Board took 
too long, the respondents also tell us that 
we should defer enforcement while the 
Board conducts a fourth hearing. The ad-
ministrative law judge heard a member of 
the NLRB's staff remark that Frank Dybel 
possesses firearms and had in the past 
made a threat of violence, a subject that 
acquired significance in light of an anony-
mous call stating that there might be a 
"security problem" at the hearing. Coun-
sel and the ALJ discussed the phone call on 
the record at the start of the hearing. La-
ter the ALT granted a motion to strike the 
dialog and said that she would attempt to 
prevent the Board from receiving a copy of 
the interchange. 
Administrative judges can't rip pages out 
of transcripts, so the Board received the 
full proceedings of the hearing. Claiming 
that they learned this only recently, the 
respondents ask us to remand for a new 
decision at which the Board will be igno-
rant of the subject. Just how ignorance 
can be achieved—short of waiting for a 
new_ complement of members to take of-
fice—the respondents do not say. Nothing 
in the Board's opinion suggests that its 
members were, aware *of, let alone influ-
enced byf the contretemps. So there was 
no prejudice. A remand, with instructions 
to ignore something the members probably 
did not know in the first place, would back-, 
fire. It would be like remanding a case 
with instructions that none of the members 
of the Board think about Greenland any-
time during the next month. The nature of 
the order would ensure its violation. At all 
events, the record shows that a copy of the 
transcript, including the pages that respon-
dents say are not supposed to be there, was 
mailed to them in January 1990, and they 
did nothing to alert the General Counsel to 
this supposed "violation" of the ALJ's or-
der. They did not raise the subject at all 
before the Board, or in this court until 
April 1992. Such delay by persons who 
accuse the Board of taking too much time 
is imprudent. See also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) 
(precluding court from considering issues 
not presented to Board, save in exceptional 
circumstances). 
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[6] Must the Dybels pay Manufacture aggregating $350,000 a year but had paid 
imj's debt to the three employees? The them nothing sjnce 1981. By mid-1984 the 
Board devoted a page and a half to this debt to the Dybels approximated $600,000. 
question, citing two of its own opinions and Between July 1984 and the end of 1985, 
no statutes or cases. Although it used the Manufacturing sold all of its assets and 
jargon of shareholders' liability ("piercing paid the proceeds (or delivered the assets), 
the corporate veil" and so on), the extent to worth $221,000 in all, to the Dybels. This 
which investors are responsible for the cor* is their own reckoning, by which Manufac-
porate debts is a question of state law—foj- turing was insolvent in both 1984 and 1985. 
the National Labor Relations Act regulates
 A creditor aggrieved by a fraudulent 
employers, not shareholders or creditors.
 c o n v e y a n c e m a y a v oid that transfer, re-
State law has something to say about the
 qujrjng the preferred creditors to refund 
liability of investors who withdraw funds
 t h e m o n e y to the debtor. If 108(a)(1). Al-
from a corporation in order to avoid paying ternatively, "[i]f a creditor has obtained a 
its debts, but this comes under the heading judgment on a claim against the debtor, the 
of fraudulent conveyances rather than
 creditor, if the court so orders, may levy 
"veil piercing." The Board's reasoning
 exeCution on the asset transferred or its 
concentrated on the transfer, so although it
 pr0ceeds." H 108(b). The NLRB, acting as 
did not invoke the proper body of rules, it
 a c o u r t for this purpose, used the latter 
wocatf be pointless to remand for the pa*
 approach, and quite proper/y^ Manufactur-
pose of patching up the opinion.
 i n g distributed to its insiders assets, includ-
Manufacturing was incorporated in Illi- ing two yachts, a condominium, and several 
nois, which ' has adopted the Uniform cars* worth three times^Uie competing cred-
Fraudulent Transfer Act. IH.Rev.Stat. ch. iters' claims. The Dybels received $221.-
59 MI 101-12. Section 6(b) of the Act 000 in 1984 dollars; the three creditor em--
(11106(b) in Illinois) provides: "A transfer ployees' claims were worth approximately 
made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a $70,000 in 1984 dollars. Accordingly, the 
creditor whose claim arose before the claims may be satisfied from the Dybels' 
transfer was made if the transfer was assets.* 
made to an insider for an antecedent debt, Execution may be complicated by Frank 
the debtor was insolvent at that time, and D y D e ] ' s death. In February 1992 respon-
s e insider had reasonable cause to believe
 dents filed a notice of his death, Fed 
that the debtor was insolvent." This rule
 R . A p p . p . 43(a), but did not identify or sub-
fits our case like a glove. Manufacturing
 s t i t u t e t h e administrator of his estate or his 
paid off debts to its insiders (past-due personal representative despite the Board's 
wages are debts) at a time when it was
 r e quest Actions to recover fraudulent 
insolvent, and the insiders knew i t Re- conveyances survive the preferred credi-
spondents' brief in this court proclaims the
 tor>s death. Frank Dybel's successor 
insolvency of the firm, as if that justified
 s e e m s ^ devoted as he was to a policy of 
preferential payments to the managers, passive resistance to the Board. Rule 43(a) 
According to § 3(a), "[a] debtor is insolvent provides, among other things, that "substi-
if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater tution shall be effected in the court of 
than all of the debtor's assets at a fair appeals in accordance with this subdivi-
valuation." Respondents insist that Manu-
 s j o n . " Any suggestion of death filed under 
factoring ceased operations in July 1984 Ruie 43(a) in a case that does not abate on 
because of declining sales and increasing death should identify the successor in inter-
costs. Manufacturing says that it had est. We direct respondents to identify 
promised to pay the four Dybels salaries within seven days the administrator of 
fThe Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act became 
effective in Illinois at the beginning of 1990, 
~f.„.. ,h* rwhels drained Manufacturing of as-
ch. 59 <"4. The Board made such a finding, 
which we quoted in the text, so that the change 
of law does not matter and we need not decide 
Frank Dybel's estate or equivalent repre-
sentative, who shall be substituted and 
bound by our judgment enforcing the 
Board's order. Cf. McSurely v. McClel-
Ian, 753 F.2d 88, 97-99 (D.C.Cir.1985). 
[7] Remaining for discussion is the 
Board's order that IMCO Sales, IMCO Ser-
vice, Zoe Enterprises, and Dybel Enterpris-
es, also are liable for the back pay. The 
Board threw the book at these four enti-
ties—the hornbook, that is. The Board's 
opinion is filled with blackletter terms such 
as alter ego and piercing the corporate veil. 
If the firms really are alter egos, then the 
surviving entities are liable for all of Man-
ufacturing's debts, not just its obligations 
under the labor laws. Once more, howev-
er, the NLRB 'neglects to identify the 
source of law. The Board cited four of its 
own cases and nothing else. Nary an Illi-
nois opinion is to be found. Although this 
might be appropriate if it were enforcing 
simple provisions of federal statutes, the-
Board does not quote or even refer to any 
statute. Nothing in the Board's portfolio 
gives it superintendence over how corpora-
tions under common ownership arrange 
theg relations, Cf. United States v. Kim-
"^'foods, Inc., 440 IJ.S. 715, 99 S.Ct 
$£>59 L.Ed.2d 7U (1979) (holding thatj> 
tjje absence of a federal statute displacing 
i t state law supplies the legal rules even 
xphen the obligation runs directly to the 
tlnited States). Although we do not rule 
out the possibility that the NLRB could 
create a federal common law of corporate 
groups, see Wilson McLeod, Shareholders9 
Liability and Workers* Rights: Piercing 
the Corporate Veil Under Federal Labor 
Law, 9 Hofstra Lab.LJ. 115 (1991) (argu-
ing that this is appropriate), the Board has 
not tried to do so. Its enduring disregard 
of the choice-of-law question, see Esmark, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 755 n. 26 (7th 
Cir.1989), does not permit a court to defer 
to its non-resolution. 
[8] The Board's principal theory is that 
the four Dybel entities cooperated in the 
production and sale of the electronic de-
vices: Manufacturing made them, Sales 
sold them, Service serviced them, Zoe 
owned the building, and Dybel Enterprises 
put up the dough. After Manufacturing 
folded, the Dybels contracted for the manu-
facture of the controls and went on selling 
them. Yet no state of which we are 
aware—and certainly not Illinois—holds 
members of brother-sister groups responsi-
ble for each other's debts just because they 
are in the same line of business. See Phil-
lip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate 
Groups § 8.03 (1987). States require 
more, such as systematic disregard of the 
corporate form or arranging one's affairs 
to deceive creditors. SeaLand Services, 
Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th 
Cir.1991) (Illinois law); see also, e.g., Per-
petual Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Mi-
chaelson Properties Inc., 974 F.2d 545 (4th 
Cir.1992) (Virginia law); Walkovszky v. 
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 
223 N.E.2d 6 (1966). If shareholders exer-
cise control over a group of related corpo-
rations "in disregard of the separate corpo-
rate identity" of these firms, Esmark, 887 
F.2d at 759, the Board may consider all to 
be one; we held in Esmark, however, that 
an investor's (or parent's) participation in 
.the management of a firm is not the same 
as disregarding the corporate form and 
does not permit the Board to lump all of 
the affiliated firms into a single enterprise. 
Id. at 760. 
[9] The Dybels did not form IMCO 
Sales, IMCO Service, and the two partner-
ships to evade the labor laws. All four 
entities predated the first efforts to orga-
nize the employees. None of the employ-
ees was defrauded about the identity of his 
employer. There was no shell game; Man-
ufacturing's assets were bailed out to the 
Dybels, not to other family corporations. 
(Dybel Enterprises bought some assets 
from Manufacturing, which distributed the 
cash to the Dybels, but the Board does not 
contend that the partnership disregarded 
Manufacturing's separate existence or paid 
less than fair market value.) The Board's 
observation that the corporations and part-
nerships "employ the same accounting firm 
and bank at the same institutions" hardly 
aids its cause. Under what legal rule does 
holding an account at the same bank as a 
sibling corporation justify ignoring the cor-
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porate form? "[T]he Board may not disre-
gard settled principles of corporate law." 
Esmark, 887 F.2d at 753. Dwelling on 
such common, and irrelevant, particulars 
reinforces the impression that the Board 
has tossed corporate law out the window 
and wants to hold all affiliated firms re-
sponsible for each other's obligations to 
workers. We forbade such an approach in 
Esmark, a case the Board did not trouble 
to cite or distinguish. (Of course it was 
not discriminating against Esmark; it did 
not rely on, distinguish, criticize, or other-
wise address, a single opinion of any state 
or federal court.) 
[10] Nonetheless, the Board invoked a 
genuinely federal theory of liability to em-
ployees, a theory sufficient in these circum-
stances to support its order. Section 8(a)* 
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), lists adts 
that are unfair labor practices "for an em-
ployer". What is the "employer",for this 
purpose? Presumptively the corporation 
that writes the paychecks. But perhaps 
the "employer" is he who calls the tune, 
and not just whoever pays the piper. ,Por 
decades the Board has treated the enter-
prise with effective direction over labor 
relations as the "employer," and the Su-
preme Court has referred approvingly io 
both the "joint employer" and the "single 
employer" variants of this doctrine. E.g., 
Radio & Television Broadcast Techni-
cians v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 
380 U.S. 255, 256, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 
789 (1965); South Prairie Construction 
Co, v. Operating Engineers, 425 U.S. 800, 
802-03, 96 S.Ct 1842, 1843-44, 48 L.Ed.2d 
382 (1976). We have held that the Board 
acts within its discretion in treating as a 
single employer firms that operate as an 
integrated enterprise and "exert[] signifi-
cant control over" the employees in ques-
tion. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. NLRB, 
879 F.2d 1526, 1530 (7th Cir.1989); see also, 
e.g., W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 860 
F.2d 244, 247 (7th Cir.1988); NLRB v. 
Western Temporary Services, Inc., 821 
F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (7th Cir.1987). Here 
the Board wrote: 
[T]he facts establish that the five entities 
ground that the factor of joint control 
over labor relations is not present among 
all the entities and individuals named, 
because not all the corporations and part-
nerships had or have employees. For 
those Respondent entities that have or 
have had employees, however, labor rela-
tions authority has been shared by the 
Dybels. Thus, as to those entities, this 
criterion is satisfied. Because all other 
pertinent single employer criteria are 
met with respect to the five entities, and 
because there is no arms-length relation-
ship among them, the single employer 
finding is warranted. 
304 N.L.R.B. No. 94 at 8. In other words, 
the Dybels used their three corporations 
and two partnerships to operate different 
aspects of one electronic-controls enter-
prise, having a single pool of employees to 
whom they applied a single labor-relations 
policy. Substantial evidence in the record 
supports this conclusion, 
[11] Respondents do not deny that the 
corporations and partnerships embarked on 
a common enterprise, and that when Manu-
facturing shut down IMCO Sales took over 
its final-assembly functions while continu-
ing to sell parts made by outside contract 
tors. They do not deny that IMCO Sales 
hired new employees (some of whom used 
to work for Manufacturing) to carry out 
these tasks. They do not deny that the^  
Dybels have one labor-relations policy. 
But they insist that Zoe Enterprises, Dybel 
Enterprises, and IMCO Service never had 
any employees and so cannot be a "single 
employer" with Manufacturing and IMCO 
Sales. We see how partnerships can lack 
employees. But IMCO Service Corpora-
tion? A corporation must have employees; 
in what other way can it act? Maybe the 
Dybels mean that they were its only em-
ployees (independent contractors provided 
the service to purchasers of the electronic 
gizmos). No matter. Neither the Board 
nor this court requires that firms have 
employees to be part of a single employer. 
It is enough that they be part of a common 
enterprise with a common labor policy. 
*rr D D „, i?*»c„\>n>0 Zii'nPTmnrkeL Inc.. 872 
can belong to the single employer by giving 
as well as by receiving directions about 
labor policy. 
* We have now enforced the Board's or-
ders three times, and we remind the re-
spondents that disobedience to these judg-
ments is contempt of court. 
ENFORCED. 
SZ\ 
( O fX!Y NUMBER SYSTEM> 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Marcos M. COJAB, Defendant-
Appellant. 
No. 91-3903. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Argued May 27, 1992. 
Pecided Oct._£7, 1992. 
Reheariftg Snd:feehe^ring En Banc 
Denied Dec 28:nfi92. 
Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy 
to distribute in excess of five kilograms of 
cocaine and was sentenced by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin, Robert W. Warren, Sen-
ior District Judge, and he appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Kanne, Circuit Judge, 
held that: (1) denial of reduction in offense 
tevel under Sentencing Guidelines for ac-
ceptance of responsibility after defendant 
failed to provide financial information to 
probation office did not violate privilege 
against self-incrimination; (2) record sup-
ported denial of reduction despite guilty 
plea; and (3) record supported increase in 
offense level on ground that activity was 
otherwise extensive, regardless of whether 
it involved five or more participants. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <3=»1252 
Witnesses o=>297(8) 
Refusing to grant two-level reduction 
under Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance 
of responsibility for failure of drug dealer 
to provide financial information to proba-
tion office did not penalize defendant for 
exercising Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination; denial of reduc-
tion was a "denied benefit," rather than a 
"penalty." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18 
U.S.C.A.App.; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Criminal Law <^1139, 1158(1) 
Court of Appeals reviews challenges to 
district court's sentencing determination 
under deferential standard, and to extent 
determination turns on questions of fact, 
district court's findings will not be dis-
turbed unless Court of Appeals is left with 
definite and firm conviction that mistake 
has been committed, but question involving 
interpretation of Sentencing Guidelines 
term is matter of law subject to de novo 
review. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 et seq., 18 
U.S.C.A.App. 
3. Criminal Law. e»1252 
Record supported denial of two-level 
reduction under Sentencing Guidelines for 
acceptance of responsibility where defen-
dant pleaded guilty to obtain dismissal of 
charges against his wife but there was no 
additional evidence of affirmative recogni-
tion of guilt and defendant failed to provide 
probation office with requested financial 
information. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, 18 
U.S.CA.App. 
4. Criminal Law <s>1252 
Entry of guilty plea combined with 
truthful admission of involvement in of-
fense and related conduct constitutes sig-
nificant evidence of acceptance of responsi-
bility for purposes of reduction under Sen-
tencing Guidelines, but this evidence may 
be outweighed by conduct inconsistent with 
acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. 
§ 3E1.1, 18 U.S.C.A.App. 
*78F 20-10 
E. Continental Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1993). 
We think this is'tfte souna consu-ut-uwi w 
the statute. It was adopted in EEOC v. 
Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 
1977), the most recent decision on the sub-
ject, concluding that a construction authoriz-
ing separate actions would render inconse-
quential both the provision for permissive 
intervention, and the requirement of a certifi-
cate. Earlier EEOC v. Missouri Pacific 
R.R., 493 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir.1974), reached 
the same result, emphasizing the avoidance 
of "duplicitous lawsuits when both actions 
find their genesis in one unlawful employ-
ment practice charge." In 1975, the Sixth 
Circuit had disagreed with the Eighth, hold-
ing that if "the EEOC investigation of the 
[individual's] charge could reasonably have 
been expected to^disclose that company prac-
tices had a racial impact extending beyond 
[the individual's] particular situation, the 
EEOC was entitled to bring its own suit 
based on its investigation's revelations." 
Equal Employment Op. Com'n. v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 n. 15 (6th 
Cir.1975). 
The construction permitting separate suit 
was adopted in EEOC v. North Hills Passa- -
vant Hosp.y 544 F.2d 664, 667-672 (3d Cir. 
1976), rejecting the implication from the pro-
vision for permissive intervention, relied on 
by the Eighth and, later, the Tenth Circuits. 
We, however, are persuaded that the implica-
tion is sound. 
Insofar as the judgment appealed from 
dismissed the EEOC's ADEA claim, it is 
REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
In all other respects, the judgment is AF-
FIRMED. Each party shall bear its own costs. 
O f MYNUMB1P SYSTEM > 
CONTINENTAL BANK, N.A., formerly 
known as Continental Illinois National 
Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Andrew C. MEYER, Jr., Nancy M. Lubin, 
as Administratrix of the Estate of Don-
ald M. Lubin, and Philip J. Crowe, Jr., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 91-3476. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Argued June 8, 1992. 
Decided Dec. 1, 1993. 
Bank which had loaned money for in-
vestment in horse-breeding limited partner-
ship sued borrowers on notes, and borrowers 
counterclaimed for fraud. The United States 
District Court for the Northern District of 
- Illinois, Eastern Division, Ann Claire 
Williams, J., dismissed counterclaim, struck 
affirmative defenses, and allowed substitution 
of administratrix in place of deceased defen-
dant, and granted bank's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Borrowers appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Fairchild, Senior Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) borrowers waived de-
fense of lack of personal jurisdiction, though 
they raised it in answer, where they fully 
participated in litigation of the merits for 
over two and one-half years without actively 
contesting personal jurisdiction; (2) there 
was no error in not dismissing deceased de-
fendant though bank did not move for substi-
tution of administratrix until over eight 
months after such defendant's death was 
suggested; (3) there was no abuse of discre-
tion in denying motion to amend, to assert 
counterclaim and affirmative defense based 
on "aiding a fraud" theory; and (4) borrow-
ers did not allege false statements of fact by 
bank, but only opinion, and thus did not have 
cause of action for fraud under Illinois law. 
Affirmed. 
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1. Federal Courts 0 9 5 
Defendants in suit on notes waived ob-
jection to lack of personal jurisdiction, al-
though they pled lack of jurisdiction in their 
answer, where they fully participated in liti-
gation of the merits for over two and one-half 
years without actively contesting personal 
jurisdiction, including pailicipation and 
lengthy discovery and filing and opposing 
various motions. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
12(h), (h)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>751 
Federal Courts <3>95 
Privileged defenses of lack of jurisdic-
tion over the person, improper venue, insuffi-
ciency of process, or insufficiency of service 
of process may be waived by formal submis-
sion in a cause or by submission through 
conduct, and party need not actually file an-
swer or motion before waiver is found. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(h)(1), 28 U.S.CA 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>365 
There was no error in not dismissing 
suit against deceased defendant in suit on 
notes though plaintiff did not move for sub-
stitution of administratrix until over eight 
months after decedent's death was suggest-
ed, where district court found excusable ne-
glect on theory that, after decedent's death, 
his attorneys, who represented all three de-
fendants, continued to file papers on dece-
dent's behalf and continued to participate in 
settlement discussions, creating reasonable 
belief that estate would be substituted with-
out prejudice. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 
6(b), (b)(2), 25(a)UX 25 note, 28 U.S.CA 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <3>364 
Though rule providing that action shall 
be dismissed as to deceased party unless 
motion for substitution is made not later than 
90 days after death is suggested on record is 
couched in mandatory terms, the 90-day re-
quirement may be extended on ground of 
excusable neglect. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 
6(b), (b)(2), 25(a)(1), 25 note, 28 U.S.CA. 
5. Federal Courts 0817 
District court's refusal to permit amend-
ment nf pnmnlaint is reviewed for abuse of 
6. Federal Civil Procedure <S»841 
In suit on notes in which defendants had 
asserted fraud counterclaim and defense, 
there was no abuse of discretion in refusing 
to allow amendment to assert second coun-
terclaim and defense based on "aiding a 
fraud," where complaint had been filed over 
two years previously, facts of transaction 
were known to defendants and could have 
been pled at any time after filing of initial 
complaint, and allowing amendment would 
have put plaintiff to additional discovery and 
thus prejudiced it. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 
15(a), 28 U.S.CA. 
7. Fraud ^ l l ( l ) , 12 
To establish fraud under Illinois law, 
parties claiming it must prove misrepresenta-
tion of fact, and statement which is merely 
expression of opinion or.relates to future or 
contingent events, expectations or probabili-
ties ordinarily does not constitute actionable 
misrepresentation* 
8. Federal Civil Procedure e=*636 
Counterclaim against bank which had 
loaned money for investment in limited part-
nership and was suing on borrowers' notes, 
alleged representation by bank to borrowers 
that partnership wag "structured" so as to 
make a profit was only opinion that partner; 
ship, not yet in existence, would produce a 
profit, and thus wras not actionable fraud 
under Illinois lawT, absent pleading of the 
circumstances with particularity to showr that 
term "structured" was statement of fact con-
cerning the form of the partnership. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
9. Fraud <S>12 
Though representations as to past in-
come of business are actionable under Illinois 
law concerning fraud, representations as to 
future income are not. 
10. Banks and Banking O100 
Alleged representations by bank which 
loaned money for investment in limited part-
nership, not yet in operation, that partner-
ship wras a 4trisk free" investment expressed 
only opinion, and wras not actionable by bor-
rowers under Illinois law, and the same wras 
bred by the partnership would oe 01 mgnesi 
quality and partnership would be managed 
by competent general partners. 
Stephen Novack, Bruce Braverman (ar-
gued), Eric N. Macey, Novack & Macey, 
Lester Stone, Thomas D. Sullivan, Robert D. 
Hughes, Stone & Hughes, Chicago, IL, for 
plaintiff-appellee. 
Joanne A. Sarasin (argued), Stuart M. 
Widman, Much, Shelist, Freed, Denenberg & 
Ament, Chicago, IL, for defendants-appel-
lants. 
Before CUMMINGS and BAUER, Circuit 
Judges, and FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit 
Judge. 
FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge. 
In 1984, Continental Bank lent funds to 
Andrew C. Meyer, Jr., Donald M. Lubin and 
Philip J. Crowe, Jr, to invest in a horse-
breeding limited partnership. In 1988, the 
bank sued each of these individuals to recov-
er on the unpaid renewal notes. In July 
1989, the. actions were consolidated and the 
bank filed an amended, consolidated com-
plaint against all defendants.1 The defen-
dants filed an answer including several affir-
mative defenses. The district court struck 
all the defenses, but gave leave to amend the 
defense based on fraud. The defendants 
amended that defense and added another 
("aiding a fraud") and a two-count counter-
claim. The court dismissed the counterclaim 
and struck the affirmative defenses. The 
bank moved for summary judgment, and the 
defendants responded solely by challenging 
personal jurisdiction. The court found the 
defendants' active participation in the litiga-
tion for two-and-a-half years constituted a 
waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense 
and granted summary judgment. The court 
additionally allowed for substitution of the 
administratrix of defendant Lubin's estate in 
place of the deceased Lubin, discussed more 
fully below. The defendants now appeal. 
We affirm. 
On appeal* we address whether the district 
court properly struck the defendants most 
recent affirmative defenses and dismissed 
the counterclaims. We drawT on defendants' 
pleading for the facts. 
The three defendants were partners in a 
law firm in Massachusetts. They invested in 
and became limited partners in Sunrise 
Farm Breeding Partnership No. 3, operating 
in Illinois. The general partners were 
Charles Schmidt and Edwrard Zurek. The 
bank had financed two similar partnerships, 
Sunrise No. 1 and No. 2. Lubin and Meyer 
had invested in No. 2. The purpose of the 
partnership was "to breed world class and 
champion thoroughbred stallions to proven 
stakes brood mares with internationally rec-
ognized pedigrees so as to breed world class 
thoroughbred yearlings which wrould be sold 
at a profit." 
Defendants' pleading is not very specific as 
to what happened. We gather that each 
defendant borrowed $200,000 from the bank 
and invested that amount. The breeding 
program is said to have "failed." It seems 
reasonable to assume that defendants claim 
they received no profits and their interests 
became valueless because in their counter-
claim theyl seek to recover the part of the 
loans they had repaid, and their affirmative 
defenses sought to prevent the bank recover-
ing the unpaid balances. Their allegations of 
information the bank failed to reveal sug-
gests a claim that the failure was caused by 
Schmidt's selling to the partnership stallion 
breeding seasons which he owned for exces-
sive fees and without arm's length negotia-
tion. Other allegations suggest that the 
mares were not of good quality or value. 
The claim of fraud includes alleged oral 
representations by a bank officer and failure 
to inform defendants of other facts, including 
untruths in a Private Placement Memoran-
dum prepared by the General Partners, and 
approved by the bank officer and attorney. 
The representations were made before the 
defendants borrowed the money or the part-
nership began to operate. 
1. Federal jurisdiction is based upon diversity. Illinois law governs all substantive issues. 
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The oral representations alleged, as sum-
manzed in appellants* brief, were uthat Sun-
rise No. 3(1) was structured so as to make a 
profit, (2) was a 'risk free' investment, (3) 
had highest quality horses, and (4) was man-
aged by competent General Partners." 
The alleged omissions were failures to say 
(1) that Schmidt would personally sell stallion 
seasons to the partnership, (2) that the part-
nership "was structured primarily to benefit 
the Bank and the General Partners," and 
failures to correct statements in the Private 
Placement Memorandum, (3) that the bank 
had investigated the partnership when it had 
not, (4) that Zurek was the owner of a partic-
ular farm in Kentucky, when he was not, and 
(5) that the bank had committed to fund the 
investments of limited partners based solely 
on the value of the horses and foals, when in 
fact it also relied on the credit of the inves-
tors. 
The pleading did not allege that the bank 
had.a duty to disclose to defendants the 
matters allegedly omitted or to correct the 
allegedly untrue statements in the Memoran-
dum. 
The district court concluded that the de-
fendants had failed to allege that the bank 
made any false statements of fact, as re-
quired for fraud under Illinois law\ Instead, 
the court determined that the bank's repre-
sentations were only opinions. The district 
court further decided that the defendants 
had not pled scienter with the required speci-
ficity. The district court also found that the 
defendants had failed adequately to plead 
loss causation. For these reasons, the court 
struck the defendants1 fraud defense and dis-
missed the fraud count of the counterclaim. 
In the second affirmative defense and sec-
ond count of the counterclaim, defendants 
alleged that the bank assisted Schmidt and 
Zurek in their scheme to defraud defendants 
and other limited partners. The bank's mo-
tive allegedly was to help Schmidt and Zurek 
repay their own debts to the bank. They 
alleged that Zurek orally made misrepresen-
tations to defendants concerning the struc-
turing of the partnership and the quality of 
the horses, and made representations in the 
™„:._4_ Di^nmont Wpmorandum soi?iewrhat 
ferred to. The bank people allegedly knew 
of the representations and omissions, and 
knew they were false or had been made with 
reckless disregard of their truth. It was 
alleged that the bank assisted Schmidt and 
Zurek in perpetrating the fraud by "endors-
ing" Sunrise No. 3, confirming that Zurek's 
statements were correct, and failing to give 
information omitted by Schmidt and Zurek. 
The district court struck the second affir-
mative defense and dismissed the second 
count of the counterclaim. The district 
judge's first reason was that they were not 
timely filed, noting defendants' admission 
that the "aiding a fraud" theory is "simply a 
new legal theory which arises out of the same 
facts of which Plaintiff [sic] has alwrays been 
aware." She also concluded that defendants 
did not sufficiently allege that the bank bene: 
fitted from the fraud. 
The bank then moved for summary judg-
ment, and the defendants raised only their 
claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. This 
defense had been pled in the defendants* 
answer, but had not been raised since that 
time. The court found that the defendants 
had waived the personal jurisdiction defense 
by extensively participating in litigation of 
the merits for two-and-a-half years before, 
affirmatively pressing the challenge to per-
sonal jurisdiction. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction 
[1] The defendants contend that the dis-
trict court erred in finding that they had 
waived their objection to personal jurisdic-
tion. The district court held that although 
the defendants pled lack of jurisdiction in 
their answer, they had waived the defense by 
extensive participation in the merits of the 
lawsuit without raising the defense affirma-
tively. 
[2] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(h)(1) provides that "[a] defense of lack of 
jurisdiction over the person . is waived . . . 
if it is neither made by motion under this 
rule nor included in a responsive pleading or 
an amendment thereof permitted by Rule 
defendants did raise the defense in their 
answer, and therefore the waiver provided 
for by Rule 12(h) did not occur. See Adden 
v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1156-57 (7th 
Cir.1982). However, the privileged defenses 
referred to in Rule 12(h)(1) "may be waived 
by 'formal submission in a cause, or by sub-
mission through conduct/ " Trustees of Cen-
tral Laborers' Welfare Fund v. Lowery, 924 
F.2d 731, 732 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting Marcial 
Vein, S.A. v. SS Galicia, 723 F.2d 994, 996-
97 (1st Cir.1983)); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Coiy., 308 U.S. 165, 168, 60 
S.Ct. 153,154, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939); Yeldell v. 
Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 539 (8th Cir.1990); see 
Burton v. Northern Dutchess Hosp., 106 
F.R.D. 477, 481 IS.D.N.Y.1985) (asserting 
jurisdictional defect in answer does "not pre-
serve the defense in perpetuity"). Indeed, 
"[a] party need not actually file an answer or 
motion before waiver is found." Central La-
borers' Welfare Fund, 924 F2d at 732-33; 
O'Brien v. Sage Group, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 81, 
83 (N.D.I11.1992), judgment afFd, 998 F.2d 
1394 (1993). 
Here, the defendants fully participated in 
litigation of the merits for over two-and-a-
half ye^rs without actively contesting person-
al jurisdiction. They participated in lengthy 
discovery, filed various motions and opposed 
a number of motions filed by the bank. 
.While the defendants literally complied with 
Rule 12(h), "they did not comply with the 
spirit of the rule, which is 'to expedite and 
simplify proceedings in the Federal Courts.'" 
Yeldell 913 F.2d at 539 (quoting C. Wright & 
A. Miller, 5A Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 1342, at 162 (2d ed.1990)). The dis-
trict court could properly conclude that the 
defendants' delay in urging this threshold 
issue manifests an intent to submit to the 
court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. (defendants 
waived defense of personal jurisdiction where 
they participated in discovery, filed motions 
and participated in five-day trial without rais-
ing issue); O'Brien, 141 F.R.D. at 83-84 
(failure to assert defense of improper service 
waived when defendant moved to set aside 
default without objecting to validity of ser-
vice). 
B. Substitution oj asiaie 
[3] Defendant Donald Lubin died on 
June 22, 1990, and in August 1990, the Lubin 
estate was opened. The bank, however, did 
not move for substitution of the Administra-
trix until March 12, 1991, over eight months 
after Lubin's death was suggested. The dis-
trict court granted the bank's motion to sub-
stitute. The court permitted the late filing, 
finding that the failure to file in time was the 
result of excusable neglect. All three defen-
dants were represented by the same attor-
neys (as they are on this appeal). The court 
found that "the fact that after Lubin died his 
attorneys continued to file papers on his 
behalf and continued to participate in settle-
ment discussions on his behalf created a rea-
sonable belief in plaintiffs attorneys that Lu-
bin's estate would be substituted without ob-
jection." March 14, 1991 Tr. at 2-3. 
[4] The defendants assert that the dis-
trict court erred in not dismissing Lubin 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
25(a)(1). The Rule provides: "Unless the 
motion for substitution is made not later than 
90 days after the death is suggested upon the 
record . . . the action shall be dismissed as to 
the deceased party." While couched in man-
datory terms, the Advisory Committee Notes 
to Rule 25 indicate that the 90-day require-
ment may be extended by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 6(b). Rule 6(b)(2) states that 
a district court "for cause shown may at any 
time in its discretion . . . upon motion made 
after the expiration of the specified period 
permit the act to be done where the failure 
to act was the result of excusable ne-
glect. . . ." "[T]he history of Rule 25(a) and 
Rule 6(b) makes it clear that the 90 day time 
period was not intended to act as a bar to 
otherwise meritorious actions, and extensions 
of the period may be liberally granted." 
Tatterson v. Koppers Co., 104 F.R.D. 19, 20 
(W.D.Pa.1984). 
C Dismissal of "Aiding a Fraud" Counter-
claim and Defense 
[5,6] The defendants contend that the 
district court erred in dismissing its second 
affirmative defense and Count II of the coun-
terclaim based on an "aiding a fraud" theory. 
This theory was pled for the first time in the 
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defendants' amended affirmative defenses 
and counterclaim, filed on October 4, 1990. 
The distinct court found that (1) the defense 
and counterclaim were untimely and (2) the 
claims were legally deficient. We review a 
district court's refusal to permit amendment 
of a complaint for an abuse of discretion. 
Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 
350, 353 (7th Cir.1982) (citing Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltinc, 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 
795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971)); Kleinhans v. 
Lisle Sav. Profit Sharing Trust, 810 F.2d 
618, 625 (7th Cir.1987). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) pro-
vides that leave to amend the pleadings 
"shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires." The Supreme Court elaborated in 
FoTnan v. Davis; 
If the Underlying tacts or circumstances 
relied upon by a plaintiff may be.a proper 
subject of relief, he ought to1>e afforded an 
opportunity to test his claim on* the merits. 
In the absence of any apparent or declared 
reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or 
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 
amendments previously allowed, undue 
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue 
of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, 
as the rules require, be "freely given." 
371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 
(1962); quoted in Murphy, 691 F.2d at 353. 
The complaint in this action wras filed in 
September 1988; the defendants did not file 
their amended affirmative defenses and 
counterclaim until October 4, 1990. Al-
though other maneuvers occurred during this 
time, the facts of the 1984 transaction and 
representations preceding it did not change 
and must have been known to defendants. 
These facts could have been pled at any time 
after the filing of the initial complaint. See 
Kleinhans, 810 F.2d at 625. If the amend-
ment were allowed, the bank would have 
been put to additional discovery, and thus 
prejudiced. We conclude that the district 
-x J :J .^4. oKuco itc Hkrrption in refusing 
D. Dismissal of Fraud Counteixlaim and 
Defense 
The defendants assert that the distinct 
court erred in dismissing its first affirmative 
defense and Count I of the counterclaim. 
This defense and counterclaim were based on 
alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and 
omissions made by the bank. The district 
court struck this claim and defense on three 
grounds: (1) that the alleged misrepresenta-
tions were statements of opinion, not fact, 
and therefore were not actionable as fraud; 
(2) that the bank's knowledge was not prop-
erly pleaded; and (3) that loss causation was 
not properly pleaded. The defendants con-
tend that the district court erred on all 
grounds. In the alternative, the defendants 
contend that we should reverse and remand 
for leave to amend. 
The defendants alleged that a bank officer 
made statements that Sunrise No. 3 was 
structured so as to make a profit, that it wras 
a "risk free" investment, that the horse^ 
were of highest quality, and that Sunrise No.* 
3 was managed by competent General Part: 
-ners. The district court found that the de-
fendants "failed to allege that the Bank made 
any false statements of fact and instead only 
allege[d] that they relied on the Bank's opin-
ions. This cannot form the basis for a frauff 
claim." Mera.Op. at 5. 
[7,8] To establish fraud under Illinois 
law, the defendants must prove a misrepre-
sentation of fact. Nieinoth v. Kohls, 171 
Ill.App.3d 54, 121 IU.Dec. 37^46, 524 N.E.2d 
1085, 1094, appeal denied 122 I11.2d 578, 125 
IlLDec. 222, 530 N.E.2d 250 (1988) (citing 
Mercado v. United Investors, Inc., 144 111. 
App.3d 886, 98 IU.Dec. 702, 494 N.E.2d 824 
(1986)). A "statement which is merely an 
expression of opinion or which relates to 
future or contingent events, expectations or 
probabilities, rather than to pre-existent or 
present facts, ordinarily does not constitute 
an actionable misrepresentation" under Illi-
nois law. Peterson Indus., Inc. v. Lake View 
Trust & Sav. Bank, 584 F.2d 166, 169 (7th 
Cir.1978) (quoting Metro. Bank and Trust 
Co. v. Oliver 4 Ill.App.3d 975, 283 N.E.2d 62, 
64 (1972)); Banington Press, Inc. v. Morey, 
752 F.2d 307, 310 n. 1 (7th Cir.1985); Niem-
The statements pled here do not fall within 
any recognized exception to this general rule. 
First, the defendants allege that the bank 
stated that Sunrise No. 3 was structured so 
as to make a profit. Their pleading did not 
allege what they understood was meant by 
"structured." It sounds like a reference to 
the form or design of the partnership. Al-
though a statement that a partnership or 
other entity was "structured" in a specified 
manner could be a statement of fact concern-
ing its form, the alleged statement did not 
supply those specifics, nor is there any alle-
gation as to how the form of the partnership 
caused it to fail to make a profit Without 
more specificity in this and other allegations, 
the pleading fails to state the circumstances 
constituting fraud \*ath particularity. Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b). We agree with the 
district court that the statement was only an 
opinion that the partnership, not yet in exis-
tence, would produce a profit, and was not a 
representation of a pre-existent or present 
fact. 
[9] "It is well settled in Illinois that al-
though representations as to the past income 
of a business are actionable, representations 
as to future income are not." Niemoth, at 
46, 524 N.E^d at 1094 (citing Mother Earth, 
Ltdu Strawberry Camel, Ltd., 72 Ill.App.3d 
37, 28 IlLDec. 226, 390 N.E.2d 393 (1979)). 
See Barrington Press, 752 F.2d at 310 n. 1 
(four-year projections of future sales and 
profitability of ongoing business are predic-
tions or opinions regarding future business 
performance); Ziskin v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 
106 IU.App.3d 482, 62 Ill.Dec. 255, 259, 435 
N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (1982) (representation of 
future profitability is an opinion of future 
occurrence, and without more, not action-
able). 
Defendants argue that when the bank stat-
ed that "Sunrise No. 3 'was structured so as 
to make a profit/ " they "were representing 
that the tangible features such as the hoi%ses 
used, fees paid and foal sharing agreements 
were sound," and were not simply "predict-
ing earnings potential." Opening Brief at 17. 
We do not deem that a reasonable interpre-
tation. 
Defendants rely on Peterson v. Baloun, 
715 F.Supp. 212, 216 (N.D.I11.1989) (under 
Illinois law, a representation concerning proi-
it expectations may be a promise of a future 
event which is actionable if used to perpe-
trate a fraud). We agree with Judge 
Williams in distinguishing Peterson because 
there the defendant "making the representa-
tion regarding the 'expected return' on in-
vesting in the company was an officer, di-
rector, and majority shareholder of the com-
pany" already in existence. 
[10] Second, the defendants allege that 
the bank represented that the partnership 
was a risk free investment. No one could 
take literally a statement that a program of 
breeding thoroughbred horses was "risk 
free." The defendants do not allege that the 
partnership was in operation at the time this 
statement was made. We conclude that this 
statement only expresses an opinion and is 
not actionable under Illinois law. 
The defendants also allege that the bank 
officers stated that the horses wTere (neces-
sarily
 r"would be") of the highest quality, and 
that the partnership would be managed by 
competent general partners. These state-
ments are no more than opinion. See, e.g., 
Nanlawala v. Jack Carl Assoc, Inc., 669 
F.Supp. 204, 207 (N.D.I11.1987) (statements 
that defendant had "expertise" and that he 
would "pick good trades" not actionable de-
ception under Commodity Exchange Act, 7 
U.S.C. § 6h); Royal Business Machines, 
Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 41, 45 
(7th Cir.1980) (statements that machines 
"were of high quality" not a factual represen-
tation under Indiana law); Forbis v. Reilly, 
684 F.Supp. 1317, 1322 (W.D.Pa.), affd with-
out opinion, 862 F.2d 307 (3d Cir.1988) 
(statement that "this colt was one of the 
finest ever bred" and "perfect for use as a 
foundation stallion" no more than puffing and 
not actionable as fraud in Pennsylvania). 
Defendants make no argument on appeal 
concerning the bank's omissions except to 
point out that the judge "failed to address 
the bank's omissions which were sufficient to 
support the fraud claim." Several of the 
alleged omissions were in terms of opinions 
or predictions of future happenings or refer-
ences to the "structure" of the partnership 
without disclosing what was wrong about the 
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"structure." Defendants' brief suggests no 
theory as to the duty of the bank to supply 
defendants with the omitted information or 
to correct the alleged errors in the Private 
Placement Memorandum. We shall not en-
deavor to devise arguments for them. 
The district court also found that the de-
fendants did not properly allege scienter, and 
that they had failed to allege loss causation. 
Because we conclude that the defendants 
have not alleged false statements of fact un-
der Illinois law, we need not address these 
alternative grounds. 
Accordingly, we AFFIRM. 
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De Etta JOHNSON, Individually and as 
Conservator of the Estate of Wanda 
Johnson and as Next Friend of Dom-
iauant Johnson, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
METHODIST MEDICAL CENTER OF 
ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 92-2937. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
Argued Sept. 29, 1993. 
Decided Dec. 1, 1993. 
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing 
En Banc Denied Dec. 28, 1993. 
Patient's mother brought medical mal-
practice action against hospital and three 
physicians. The United States District 
Court for the Central District of Illinois, 
Michael M. Mihm, Chief Judge, denied plain-
tiffs motion for leave to file third amended 
complaint and granted summary judgment in 
favor of hospital, and plaintiff appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Fairchild, Senior Circuit 
TnHcrp HPIH that: (1) district court did not 
motion for leave to file third amended com-
plaint; (2) plaintiff waived claims of hospital's 
negligence based on additional negligent acts 
and failures not alleged in first three com-
plaints; and (3) physician who treated pa-
tient in hospital was not agent of hospital. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Courts e=>817 
Court of Appeals reviews district court's 
denial of plaintiffs motion for leave to file 
proposed amended complaint for abuse of 
discretion; denial will be overturned only if 
there was no justifying reason for it. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 U.S.CA 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <s>840 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in medical malpractice action brought 
against hospital and physicians when it de-
nied plaintiffs motion for leave to file third 
amended complaint four years after com-
mencement of action; proposed complain^ 
brought in additional actors, such as hospi-
tal's nursing staff, who took alleged actions 
-that were distinct from allegations raised in 
second amended complaint, and amendment 
would have prejudiced hospital if granted by 
forcing it to respond to additional allegations 
and engage in substantial additional discov-
ery. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 15(a), 28 
U.S.CA. 
3. Federal Courts <3=>776 
Court of Appeals reviews district court's 
grant of summary judgment de novo. Fed. 
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(e), 28 U.S.CA 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <3>1811 
Medical malpractice plaintiff who pled 
specific failures of three named doctors, un-
named residents and hospital employees in 
her first three complaints waived claims of 
hospital's negligence based on additional neg-
ligent acts and failures not alleged in first 
three complaints. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 
8(a), 56(e), 28 U.S.CA. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure O=>650.1 
Complaint's allegations of negligence 
may be so specific that plaintiff waives claim 
of negligence based on other and different 
F. Dietrich v. Burrows, 164 F.R.D. 220 (N.D.Ohio 1995). 
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or entitlement to a limited fund, like in those 
cases. The absent parties in this case ap-
pear, at most, to be "slandered outsiders" 
that are not necessary under Pujol 
Lastly, defendant contends that the absent 
persons' interests in the present suit will 
leave the defendant subject to a substantial 
risk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of the 
claimed interest. Defendant argues that the 
factfinder in the present case may apportion 
liability between the defendant and the ab-
sent persons differently than a factfinder in a 
separate suit for contribution. This would, 
according to defendant, subject him to dou-
ble, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obli-
gations under Rule 19(a). It is true that "the 
defendant may properly wish to avoid multi-
ple litigation, or inconsistent relief, or sole 
responsibility he shares with another." 
Provident Bank, 390 U.S. at 110, 88 S.Ct. at 
737. Nonetheless, it takes more than the 
threat of such a situation to make a person 
necessary under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii). Janney, 
11 F.3d at 411-12; Field v. Volkswagenwerk 
AG, 626 F.2d 293, 302 (3rd Cir.1980); Bedel 
103 F.R.D. at 81. But see Whyham, 96 
F.R.D. at 561. Janney states: 
the possibility that [defendant] may bear 
the whole loss if it is found liable is not the 
equivalent of double liability. It is instead 
a common result of joint and several liabili-
ty and should not be equated with preju-
dice. Inherent in the concept of joint and 
several liability is the right of a plaintiff to 
satisfy its whole judgment by execution 
against any one of the multiple defendants 
who are liable to him, thereby forcing the 
debtor who has paid the whole debt to 
protect itself by an action for contribution 
against the other joint obligors. 
Janney, 11 F.3d at 412. Bedel referring to a 
different apportionment of liability by a sec-
ond factfinder in a suit for contribution, 
states: 
[A] determination in the [suit for contribu-
tion] of no liability on the part of [the 
absent person] would impose no "obli-
gation" on the defendant, but rather would 
be an adjudication concerning the obli-
might be, to a certain extent, logically in-
consistent, Rule 19 does not speak of in-
consistent "results." Rather, it speaks of 
inconsistent "obligations." 
Bedel 103 F.R.D. at 81. Thus, while defen-
dant may be subject to inconsistent judg-
ments, it will not be subject to a substantial 
risk of double, multiple, or inconsistent obli-
gations, as those terms are used in Rule 
19(a)(2)(ii). 
Therefore, defendant has failed to demon-
strate that the owners or installer of the 
systems are necessary parties under Rule 
19(a). Accordingly, it is unnecessary to con-
sider whether they are indispensable under 
Rule 19(b). 
ORDER 
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that 
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to 
add an indispensable party pursuant to Fed. 
R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7) and 19 be DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Kenneth G. DIETRICH, et al., Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Richard W. BURROWS, 
et al., Defendants. 
No. 3:93 CV 7505. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. Ohio, 
Western Division. 
Nov. 8, 1995. 
In action against several agents of town-
ship, claiming, inter alia, violation of federal 
constitutional rights, following death of one 
of the plaintiffs, another plaintiff moved to 
substitute himself as administrator of estate 
* '
i L
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filed by defendants was infirm, and (2) mo-
tion to substitute was timely. 
Motion granted. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <s=*365 
Suggestion of death must identify suc-
cessor or representative of the deceased. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure 0363.1, 365 
Suggestion of death, which did not iden-
tify successor or representative of deceased, 
was infirm, and thus did not commence 90-
day period for filing motion for substitution. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25(a), 28 U.S.CA 
a Federal Civil Procedure C=>363.1 
Ninety-day time limit for filing motion 
for substitution after suggestion of death is 
filed is subject to enlargement if good cause 
can be shown as to why timely motion is not 
possible. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), 
25(a), 28 U.S.C A 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363.1 
Ninety-day time limit for filing motion 
for substitution after suggestion of death was 
filed was subject to enlargement, where mov-
ant did not become deceased's personal rep-
resentative until after the 90-day period had 
elapsed and moved for substitution immedi-
ately on becoming personal representative. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), 25(a), 28 
U.S.CA 
Edward G. Kramer, Kramer & Nierman, 
Cleveland, OH, for Kenneth G. Dietrich, Bri-
an T. Dietrich and Firelands Investigative 
Agency, Inc. 
Nick Tomino, Reminger & Reminger, 
Cleveland, OH, for Richard W. Burrows, Ma-
rie Hildebrandt, William Dwelle, Donald Sen-
ne, Lloyd Barcus, James Lang, James A. 
Jenkins and James Scheid. 
Dennis J. Niermann, Edward G. Kramer, 
Kramer & Nierman, Cleveland, OH, for Bri-
an T. Dietrich. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
KATZ, District Judge. 
This matter is before the Court on a mo-
tion by Plaintiff Brian T. Dietrich to substi-
tute himself, as Administrator of the Estate 
of Kenneth Dietrich, for the late Kenneth G. 
Dietrich, as plaintiff. Defendants have filed 
an opposition to this motion and have moved 
to dismiss Kenneth G. Dietrich as a party. 
For the following reasons, the Court will 
grant Plaintiffs motion. Defendants' motion 
will be denied as moot, since granting Plain-
tiffs motion removes Kenneth Dietrich as a 
party. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs Kenneth G. Dietrich, Brian T. 
Dietrich, and Firelands Investigative Agency, 
Inc. brought this suit against several agents 
of Perkins Township, claiming, inter alia, 
violations of their rights under the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. On March 31, 
1995, Plaintiff Kenneth Dietrich died. 
A Suggestion of Death was filed by Defen-
dants on May 23, 1995. Defendants properly 
served notice of the Suggestion of Death on 
parties Brian Dietrich and Firelands Investi-
gative Agency. They did not serve the ad-
ministrator of the estate, Priscilla E. Diet-
rich. Priscilla E. Dietrich died on June 21, 
1995. Plaintiff Brian Dietrich was made ad-
ministrator of Kenneth Dietrich's estate on 
August 30,1995. 
In a motion dated August 30, 1995 and 
filed September 5, 1995, Plaintiff Brian Diet-
rich filed the motion for substitution that is 
now at issue. Defendants oppose this substi-
tution on the grounds that the motion was 
filed more than 90 days after Defendants 
filed their Suggestion of Death. Plaintiff 
responds that service was never made on the 
administrator of Kenneth Dietrich's estate, 
so the 90-day period never began to run. 
DISCUSSION 
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a), a motion for 
substitution after the death of a party must 
be filed within 90 days of the date the Sug-
gestion of Death is filed and served on the 
successors or representatives of the deceased 
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party. The parties have identified the issue 
before the Court as being whether the Court 
should hold a motion for substitution to be 
untimely filed where the motion is filed more 
than 90 days after the personal representa-
tive of the deceased received service of the 
Suggestion of Death, but was unable to com-
ply with the time limit because he did not 
become the deceased's personal representa-
tive until after the 90-day period had 
elapsed. 
[1,2] Before the Court addresses the is-
sue of sufficiency of process, howrever, the 
Court must determine whether the Sugges-
tion of Death filed by Defendants was suffi-
cient. The law is well settled that the Sug-
gestion of Death must identify the successor 
or representative of the deceased. McSurely 
v. McClellav, 753 F.2d 88, 98 (D.C.Cir.1985); 
Smith u Pianos, 151 F.R.D. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993). The Suggestion of Death filed in this 
case does not do so. 
Since the Suggestion of Death is itself 
infirm, the Court need not address the suffi-
ciency of process. The 90-day period never 
began to run because no sufficient Sugges-
tion of Death was filed with the Court.1 Bri-
an Dietrich's motion to substitute himself as 
plaintiff was, therefore, timely filed. 
[3,4] Even if the Suggestion of Death 
wrere sufficient on its face, the Court would 
find Plaintiffs motion to have been timely 
filed. The 90-day time limit is subject to 
enlargement pursuant to Rule 6(b) if good 
cause can be shown as to why a timely 
motion is not possible. Continental Bank 
N.A v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.1993); 
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1969); 
Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292 
(2d Cir.1966). In this case, Brian Dietrich 
wras unable to move to substitute himself 
as plaintiff until August 30, 1995, when he 
became Kenneth Dietrich's personal repre-
sentative. He moved for substitution im-
mediately on becoming Kenneth Dietrich's 
personal representative. He was diligent 
in protecting his interests. The Court 
finds that Plaintiff has shown good cause 
for his failure timely to file. 
Further, the Court finds it appropriate to 
allow Brian Dietrich to substitute himself as 
Kenneth Dietrich's personal representative 
in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Brian Dietrich's motion to substi-
tute himself as Kenneth Dietrich's personal 
representative is, therefore, granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
JUDGMENT ENTRY 
For the reasons stated in the Memoran-
dum Opinion filed contemporaneously with 
this Judgment Entry, IT IS HEREBY OR. 
DERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
Plaintiffs motion for substitution (Doc. No. 
50) is granted. Defendants' motion to dis-
miss Kenneth G. Dietrich as a party (Doc 
No. 51) is denied. 
O f « r NUMBER SYSTEM 
«**+^ s> 
In re TELECTRONICS PACING SYS-
TEMS, INC, ACCUFIX ATRIAL "J" 
LEADS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITI-
GATION. 
No. MDL-1057. 
United States District Court, 
S.D. Ohio, 
Western Division. 
Nov. 17, 1995. 
Named representatives moved for class 
certification in their action against the manu-
facturer of allegedly defective pacemaker 
lead retention wires, in which plaintiffs as-
serted causes of action for, inter alia, strict 
liability, negligence, failure to warn, and 
breach of warranty. The District Court, 
- ~ ^ - j - tUo* Dn.n onrl PnQ. *1 knowledge of the Dartv's death is not sufficient 
G. InreCardoza, 111 B.R. 906 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1990). 
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ban all jury trials in bankruptcy courts, at 
least in "core" matters. Statements made 
by senators involved in drafting the 1984 
Act su^^ort this conclusion, McCormicks 
67 B.R. at 842. 
Other authority provides further support 
for bankruptcy judges performing jury tri-
als. In Blackman v. Seton (In re Black-
man), 55 B.R. 437, 440 (Bankr. D.D.C. 
1985), another court noted that 28 U.S.C. 
§1411 did not codify Emergency Rule 
(d)(l)(D)'s prohibition on jury trials in bank-
ruptcy courts. Instead the court noted 
that § 1411 "specifically advertfed] to the 
right to trial by jury without in any way 
indicating that the bankruptcy court unit of 
the district court is prohibited from con-
ducting jury trials." Id. This court thus 
found that § 1411 itself supports the notion 
that bankruptcy courts may conduct jury 
trials. 
28 U.S.C. § 157 also sanctions jury trials 
in bankruptcy courts. Macon Prestressed 
Concrete v. Duke, 46 B.R. 727, 730 (M.D. 
Ga.1985). Section 157(a) gives district 
courts the authority to transfer "all pro-
ceedings . . . related to a case under title 
11" to bankruptcy judges, id., and when 
the proceedings transferred are core pro-
ceedings within the meaning of § 157(b)(2), 
the bankruptcy court may enter a binding 
judgment on the jury's verdict under 
§ 157(b)(1), which is appealable only under 
the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 158. Id. Thus, at 
least as far as core proceedings are con-
cerned, § 157 "vests the bankruptcy court 
with the same authority to conduct a jury 
trial as exists in [a district] court." Id. 
One year after its decision in Northern 
Pipeline, the Supreme Court adopted the 
since repealed Bankruptcy Rule 9015, 
which allowed jury trials in bankruptcy 
court. Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re 
Gaildeen Industries), 59 B.R. 402, 407 
(N.D. Cal.1986). "Surely had the Court 
meant to preclude bankruptcy judges from 
conducting jury trials, it would not have 
adopted the Rule." Id. True, Rule 9015 
has been repealed, but the advisory note 
commenting on its repeal left open the 
question of whether or not bankruptcy 
fiave therefore continued to hold that they 
(:an. Price-Watson v. Amex Steel (In re 
Price-Watson), 66 B.R. 144 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex.1987). 
Lastly, the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Jn re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2nd 
Cir., 1990), held that the bankruptcy court 
may conduct jury trials in core proceedings 
and conducting jury trials in core proceed-
ings does not run afoul of Article III or the 
Seventh Amendment. 
For the foregoing reasons, I agree with 
the majority of courts and hold that it is 
appropriate for bankruptcy judges to hold 
jury trials in core matters. I do not reach 
the issue of whether jury jury trials in 
bankruptcy courts are permitted in noncore 
proceedings, since that problem is not now 
before this court. The motion to withdraw1 
reference as to the third party complaint 
against Dames Pierce, which lias already, 
been found to be a core proceeding, is 
therefore DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
( O f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
In re Arthur J. CARDOZA and Natalie 
H. Cardoza, Debtors. 
David G. TREMBLEY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY MORTGAGE, et 
al., Defendants. 
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Cross-Complainant, 
v. 
Walter L. CARPENTER, 
Cross-Defendant. 
Adv. No. 89-90010-B7. 
Related Bankruptcy No. 88-03473-B7. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
S.D. California. 
Feb. 12, 1990. 
Action was brought for damages and 
Cite as HI BR. 906 
certain liens and dischargeability of debt. 
Surety for one of defendants moved to 
dismiss based on plaintiffs failure to time-
ly move to substitute defendant's estate 
following defendant's death. The Bank-
ruptcy Court, Peter W. Bowie, J., held that: 
(1) surety company which had filed bond on 
notary public's behalf, and which was 
named as additional defendant in action 
arising from notary public's alleged ac-
knowledgement of forged endorsement, 
had authority to file suggestion of death 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
when notary public died during pendency 
of action; (2) suggestion of death was not 
deficient, for failing to include name and 
address of representative of estate who 
could be substituted as defendant; and (3) 
plaintiff failed to demonstrate delay was 
result of any "excusable neglect" and was 
not entitled to enlargement of time within 
which to move for substitution. 
So ordered. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure <e=>365 
Surety company which had filed bond 
on notary public's behalf, and which was 
named as additional defendant in action 
arising from notary public's alleged ac-
knowledgement of forged endorsement, 
had authority to file suggestion of death 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
w^hen notary public died during pendency 
of action. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 25, 28 
U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <£=>365 
Suggestion of death that was filed by 
surety when notary public died during 
pendency of action against him was not 
deficient, and served to trigger 90-day time 
limit on motion to substitute, though sug-
gestion did not include name and address 
of representative of estate who could be 
substituted as defendant. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>365 
Plaintiffs delay in moving for substi-
tution of parties, after plaintiff had re-
ceived suggestion of defendant's death, 
was not result of any "excusable neglect," 
where only excuse offered was that sug-
(Bkrtcy.S.U.lai. i**u; 
gestion of death was delivered to cocounsel 
responsible for trial matters, and that at-
torney in charge of procedural matters 
learned of it only belatedly; plaintiff was 
not entitled to enlargement of time within 
which to move for substitution. Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=»365 
Party who was allegedly injured by 
notary public's acknowledgement of forged 
endorsement, but who had not timely 
moved to substitute notary public's estate 
as defendant following notary public's 
death, was not entitled to proceed directly 
against surety company which had filed 
bond on notary public's behalf, where sure-
ty company had never accepted defense of 
cause or arranged for counsel to represent 
notary public and to make appearance for 
him. West's Ann.Cal.Prob.Code §§ 709, 
709.1, 721 (Repealed); Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rule 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
Robert L. Rentto, San Diego, Cal., for 
plaintiff. 
Franklin Geerdes, Chula Vista, Cal., for 
defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
PETER W. BOWIE, Bankruptcy 
Judge. 
On January 6, 1989 Plaintiff Trembley 
filed an adversary complaint styled "Com-
plaint to Determine Validity, Priority and 
Extent of Liens and Other Interests in 
Property, for Damages and to Determine 
Dischargeability of Debt, and Demand for 
Jury Trial." Named as defendants were 
the debtors and many others. 
The essence of the complaint is that 
Trembley asserts he was part owner of a 
piece of property with the debtors. Tremb-
ley alleges that the debtors and others 
forged his name to a quit claim deed trans-
ferring his interest in the property to the 
debtors. Among the other defendants is 
Walter L. Carpenter who is alleged to have 
acknowledged the forged signature on the 
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quit claim deed in his capacity as a notary 
public. 
The Third Claim in the complaint is as-
serted directly against Mr. Carpenter for 
his alleged actions as the notary on the quit 
claim deed. In addition, Trembley sues 
Does 46 through 50, who are alleged to be 
''insurance corporations who had executed 
their official bonds as surety for Mr. Car-
penter " 
On February 3, 1989 Trembley filed an 
amendment to the complaint naming West-
ern Surety Company as Doe 46. On Febru-
ary 6, 1989 Anthony Erbacher, as attorney 
for Walter Carpenter, filed Carpenter's ver-
ified answer to the complaint. On Febru-
ary 28, 1989 Franklin Geerdes, as attorney 
for Western Surety Company, filed West-
ern Surety's answer. In addition, on 
March 1,1989 Western Surety filed a cross-
complaint against Walter Carpenter for re-
imbursement under California law if West-
ern Surety is held liable on its bond. 
On April 4, 1989 Attorney Geerdes, on 
behalf of his client, Western Surety, filed 
and served on all parties a document styled 
"Suggestion of Death upon the Record Un-
der Rule 25(a)(1)." The document asserts 
that Western Surety is a party to the pro-
ceeding, and gives notice that Walter Car-
penter died March 12, 1989. A copy of the 
registered death certificate was attached as 
an exhibit. The death certificate, in perti-
nent part, sets out the name, relationship 
and address of the "informant" as "ROB 
MOTTA; EXECUTRIX 1520 TYLER AVE-
NUE # 3 SAN DIEGO, CA 92103". 
Subsequently, Mr. Erbacher filed an 
Amended Answer for Mr. Carpenter, re-
flecting that Mr. Carpenter was deceased, 
and conforming the answer to District 
Court Local Rule 110-7, as this Court had 
required. 
On August 14, 1989 Mr. Geerdes filed a 
motion on behalf of Western Surety to 
dismiss Trembley's Third Claim on the 
ground that more than 90 days had elapsed 
from the filing and service of the sugges-
tion of death without any motion for substi-
tution having been made. Western Surety 
invoked the provisions of Rule 25(a), Fed.R. 
ruptcy proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 
7025. The motion was noticed for hearing 
for September 15, 1989. 
On September 8, 1989 Trembley caused 
to be filed a document styled "Ex-parte 
Petition for Leave to Proceed Against Wal-
ter L. Carpenter in the Name of the Estate 
of Walter L. Carpenter on an Insured 
Claim Pursuant to Probate Code Section 
709.1 and Section 721." On September 15, 
1989 the hearing on Western Surety's mo-
tion was held and the motion was granted. 
On September 18, 1989 this Court denied 
Trembley's ex parte motion. 
Substantial time elapsed while the order 
dismissing the third claim was being draft-
ed and circulated among counsel for ap-
proval. Ultimately, an order was filed and 
entered on October 24, 1989. On Novem-
ber 3, 1989 Trembley timely noticed for 
hearing on December 18 his motion for 
reconsideration of the order granting the 
motion to dismiss. The essential premise 
of the motion for reconsideration was that 
Trembley believed that the Court had not 
fully considered his arguments in opposi-
tion to the motion because his opposition 
had been returned to his counsel by the 
Cleric's Office because the pleading did not 
conform to the rules of this district. 
The motion for reconsideration was 
heard on December 18, 1989 and was taken 
under submission. This Court has jurisdic-
tion of this matter under 2£ U.S.C. § 1334 
and General Order 312-tf of the United 
States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California. This is a core proceed-
ing under 28 U.S.C. § 157(bX2)(A), (O). 
[1] The essence of Trembley's position 
is that the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 
(1969) "remains controlling on the construc-
tion and interpretation of F.R.Civ.P. 
25(a)(1). Mr. Geerdes' suggestion did not 
trigger the 90-day time period." In the 
alternative Trembley asks for an enlarge-
ment of time under Rule 6, F.R.Civ.P. in 
which to seek a substitution for Mr. Car-
Cite as HI BR. 906 
In this Court's view, reliance on Rende v. 
Kay is misplaced. In Rende, suit was filed 
by plaintiffs Rende against defendant Kay 
for personal injuries, including those of a 
minor. Thereafter, Kay died. The attor-
ney Kay had hired to defend the action 
filed a suggestion of death and gave notice 
to the plaintiffs attorney. Seven or eight 
months later, the attorney hired by Kay 
"moved in his own name to dismiss the 
action .. ." for failure of plaintiffs to sub-
stitute for the decedent. 415 F.2d at 984. 
The D.C. Circuit quoted the Committee 
Notes on the 1963 revision to Rule 25. 
They emphasized one part in particular: 
If a party or the representative of the 
deceased party^desires to limit the time 
within which another may make the mo-
tion [to substitute], he may do so by 
suggesting the death upon the record. 
415 F.2d at 985. The court thereafter stat-
ed: 
Although the attorney for the defendant 
was retained to "represent" the deceased 
as his counsel, he is not a person who 
could be made a party, and is not a 
"representative of the deceased party" in 
the sense contemplated by Rule 25(a)(1). 
Id. Because Kay's attorney was neither a 
party nor a representative of the deceased 
party, he was not one of the persons per-
mitted by Rule 25 to make a suggestion of 
death on the record which was sufficient to 
trigger the 90 day period for bringing a 
motion to substitute. 
On its facts, Rende v. Kay does not 
apply to the case at bar. In the instant 
case, the suggestion of death was not filed 
by Mr. Erbacher, counsel hired by Mr. Car-
penter before his death. Instead, the sug-
gestion was filed by Western Surety, a 
party, through its counsel Mr. Geerdes. 
As a party, Western Surety is clearly au-
thorized to make the suggestion of death 
under Rule 25, as even the D.C. Circuit 
recognized in Rende v. Kay. Al-Jundi v. 
Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246 (W.D.N.Y. 
1980); National Equipment Rental v. 
Whitecrajl Unlimited, 75 F.R.D. 507, 510 
(E.D.N.Y.1977); In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390, 
392-393 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984). 
(Bkrtcy.S.D.Cai. lrai; 
[2] Trembley also argues that Western 
Surety's suggestion of death was deficient 
because it did not include the name and 
address of the representative of the estate 
who could be substituted for the decedent. 
It is true that the court in Rende v. Kay 
stated: 
The Advisory Committee, in outlining 
that suggestion of death could be made 
by "the representative of the deceased 
party" plainly contemplated that the sug-
gestion emanating from the side of the 
deceased would identify a representative 
of the estate, such as an executor or 
administrator, who could be substituted 
for the deceased as a party (Empha-
sis added.) 
415 F.2d at 985. The same court conclud-
ed: 
No injustice results from the require-
ment that a suggestion of death identify 
the representative or successor of an es-
tate who may be substituted as a party 
for the deceased before Rule 25(aXl) 
may be invoked by those who represent 
or inherit from the deceased, (Empha-
sis added.) 
415 F.2d at 986. To the extent Rende is 
asserted for the proposition that a sugges-
tion of death must include the identity of 
the representative of the estate, that ruling 
only applies when the suggestion of death 
is filed by the representative or successor 
of the estate. No such rule binds other 
parties who may file and serve the sugges-
tion of death, such as Western Surety. Yo-
nofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1012 
(S.D.N.Y.1973). The Court notes, in pass-
ing, that the copy of the death certificate 
served with the suggestion of death con-
tained the name and address of a person 
identified on that document as executrix. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court 
concludes that Western Surety is a party 
competent to file and serve a suggestion of 
death sufficient to trigger the 90 day peri-
od specified in Rule 25, and that Western 
Surety did so on or about April 4, 1989. 
[3] The Court's consideration is not 
completed, however, because Trembley 
asks that the time to move for substitution 
be enlarged pursuant to Rule 6(b), Fed.R. 
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Civ.P., which is applicable in this proceed-
ing by Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). By the 
terms of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), and be-
cause the request to enlarge is made out-
side the 90 days set forth in Rule 25, the 
movant must show that "the failure to act 
was the result of excusable neglect/' 
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1); Yonofsky v. 
Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973). 
Counsel for Trembley states that the rea-
son no action was taken on the April 4, 
1989 suggestion of death was that the 
pleading "was delivered to the under-
signed's co-counsel, and our allocation of 
the work load is that the undersigned will 
be responsible for the procedural matters 
and Mr. Andreos for the trial matters, so 
the undersigned was not aware of the 
pleading until now." Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Mo-
tion to Dismiss and Motion Alternatively 
for Extension of Time to Move for Substi-
tution of Parties. The "undersigned" is 
attorney Robert Rentto. 
The face of the complaint indicates it was 
filed by Robert L. Rentto Professional Law 
Corporation and George P. Andreos, A.P. 
L.C. as attorneys for David G. Trembley. 
Rentto and Andreos Share the same street 
address and the same suite number, but 
each are shown with different telephone 
numbers. A similar heading was on the 
amendment naming Western Surety as Doe 
46. The suggestion of death was served 
listing the names of both attorneys serially, 
followed by the single address that served 
them both. Apparently, Mr. Rentto is as-
serting through his memorandum that Mr. 
Andreos did not show him the suggestion 
of death filed and served by Western Sure-
ty. 
Western Surety made part of the record 
in support of its motion to dismiss a copy 
of a letter from Western Surety's counsel, 
Mr. Geerdes, to Mr. Rentto. The letter is 
dated March 16, 1989, four days after Mr. 
Carpenter's death, and nineteen days be-
fore the suggestion of death was filed and 
served. The entire three page letter con-
cerns the effect of Mr. Carpenter's death, 
graph. At the bottom of the second page, 
Mr. Geerdes inquired: 
On the practical side, who will open a 
probate estate so that your Plaintiffs 
cause of action might survive, if it does, 
as against the personal representative of 
the estate of the decedent? 
On page three of the letter, Mr. Geerdes 
advised Mr. Rentto he was not going to 
take any discovery at present because 
"such discovery would be unneces-
sary/inappropriate unless the Plaintiff un-
dertakes to revive his now dead claim 
through service upon a personal represent-
ative of the decedent's estate." Mr. Rentto 
may not have known of the filing and ser-
vice of the Rule 25 suggestion of death, 
although there is no declaration in the 
record to that effect Nevertheless, Mr. 
Rentto clearly knew from the March 16 
letter, of the death of Mr. Carpenter and 
Western Surety's position that either 
Trembley or the estate had to bring in a 
representative in order for the claim to 
survive. See e.g., In re Bell, 92 B.R. 911 
(Bankr.E.D.Cal.1988). Yet nothing hap-
pened until after Western Surety filed its 
motion to dismiss, over four months after 
filing and service of the suggestion of 
death, and more than five months after 
Western Surety's letter to Mr. Rentto. 
While measuring excusable neglect in-
volves a liberal standard and enlargements 
of time are favored, this Court cannot con-
clude on the record before^t that the fail-
ure of Mr. Rentto or Mr. Andreos to timely 
move to substitute a representative of Mr. 
Carpenter's estate was the result of excus-
able neglect, particularly inasmuch as 
Western Surety's liability on its bond is 
derived from the liability of Mr. Carpenter, 
now deceased. Breckenridge v. Mason, 
256 Cal.App.2d 121, 130, 64 Cal.Rptr. 201 
(Second Dist.1967). 
[4] One last issue remains. Trembley 
asserts that he should be permitted to pro-
ceed directly against Western Surety to the 
limits of its policy pursuant to California 
Probate Code sections 709, 709.1 and 721. 
Probate Code section 709 provides in perti-
Cheat 111 U.K. 7 i i 
If an action is pending against the 
decedent at the time of his or her death, 
the plaintiff shall in like manner file his 
or her claim as required in other cases. 
No recovery shall be allowed against de-
cedent's estate in the action unless proof 
is made of the filing. If, however, the 
action which is pending is an action for 
damages, the decedent was insured 
therefor, the insurer has accepted the 
defense of the cause, and an appear-
ance has been made in such action on 
behalf of the decedent, no claim shall be 
required except for amounts in excess of 
or not covered by the insurance. (Em-
phasis added.) 
Section 709.1 provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, the court in which an action de-
scribed in Section 709 is pending may 
permit the action to be continued against 
the defendant in the name of "Estate of 
(name of decedent), Deceased," upon pe-
tition of the plaintiff, pursuant to the 
same procedure, and upon the same 
terms and conditions, as are provided in 
Section 721 for claims which were not 
the subject of a pending action at dece-
dent's death. The procedure of this sec-
tion is cumulative and does not super-
sede the procedure provided in subdivi-
sion (b) of Section 385 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. 
"As already noted, Trembley did file with 
this Court on September 8, 1989 a pleading 
styled "Ex-Parte Petition for Leave to Pro-
ceed Against Walter L. Carpenter in the 
Name of the Estate of Walter L. Carpenter 
on an Insured Claim Pursuant to Probate 
Code Section 709.1 and Section 721." How-
ever, as this Court reads Probate Code 
sections 709 and 709.1, in order for an 
action to continue under 709.1 by invoking 
the procedure of section 721, the action 
must meet the requirements of section 709. 
That is, the action must be one "for dam-
ages, the decedent was insured therefor, 
the insurer has accepted the defense of the 
cause, and an appearance has been made in 
such action on behalf of the decedent—" 
While Trembley's suit against Carpenter 
seeks damages and Carpenter was alleg-
edly insured therefor, there is no showing 
Western Surety accepted the defense of the 
cause or arranged for counsel to represent 
Carpenter and make an appearance for 
him. Indeed, the contrary is the case, for 
Western Surety filed its own cross-com-
plaint against Carpenter before he died. 
Because Trembley's action against Carpen-
ter does not fall within Probate Code sec-
tion 709, section 709.1 does not save it 
For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs 
motion for reconsideration is denied. 
Counsel for Western Surety shall prepare, 
serve and lodge a proposed judgment of 
dismissal in accordance with Bankruptcy 
Rule 7054(b) within fifteen (15) days after 
the date of entry of this order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
% | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
In re Lewis C. MULLER and Lynn C. 
Muller, Debtors. 
Steven A; BERKOWITZf Plaintiff, 
v. 
Lewis C. MULLER, Defendant. 
Bankruptcy No. 89-90561-LM7. 
Related Bankruptcy No. 88-06673-LM7. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
S.D. California. 
Feb. 27, 1990. 
Chapter 7 trustee brought action 
against debtor in another estate. On debt-
or's motion to dismiss, the Bankruptcy 
Court, John J. Hargrove, J., held that Chap-
ter 7 trustee of one estate had standing to 
initiate complaint to determine nondis-
chargeability of debt against debtor in an-
other estate. 
Motion granted in part and denied in 
part. 
H. In re Klein, 36 B.R. 390 (Bkrtcy. E.D. N.Y. 1984). 
390 36 BANKRUPTCY REPORTER 
has found that § 1325(a)(5)(B) does not re-
quire interest on the claim for which a 
contract remains in force under which the 
creditor can adequately provide for the time 
value of money. By so holding, this Court 
endeavors to give fair treatment to the 
statute and to the bargain between the 
parties. 
O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM 
In re Emil Paul KLEIN, Debtor. 
Joseph MELOHN, d/b/a Marjo 
Enterprises, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Emil Paul KLEIN, Defendant 
Bankruptcy No. 882-81032-18. 
Adv. No. 883-0066-18. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
E.D. New York. 
Jan. 20, 1984. 
Chapter 7 debtor moved to dismiss ad-
versary proceeding after plaintiff therein 
died. Coexecutors of plaintiffs estate 
cross-moved to be substituted for decedent 
in the adversary proceeding. The Bank-
ruptcy Court, C. Albert Parente, J., held 
that where attorney for deceased plain-
tiff suggested his client's death upon the 
record prior to such attorney's retention 
by estate representatives, the suggestion 
was insufficient to trigger period in which 
plaintiff's representatives were required to 
move for substitution, and, therefore, repre-
sentatives' motion to be substituted, though 
made more than 90 days after attorney 
served suggestion of death upon counsel for 
debtor, was timely. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure *=>365 
Form of written "suggestion of death" 
should substantially conform to that con-
tained in appendix of forms to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.Rules Civ. 
ProcRule 25; Form 30, 28 U.S.C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <&=>365 
In addition to requirement that sugges-
tion of death provide adequate information 
to appropriate parties, suggestion may only 
be served by appropriate party or repre-
sentative of appropriate party. Fed.Rules 
Civ.ProcRule 25; Form 30, 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <*=>365 
Language in rule relating to "sugges-
tion of death," requiring that death of par-
ty be suggested upon the record by service 
of statement of fact of death as provided 
ttherein for service of motion, limits entities 
who may suggest death upon the record to 
those who may move for substitution. Fed. 
Rules Civ.ProcRule 25, 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>362, 365 
Attorney for client who dies has no 
authority either to move to be substituted 
or to suggest the death of his deceased 
client upon the record; such action could 
clearly prejudice rights of successor party 
to whom that attorney bears no legal rela-
tionship. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25, 28 
U.S.C.A. 
5. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363 
Where attorney for client who died 
suggested client's death upon the record 
prior to such attorney's retention by estate 
representatives, the suggestion was insuffi-
cient to trigger period in which client's rep-
resentatives must move for substitution; 
therefore, client's representatives' motion to 
be substituted, though made more than 90 
days after suggestion of death had been 
served upon counsel for defendant, was 
timely. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRule 25, 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
Substitution motion eranted: motion Fensterheim & Fensterheim Attvs for 
I l l 1VJU/ I V J j x j j i i i 
Cite as 36 B.R. 2 
Holland & Zinker, Smithtown, N.Y., for 
defendant/debtor. 
DECISION & 'ORDER 
C. ALBERT PARENTE, Bankruptcy 
Judge. 
Defendant, Emil Paul Klein, moves to 
dismiss the adversary proceeding com-
menced by deceased plaintiff, Joseph Me-
lohn, d/b/a Marjo Enterprises. Leon Me-
lohn and Alfons Melohn, co-executors of the 
estate of Joseph Melohn, cross-move to be 
substituted for decedent in the proceeding. 
FACTUAL CONTEXT 
On April 22,1982, defendant filed a peti-
tion under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 ("Code"). Thereafter, 
the case was converted from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7. Plaintiff, a creditor of defend-
ant, filed a complaint with the clerk of this 
court on February 4,1983 commencing this 
action objecting to defendant's discharge 
under 11 U.S.C. § 727 and to the discharge-
ability of a debt defendant allegedly in-
curred in violation of § 523(aX2). 
Plaintiff died on June 1,1983. His attor-
neys advised the court of this fact by letter 
dated June 23,1983 and followed this letter 
with the filing of a document entitled "Sug-
gestion of Death" on July 11, 1983. An 
affidavit of service transmitted with the 
document recited that the "suggestion of 
death" had been served upon counsel for 
the defendant on July 8, 1983. On August 
4, 1983, Leon Melohn and Alfons Melohn 
were granted letters testamentary as co-ex-
ecutors of the estate of Joseph Melohn. 
On November 11, 1983, the attorneys for 
the defendant moved to dismiss this adver-
sary proceeding premised upon the co-exec-
utors' failure to comply with Bankruptcy 
Rule 7025, which incorporates by reference 
Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, on the ground that they failed to 
move to be substituted within the pre-
scribed time period. The co-executors 
cross-moved to be substituted. Decision 
was reserved. 
(Bkrtcy. 1984) 
RULE 25 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Death. 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may or-
der substitution of the proper parties. 
The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, 
shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons, and may be served 
in any judicial district. Unless the mo-
tion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a statement 
of the fact of the death as provided here-
in for the service of the motion, the ac-
tion shall be dismissed as to the deceased 
party. 
FED.R.CIV.P. 25 (West 1983). 
Rule 25 was amended in 1963 to amelio-
rate the harshness of its predecessor sec-
tion. Prior to 1963, under Rule 25, in the 
event a motion to substitute was not made 
within two years from the date of death of 
a party, the court was constrained to dis-
miss the action with respect to the deceased 
party. See 3B MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE ^ 25.01-15 (2d ed. 1980). 
Moreover, prior to the 1963 amendments, 
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure which gives the court discretion to 
enlarge time periods set forth in other 
rules, by its terms did not apply to Rule 25. 
However, Rule 6 was modified contempora-
neously with Rule 25 so as to expand its 
coverage to Rule 25 as well. Staggers v. 
Otto Gerdau Company, Inc., 359 F.2d 292 
(2d Cir.1966). As a consequence, although 
under the current version of Rule 25 and 
Rule 6 a motion for substitution must be 
made no later than 90 days after the service 
of the suggestion of death, the court may 
enlarge the 90 day period upon request 
made prior to the expiration of such period. 
In addition, if the application for enlarge-
392 36 BANKRUPTCY REPORTER 
ment is made after the conclusion of such 
period, then the court may order substitu-
tion if the movant demonstrates excusable 
neglect. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1955 at 659 (1972). 
DISCUSSION 
A significant difference separating the 
current version of Rule 25 from its prede-
cessor version is that currently the time in 
which a party may make a motion to substi-
tute or to be substituted is measured from 
the service of a "suggestion of death" as 
opposed to from the actual date of death of 
a party. In light of the importance of the 
service of the "suggestion" in triggering 
the running of the 90-day period, the courts 
have required certain formal requisites to 
be met before a valid suggestion is deemed 
served. The basis for the formality re-
quirement has been succinctly stated in Na-
tional Equipment Rental v. Whitecraft Un-
limited, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 
1977): "The burden of providing formal 
notice is slight Yet it ensures that the 
information reaches all parties. Therefore 
4
. . . insistence on the observance of proce-
dural ritual is justified/ Dolgow v. Ander-
son, [45 F.R.D. 470] at 471" (RD.N.Y.1968). 
[1] Under the rubric of procedural for-
mality, and in the interest of providing 
adequate notice to all entities affected by 
the death who are involved in the proceed-
ing, the courts have required the suggestion 
of death to be embodied in a written state-
ment. 45 F.R.D. at 471, United States v. 
Miller Brothers Constr. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 
1034-35 (10th Cir.1974). Rule 25 requires 
the suggestion to be "upon the record" and 
thus it must be served upon "all parties to 
the action and thereafter, be filed with the 
clerk of the court." 75 F.R.D. at 510. 
Finally, the suggestion should substan-
tially conform to Form 30, contained in the 
Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which provides: 
SUGGESTION OF DEATH UPON THE 
RECORD UNDER RULE 25(a)(1) 
A. B. [describe as a party, or as execu-
tive or successor of CD., the deceased 
party] suggests upon the record, pursuant 
to Rule 25(a)(1), the death of CD. [de-
scribe as party] during the pendency of 
this action. (Added Jan. 21, 1963, eff. 
July 1, 1963.) 
Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 1005 
(S.D.N.Y.1973); Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 
(D.CCir.1969). 
[2] In addition to the requirement that 
a suggestion of death provide adequate in-
formation to the appropriate parties, the 
suggestion may only be served by an appro-
priate party or representative of an appro-
priate party. 
[3] The express language of Rule 25 
carefully circumscribes those entities enti-
tled to move to be substituted under Rule 
25. The applicable language states "the 
motion for substitution may be made by 
any party or by the successors or represent-
atives of the deceased party,- It has been 
held that this clause should be interpreted 
strictly so as to preclude the attorney for a 
"deceased party, from moving for substitu-
tion unless he acts for the "successors or 
representatives" at the time such motion is 
made. Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 
244, 246 (W.D.N.Y.1980); Boggs v. Dravo 
Corp., 532 FA1 897 (3d Cir.1976); but see 
Ten v. Svenska Orient Linen, 87 F.R.D. 551 
(S.D.N.Y.1980). The underlying rationale 
supporting this proposition is that the attor-
ney for a decedent is no kfhger acting on 
behalf of such decedent in light of the fact 
that his power of attorney would have ter-
minated upon the death of his principal. 
Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. at 101L 
Nor is such attorney acting for decedent's 
successors and representatives until such 
time as such successor or representative is 
officially appointed, and after having been 
appointed, retains the attorney. 
Rule 25 further requires that death be 
"suggested upon the record by service of a 
statement of the fact of death as provided 
[tjherein for the service of a motion.'' (Em-
phasis added) The court is persuaded that 
this language limits the entities who may 
may move for substitution. 
at 246, 75 F.R.D. at 510; see also 415 F.2d 
at 985. 
[4] Under the foregoing analysis, the 
attorney for a decedent has no authority 
either to move to be substituted or to sug-
gest the death of his deceased client upon 
the record. Such action could clearly preju-
dice the rights of a successor party to whom 
that attorney bears no legal relationship. 
[5] In the instant case, the attorney for 
the deceased plaintiff suggested his client's 
death upon the record prior to such attor-
ney's retention by the estate representa-
tives. Thus, this suggestion is insufficient 
to trigger the^period in which plaintiffs 
representative^ must move for substitution. 
Therefore, plaintiffs representatives' mo-
tion to be substituted is timely. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the rea-
soning of the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in a case involving a similar 
factual predicate. In Staggers v. Otto Ger-
dau Company, Inc., 359 F.2d at 295, the 
plaintiff in the action died and a represent-
ative of his estate was appointed who duly 
served and filed a suggestion of plaintiffs 
death. The motion to be substituted was 
made by plaintiffs representative but was 
made several days beyond the 90 day period 
triggered by the filing of (and presumably 
service of) the suggestion. The court rea-
soned that the representative "was under 
no obligation to file his affidavit of . . . 
[plaintiffs] death on the date that he did. 
He could have filed it later." Id. at 296. 
By clear implication, the court in allowing 
the substitution was disinclined to penalize 
the plaintiffs representative when the 90 
day period was commenced solely as the 
consequence of his (or his attorney's) con-
duct and not as a tactical maneuver of an 
adversary, premised upon expediting the ac-
tion. This was not the typical scenario 
where a defendant would suggest either 
plaintiffs or defendant's death upon the 
record to impose upon plaintiff's side the 
obligation to move for the substitution of 
either the plaintiff or defendant's repre-
sentative. See Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 
F.2d at 898^ -99; Rende v. Kay, 445 F.2d at 
Cite as 36 B.R. 393 (Bkrtcy. 1984) 
See 88 F.R.D. 984; Al Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. at 
246-47; Ten v. Svenska Orient Linen, 87 
F.R.D. at 552; National Equipment Rental 
Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unlimited Inc., 75 F.R.D. 
at 509; Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F.Supp. 
at 1011. In the instant case, it would be 
even more inequitable to penalize plaintiff's 
representatives for the filing of a sugges-
tion made by their attorney prior to his 
retention. 
The motion of Leon Melohn and Alfons 
Melohn, co-executors of the Estate of Jo-
seph Melohn, to be substituted as plaintiffs 
is granted. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. 
It is SO ORDERED. 
In re William R. KONCHAN, Debtor. 
QUADRA, LTD., an Illinois corporation, 
and Donald Summers, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
William R. KONCHAN, Defendant 
Bankruptcy No. 81 B 05272. 
Adv. No. 81 A 2592. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
N.D. Illinois, E.D. 
Jan. 20, 1984. 
Adversary action was brought request-
ing adjudication that certain debt of Chap-
ter 7 debtor was nondischargeable by rea-
son of fraud. The Bankruptcy Court, Fred-
erick J. Hertz, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs 
failed to satisfy "clear and convincing" bur-
den of proof necessary for finding of dis-
chargeability, and (2) debtor, who was a 
licensed real estate broker, violated provi-
sions of the Real Estate Brokers and Sales-
men License Act by depositing subject 
I. Unicorn Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467 (2m Cir. 1998). 
lessly costly if, as Donnelley believes, the 
FTC's case carries a fatal flaw. Yet, by 
this reasoning, any order denying sum-
mary judgment is "final" and appealable, 
because it dooms the parties to lengthy, 
expensive, and potentially wasteful endeav-
ors. If cost, delay, and aggravation of 
litigation made an order final, the distinc-
tion between interlocutory and final deci-
sions would collapse, and courts of appeals 
would be deluged. 
Id. at 431. The court also rejected Donnel-
l y ' s contention that claims of preclusion 
overcome the finality requirement Id at 
432-33. 
The Postal Service has done nothing here 
other than file an administrative complaint. 
Ite% decision is not final until the time to 
appeal the ALJ decision runs or the Judicial 
Officer resolves the appeal. Thus, there has 
been no definitive agency decision. See, e.g., 
United States Postal Serv. v. Notestine, 857 
1^ ,989 , 992-93 (5th Cir.1988). Further, 
the administrative complaint has no effect 
except to force plaintiffs to respond, an effect 
that does not amount to a cognizable legal 
consequence. Review of the Postal Service's 
^action is therefore premature. 
|v{3] Plaintiffs rely on Safir v. Gibson, 432 
FM 137 (2d Cir.1970), to argue that finality 
should not be required when the plaintiffs 
defend the administrative action on the 
ground of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
But the defense of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel does not as a general rule defeat the 
finality requirement, and we will waive finali-
ty only in rare instances. See Greenberg v. 
Comptroller of the Currency, 938 F£d 8, 11-
12 (2d Cir.1991) ("Although on occasion this 
court has directed that the doctrine of res 
judicata be applied in an administrative pro-
ceeding without waiting until a final order 
^as ready for review, see Safir v. Gibson, 432 
F.2d 137, 143-45 (2d Cir.1970), the circum-
stances of the instant case require adherence 
•to the normal requirement of exhaustion of 
a(kninistrative procedures.") (partial citation 
emitted). 
The facte of this case do not justify any 
departure from the finality requirement. 
*wntiffs can assert res judicata and collater-
/ vxna t~ir. 1770; 
al estoppel .before the Postal Service, and 
thus there is no reason to believe that they 
will be 'Vexed with needlessly duplicitous 
proceedings." Safir, 432 F.2d at 143. More-
over, we would benefit from the development 
of the record and the findings of fact that will 
result from initial agency review. See, e.g., 
Greenberg, 938 F.2d at 12 ("[A] judicial de-
termination as to whether any issues in the 
current OCC proceedings have been settled 
in prior proceedings would require a compar-
ison of the facts and transactions underlying 
both the prior and the current proceedings, a 
comparison that best can be made in the first 
instance by the OCC itself."). 
Accordingly, because the Postal Service's 
filing of an administrative complaint against 
plaintiffs did not constitute a "final agency 
action," the district court properly dismissed 
the complaint 
The judgment of the district court is af-
firmed. 
O | KCY NUMBER SYSTIM> 
UNICORN TALES, INC., a Corporation of 
the State of New York, Chippendales 
Universal, Inc., a Corporation of the 
State of New York, Valentine DeNoia, 
Administrator of the Estate of Nicholas 
DeNoia, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
Somen BANERJEE, also known as 
Steven Banerjee, Augustine Ralph 
and Angel Colon, Defendants, 
Irene Banerjee, Appellee. 
Docket No. 96-9629. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit 
Argued Dec. 4, 1997. 
Decided March 2, 1998. 
New York corporations and estate of one 
corporation's murdered shareholder brought 
468 138 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES 
federal racketeering and state law claims 
against defendant, the alleged murder. 
Subsequently, defendant's surviving spo\jSe 
filed statement of fact of his death, and, n\ore 
than 90 days later, she moved to dismiss. 
The United States District Court for' the 
Southern District of New York, Kevin Thom-
as Duffy, J., granted motion. Plaintiffs
 ap. 
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Wallace, Qjjr. 
cuit Judge of the United States Court
 0f 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by 
designation, held that: (1) statement of fact of 
death of litigant, triggering 90-day period for 
filing motion for substitution of party, need 
not be filed by party or formal or appointed 
representative of decedent's estate; (2) ^UJ.. 
viving spouse's statement of fact of death ^ag 
sufficient to trigger 90-day period, despite its 
failure to identify legal representative or suc. 
cessor; and (3) plaintiffs were properly held 
accountable for their attorneys' failure to gie 
appropriate motions to substitute within §0-
day period. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Courts e»776, 870.1 
District court's legal interpretation
 0f 
civil procedure rule governing substitution
 0f 
party upon death of litigant is reviewed de 
novo, and court's factual findings are re. 
viewed for clear error. Fed.Rules Civi*^ 
Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C A 
1 Federa) Civi) Procedure e=#fi3J 
Statement of fact of death of Utiga^ 
triggering 90-day period for filing motion for 
substitution of party, need not be filed by 
party or formal or appointed representative 
of decedent's estate. Fed.Rules Civ.Pr^ 
Rule 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.CA 
3. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>363.1 
Statement of fact of death of litig^t, 
triggering 90-day period for filing motion for 
substitution of party, need not identify dece. 
* T * I - -
 u „uu T riiffnrd Wallace, of the Un\tecj 
dent's successor or legal representative of 
estate; if there is inability or significant diffi-
culty in identifying legal representative or 
successor, motion can be brought to enlarge 
time in which to file motion for substitution. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 6(b), 25(a)(1), 28 
U.S.CA 
4. Federal Courts <S=>623 
Plaintiffs waived any claim that district 
court should have granted motion to substi-
tute defendant's surviving spouse out of timfe, 
where they did not move for substitution of 
party within 90 days after < surviving spouse 
filed statement of fact of defendant's death, 
and they did not move at any time before 
district court to substitute surviving spopse 
out of time. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules §£b), 
25(aXD, 28 U.S.C A. 
5. Attorney and Client <8=>88 
Plaintiffs would he held accountable for 
their attorneys' failure tov either move f$r 
substitution of party' within 90 days* after 
defendant's surviving spouse filed statement 
of fact of defendant's death, or to substitute 
surviving spouse out of time, resulting in 
dismissal of case. Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules 
6(b) 25(a)(1), 28 U.S.C A 
Robert E. Margulies, Jersey City, NJf 
(Frank E. Catalina, Margulies, Wind, Her-
rington & Knopf, Jersey City, NJ, on tiie 
brief), for appellants. 
Irene Banerjee, Playa Del Rey, CA, pro fie 
appellee. 
Before- WINTER, Chief Judge, 
NEWMAN and WALLACE,* Circuit 
Judges. 
WALLACE, Circuit Judge: 
In this case, we consider who may trigger 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l)Js 
90-day countdown by filing a statement of 
sitting by designation 
death of a litigant, and whether that state-
ment must identify the legal representative 
or successor. 
I 
We rely on the allegations of the pleadings 
for the necessary facts in this appeal. Uni-
corn Tales, Inc. (Unicorn) and Chippendales 
Universal, Inc. (Universal), New York busi-
nesses engaged in the operation of exotic 
jnale dance shows, licensed the name "Chip-
-pendales" from Easebe Enterprises, Inc. 
-{Easebe), a California business whose sole 
•shareholder was Somen Banerjee (Banerjee). 
-litigation over this agreement arose with 
(Unicorn and Universal suing Easebe and, in 
\tn extraordinary result, Baneijee had Nich-
gda&DeNoia, the sole shareholder of Unicorn, 
,ffiurdered on April 27,1987. 
In 1993, a grand jury indicted Banerjee on 
seven counts of racketeering activity, includ-
ing DeNoia's murder. In 1994, Unicorn, 
Universal, and the Estate of DeNoia filed a 
new action against Banerjee, asserting civil 
HICO and state law claims. Banerjee plead-
ed guilty to the criminal indictment on Au-
|just 9, 1994, and began to defend himself 
against the civil action. However, on Octo-
bean23^1994, Banfeijee committed suicide 
Whileincarcerated. 
OiTFebruary 22, 1996, Irene Baneijee, 
Acting as Banerjee's surviving spouse, prop-
erly served and filed a statement of the fact 
of Banerjee's death. More than 90 days 
%ter, she moved, Under Rule 25(a)(1) of the 
-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss 
t^he action. The district court granted the 
ftodtion and dismissed the action. This ap-
Jpea) followed. 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and 
28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction over 
ithis timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
5 1291, and we affirm. 
II 
U] We agree with our sister circuit that 
*We review the district court's legal interpre-
tation of Rule 25(a)(1) de novo and factual 
findings for clear error. Barlow v. Ground, 
39 F.3d 231, 233 (9th Cir.1994). Rule 
25(a)(1) states in part: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished^ the court may order substi-
tution of the proper parties. The motion 
for substitution may be made by any party 
or by the successors or representatives of 
the deceased party Unless the mo-
tion for substitution is made not later than 
90 days after the death is suggested upon 
the record by service of a statement of the 
fact of the death as provided herein for the 
service of the motion, the action shall be 
dismissed as to the deceased party. 
It is undisputed that no motion for substitu-
tion was brought within 90 days after Irene 
Banerjee filed a statement of the fact of 
Banerjee's death. However, three argu-
ments are presented that Rule 25(a)(1) 
should not apply to this case. 
A. 
[2] It is first contended that the state-
ment of the fact of death must be filed by a 
party or a, formal or appointed representative 
of the estate of the decedent As Irene 
Banerjee was not a party and not a formal or 
appointed representative, it is argued that 
she1 could riot trigger the 90 day period of 
Rule 25. See Alr-Jundi v. Est&te of Rockefel-
ler, 757 F.Supp. 206, 210 (W.D.N.Y.1990). 
However, the text of Rule 25(a)(1) contains 
no such restriction on who may file the state-
ment. Moreover, such a restriction is incon-
sistent with the purpose in amending the rule 
to its present format. Prior to 1963, Rule 
25(a)(1) "resulted] in an inflexible require-
ment that an action be dismissed as to a 
deceased party if substitution [was] not car-
ried out within a fixed period measured from 
the time of the death." Fed.R.Civ.P. 25 advi-
sory committee notes, 1963 Amendment. 
The present version of the rule, on the other 
hand, establishes a time limit starting from 
the time "information of the death is provid-
ed by means of a suggestion of death upon 
the record." Id Thus, Rule 25(a)(1) is de-
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signed to prevent a situation in which a ca^ 
is dismissed because a party never learned of 
the death of an opposing party. Instead, the 
party is given 90 days from the time when it 
learns from compliance with Rule 25(a)(1) of 
the death of an opposing party to take appro, 
priate action. 
Under Unicorn's proposed interpretation 
of Rule 25(a)(1), the estate must be probate^ 
and a representative selected before th§ 
statement of the fact of death can be filed. 
There is simply nothing in the rule or th$ 
advisory committee notes to suggest that 
Congress intended Rule 25(a)(1) to be SQ 
inflexible. We therefore hold that Iren$ 
Banerjee was able to trigger the 90 day 
limitation period of Rule 25(a)(1). 
B. 
tff/ It & next argue<f tAat the statement 
of the fact of death must also identify th^ 
representative of the estate or the successor 
of the decedent, and that Irene Banerjee'^ 
statement of death failed to satisfy this res 
quirement 
In Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 98$ 
(D.C.Cir.1969), the D.C. Circuit held that 
a[n]o injustice results from the requirement 
that a suggestion of death identify the repres 
sentative or successor of an estate who may 
be substituted as a party for the decease^ 
before Rule 25(a)(1) may be invoked by thos^ 
who represent or inherit from the deceased.** 
The result in Rende was based on a concern 
that Rule 25(a)(1) would be used as a weapon 
by civil defense attorneys to "place on plains 
ttf? the bardea, (rhete a? c<?xrex&?/z£?/&?/&> 
sentative was appointed for the estate in 
probate court, of instituting machinery in 
order to produce some representative of the 
estate ad litem, pending appointment of the 
representative contemplated by law of the 
domicile of the deceased." Id. 
With respect to our sister circuit, we dis-
agree with Renders interpretation of Rule 
25(a)(1). The rule does not require that the 
statement identify the successor or legal rep-
resentative; it merely requires that the 
statement of death be served on the involve^ 
~„~ r^to Wono than* no other manner ii\ 
fied by the court in Rende, we might see the 
wisdom of the requirement. However, the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do provide 
what we believe is the proper solution. Rule 
6(b) states: 
When by these rules or by a notice given 
thereunder or by order of court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within 
a specified time, the court for cause shown 
may at any time in its discretion (1) with 
or without motion or notice order the peri-
od enlarged if request therefor is made 
before the expiration of the period origi-
nally prescribed or as extended by a previ-
ous order, or (2) upon motion made after 
the expiration of the specified period per-
mit the act to be done where the failure to 
act was the result of excusable neglect^ 
but it may not extend the time for taking 
any action under Rules 50(b) and (c)(2), 
52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e),, 60(b), and 74(a)," 
except to the extent and under the condi-
tions stated in them. 
Plainly, then, if there was an inability or & 
significant difficulty in identifying Banerjee's 
legal representative or successor, a motion 
could be brought under Rule 6(b) to enlarge 
the time in which to file the motion for' 
substitution. 
Therefore, we hold that Irene Banerjeefr 
statement of the fact of death was sufficient 
to trigger Rule 25(a)(1) despite its failure to 
identify a legal representative or successor 
C. 
[4] The final argument is that the district 
court should have granted the motion to sub-
statute Irene Banerjee out of time, pursuant 
to Rule 6(b). However, there was no motion 
for the district court to allow substitution out 
of time under Rule 6(b); the motion was to 
substitute Irene Banerjee for Banerjee under 
Rule 25(a)(1). Since Unicorn did not make 
this motion in the district court, we deem it 
waived. United States v. Margiotti 85 F.3d 
100,104 (2d Cir.), cert denied, — U.S. , 
117 S.Ct 324,136 L.Ed.2d 238 (1996). 
[5] The appellants argue unpersuasively 
that they should not be penalized with dis-
missal under Rule 25(aXl) for the actions of 
-**held that clients must be held accountable 
for the acts and omissions of their attor-
neys." Pioneer Investment Services Co. v, 
'Brunswick Associates Ltd, Partnership, 507 
U.S. 380, 396, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1499, 123 
L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). 
AFFIRMED. 
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K. Douglas SCRIBNER and Laurie B. 
Scribner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v, 
John M. SUMMERS, Stephen A. Sum-
mers, and Jasco-Sun Steel Treating, 
Inc., Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 131, Docket 96-9645. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit 
Argued Sept. 15, 1997. 
Decided March 9,1998 
^Landowners filed action against neigh-
7jK)ring business, seeking recovery for barium 
contamination of their property under Com-
^l^ehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), nui-
,sance, and trespass claims. The United 
States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of New York, David G. Larimer, J., 
(niled in landowners' favor on CERCLA 
<3aim, awarded "response costs," and dis-
missed common law claims. Landowners ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, 84 F.3d 554, 
reversed and remanded. The District Court, 
•Larimer, Chief Judge, awarded landowners 
412,000 as quality of life damages. Land-
owners appealed. The Court of Appeals held 
that remand was required to permit supple-
mentation of the record on matters relating 
Hon. Manuel L Real, United States District 
Judge for the Central Distnct of California, sit-
to appropriate damages for permanent injury 
to property. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Damages <3=>110,163(4) 
Under New York law, proper measure of 
damages for permanent injury to real prop-
erty is lesser of decline in market value and 
cost of restoration; plaintiff, however, need 
only prove one of two measures and it be-
comes defendant's burden to prove that less-
er amount will sufficiently compensate for 
loss. 
2. Damages <3>39,109 
Under New York law, plaintiff may re-
cover temporary damages for iiyury to real 
property, measured by reduction of rental or 
usable value of property during pendency of 
injury. 
3. Federal Courts e=>941 
Remand was required to permit supple-
mentation of record on matters relating to 
damages to which landowners were entitled 
-under New York law for permanent injury to 
.property resulting from barium contamina-
tion caused by neighboring business, given 
t^hat record on appeal lacked sufficient evi-
dence regarding such issues as business' obli-
gations to clean up property pursuant to 
consent decree with state agency, adequacy 
of expert's estimation of cleanup costs, and 
landowners' entitlement to damages for stig-
ma arising from contamination. 
Alan J. Knauf, Rochester, NY (Knauf & 
Craig, LLP, of Counsel), for Plaintiffs-Ap-
pellants. 
Michael W. Malarney, Rochester, NY, for 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Before: FEINBERG and WALKER, 
Circuit Judges, and REAL,* District Judge. 
ting by designation 
J. Farmers Insurance Group v. District Court of the Second 
Judicial District, 507 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1973). 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, a cor-
poration, Petitioner, 
v. 
The DISTRICT COURT OF the SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, City and County of 
Denver, and the Honorable James C. Flani-
gan, one of the Judges of Said Court, Re-
spondents. 
No. 25789. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
March 12, 1973. 
Rehearing Denied April 2, 1973. 
Original proceeding on rule to show 
£ause why motion to dismiss a deceased de-
fendant as a party in a tort claim action 
.was not granted and why the Second Judi-
cial District Court granted plaintiffs* mo-
tion to substitute deceased defendant's ad-
ministratrix as party defendant. The Su-
preme Court, Hodges, J., held that failure 
of plaintiffs' attorney to file motion to 
substitute deceased defendant's administra-
trix as party defendant in tort action with-
-it'90 days after receiving notification of 
defendant's death because notification had 
bwn placed in attorney's file and over-
looked was not the result of "excusable ne-
glect" within meaning of statute allowing 
consideration of motion after expiration of 
specified period where failure to act was 
.due to excusable neglect. 
Rule made absolute. 
Groves, J., concurred in the result 
only; Kelley, J., did not participate. 
I. Parties €=»60 
Plaintiffs who failed to move to sub-
stitute deceased defendant's administratrix 
as party defendant in tort action within 90 
days after service of notification of de-
fendant's death had burden of proving that 
failure to file motion for substitution with-
in such period was due to excusable ne-
glect. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
6(b)(2), 25(a)(1). 
507 P.2d—55 
2. Motions <&=>I0 
Failure to act due to carelessness and 
negligence is not "excusable neglect" with-
in meaning of statute allowing considera-
tion of a motion made after expiration of 
specified period where failure to act was 
result of excusable neglect. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 6(b)(2). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Motions <$=>I0 
"Excusable neglect" within meaning of 
statute allowing consideration of motion 
after expiration of specified period where 
failure to act was result of excusable ne-
glect occurs when there has been a failure 
to take proper steps at the proper time, not 
in consequence of carelessness, but as the 
result of some unavoidable hindrance or 
accident. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
6(b)(2). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Attorney and Client <3=»I06 
An attorney for a deceased defendant 
has duty to notify court and other parties 
in action that client has died. 
5. Parties €=>60 
A plaintiff's attorney who receives no-
tification of defendant's death has the re-
sponsibility to properly initiate necessary 
inquiries to determine identity of person to 
be substituted for the deceased defendant 
and to file motion for substitution. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rule 25(a)(1). 
6. Parties <§=>6Q 
Failure of notification of defendant's 
death to specify the identity of the repre-
sentative who would be substituted in de-
fendant's place did not render notification 
ineffective to trigger running of 90-day 
period for filing motion to substitute de-
ceased defendant's administratrix as party 
defendant. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
25(a)(1). 
7. Parties $=*60 
Failure of plaintiffs' attorney to file 
motion to substitute deceased defendant's 
866 Colo. 507 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
administratrix as party defendant in tort 
action within 90 days after receiving noti-
fication of defendant's death because noti-
fication had been placed in attorney's file 
and overlooked was not the result of "ex-
cusable neglect0 within meaning of statute 
allowing consideration of motion after ex-
piration of specified period where failure 
to act was due to excusable neglect Rules 
of Civil Procedure, rules 6(b)(2), 
25(a)(1). 
Wolvington, Dosh, DeMoulin, Anderson 
& Campbell, Byron G. Rogers, Jr., Denver, 
for petitioner. 
Litvak, Schwartz & Karsh, Lawrence 
Litvak, Denver, for respondents. 
HODGES, Justice. 
In this original proceeding, we issued a 
rule to show cause why a motion to dismiss 
a deceased defendant as a party in a tort 
claim action was not granted, and why the 
respondent court, on the other hand, grant-
ed the plaintiffs' motion to substitute the 
deceased defendant's administratrix as a 
party defendant The motion to dismiss as 
to the deceased defendant was grounded on 
the plaintiffs' failure to move for substitu-
tion of parties within 90 days of the serv-
ice of notification of death upon the plain-
tiffs' attorneys. CR.CP. 25(a)(1) re-
quires that: "If the motion for substitution 
is not made within 90 days after such serv-
ice, the action shall be dismissed as to the 
deceased party." We make the rule abso-
lute. 
The respondent court under the facts of 
this case should have granted the motion 
for dismissal which would have thereupon 
automatically rendered the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for substitution out of order. 
Civil Action No. C-18322 in the respon-
dent court is for personal injuries resulting 
from an automobile accident. The plain-
tiffs are Judith A. and Lester J. Lambert. 
John A. Shank and two corporations are 
the named defendants. Defendant Shank 
of his death was filed in the respondent 
court. A copy of the notification was 
mailed on February 29, 1972 to the plain-
tiffs' attorneys and to the attorneys for the 
other defendants. The notification and 
certificate of mailing was filed by the peti-
tioner's attorneys acting on behalf of the 
deceased who was represented by these at-
torneys in this action after it was com-
menced. At the time of the accident, the 
petitioner was the liability insurance car-
rier for Shank. 
In October 1972, the motion to dismiss 
the case as to John A. Shank was filed in 
the respondent court. At about the same 
time, the plaintiffs filed their motion for 
an extension of time within which to file a 
motion for substitution of parties. This 
motion stated that the failure to file a 
timely motion for substitution was the re-
sult of excusable neglect by plaintiffs' 
counsel in that the "Notification of Fact of 
Death was placed in the file of the aboVe 
case and thereafter overlooked." 
Also, at this time, plaintiffs filed a mo-
tion for substitution of parties. This mo-
tion stated that the plaintiffs' claim is not 
extinguished by the death of defendant 
Shank and that Beulah L, Shank, adminis-
tratrix of the estate of John A. Shank, de-
ceased, should be substituted as a defend-
ant in his place. 
The motion to dismiss 'the motion for 
extension, and the motion for substitution 
came on for hearing before the respondent 
court on November 6, 1972. The respon-
dent court found that the motion for sub-
stitution had not been filed within the 90 
days prescribed by CR.CP. 25(a)(1), but 
that this failure was due to excusable ne-
glect on the part of the plaintiffs' attor-
neys. The court thereupon commented 
that this rule should be liberally construed 
in this case and thereupon granted the 
plaintiffs' motion for extension and for 
substitution, and then denied the motion to 
dismiss the action as to defendant Shank. 
CR.CP. 6(b)(2) allows consideration of 
a mntinn made after the expiration of a 
specified period where the failure to act 
was a result of excusable neglect. 
[1] In our view, the sole issue here is 
whether the failure to file a motion for 
substitution within the required 90 days 
under the facts here is the result of excus-
able neglect. The burden was clearly on 
the plaintiffs to show that the failure to 
comply with C.R.CP. 25(a)(1) was due to 
excusable neglect. No fact situation or ev-
idence was presented to the respondent 
court which would even approximate a 
showing of excusable neglect The plain-
tiffs' motion for extension states simply 
that the notification of defendant Shank's 
death was received; that it was placed in 
the attorney's fil^in the case; and that it 
:was "thereafter overlooked." During the 
hearing before the respondent court, the 
plaintiffs' attorney indicated to the court 
$ie additional fact that until the motion to 
dismiss was received, no inquiry or investi-
gation was made to determine the identity 
of a representative of the deceased who 
could be substituted as a party defendant. 
• [2,3] Excusable neglect involves a situ-
ation where the failure to act results from 
xtrcumstances which would cause a reason-
ably careful person to neglect a duty. It is 
impossible to describe the myriad situations 
showing excusable neglect, but in general, 
most situations involve unforeseen occur-
rences such as personal tragedy, illness, 
family death, destruction of files, and oth-
er similar situations which would cause a 
reasonably prudent person to overlook a 
required deadline date in the performance 
of some responsibility. Failure to act due 
to carelessness and negligence is not excus-
able neglect. Doyle v. Rice Ranch Oil Co., 
28 Cal.App.2d 18, 81 P.2d 980. On the 
other hand, "excusable neglect" occurs 
when there has been a failure to take prop-
er steps at the proper time, not in conse-
quence of carelessness, but as the result of 
some unavoidable hindrance or accident. 
Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Herring, 257 
Or. 201, 477 P.2d 903. 
On behalf of the respondent, it is argued 
that the notification or suggestion of death 
as filed was not proper in that it did not 
specify the identity of the representative 
who should be substituted in place of the 
defendant Shank. Also, it was argued that 
upon the death of defendant Shank, the at-
torneys who represented him in the person-
al injury case no longer represented him 
for any purpose and was not a proper par-
ty to make the notification of death. 
Therefore, it is argued that the notifica-
tion of death filed here was ineffective to 
trigger the 90-day period provided by the 
rule. The authority for the validity of 
these arguments is Rende v. Kay, 134 U.S. 
App.D.C. 403, 415 F.2d 983 (1969). The 
facts of that case are remarkably similar 
to the facts of this case, with one impor-
tant exception. In Rende, the plaintiffs 
attorney was injured shortly over a month 
after the suggestion of death was filed, 
and he did not return to his practice until 
after the expiration of the 90 days as pro-
vided in Rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which rule is 
substantially identical to our C.R.CP. 
25(a)(1). 
[+-6] In Rende, however, there is no 
discussion of the excusable neglect which 
appears to be present in that case. Rather, 
the premise for not enforcing the 90-day 
rule, was the conclusion that the attorney 
who had represented the deceased defend-
ant prior to death had no standing to file 
the notification of death which was also 
defective because it did not identify the 
representative who should be substituted in 
the place of the deceased defendant. We 
decline to be persuaded by the rationale of 
Rende. In our view, ah attorney for a de-
ceased defendant has a duty to notify the 
court and the other parties in the action 
that his client has died; and further, we 
see nothing in our rules which could rea-
sonably be a basis for requiring that notifi-
cation of death of a defendant should in-
clude the identity of the deceased defend-
ant's executor, administrator, or represent-
ative. It seems quite basic and reasonable 
that a plaintiffs attorney who receives no-
tification of the defendant's death has the 
868 Colo. 507 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
responsibility to promptly initiate the nec-
essary inquiries to determine the identity 
ol ^ ^W*<M\ to VK. %\jtast\tvjted icy: tta. de-
ceased defendant, and to file a motion for 
substitution in accordance with our Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
[7] We therefore remand this cause to 
the respondent court with directions to 
grant the motion for dismissal as to de-
fendant Shank. 
The rule is made absolute. 
GROVES, J., concurs in result only. 
KELLEY, J., not participating. 
O I KEY NUMIEI SYSTEM> 
CITY OF AURORA, a municipal corpo-
ration, Petitioner, 
v. 
Marion J. MARTIN, Respondent. 
No. C-224. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
March 5, 1973. 
Defendant was convicted in the Au-
rora Municipal Court of violating the mu-
nicipal assault and battery ordinance. The 
District Court, Adams County, Jean J. Ja-
cobucci, J., reversed the conviction on 
grounds that assault and battery is a mat-
ter of statewide concern, and that the mu-
nicipal ordinance was preempted by enact-
ment of state assault and battery statute, 
and certiorari was granted. The Supreme 
Court, Groves, J., held that difference in 
penalty provisions between municipal as-
sault and battery ordinance, which pro-
vided for a maximum fine of $300 or for 
imprisonment not to exceed 90 days, and 
state statute relating to assault and battery, 
which provided for up to one year's im-
or both, was not so great that the interest 
of the state would not be protected by a 
ijtQceeduuj; nud&c the caumci$al Qtdvamce.x 
Reversed and remanded with direction 
that judgment of the municipal court be 
reinstated. 
Kelley, J., did not participate. 
1. Municipal Corporations <S=>592(2) 
The offense of assault and battery 
may be viewed as a matter of "mixed" 
state and local concern. C.R.S. '63, 40-2-
35. 
2. Municipal Corporations €=>592(l) 
There is nothing basically invalid 
about legislation on the same subject by 
both a home rule city and the state, absent 
some conflict between the two regulations. 
Const, art. 2&, § } et seq. 
3. Municipal Corporations €=>592(l) 
There was no conflict between sub-
stantive portions of city ordinance dealing 
with assault and battery and state statute 
relating to the same subject, where the or-
dinance did not authorize what the state 
statute forbade or prohibit what the state 
statute expressly authorized. C.R.S. '63, 
40-2-35. 
4. Municipal Corporations $=>592(3) 
If a statute provides for substantially 
greater penalty than does a similar munici-
pal ordinance, such fact may be considered 
in deciding whether the Cieneral Assembly 
intended, by enacting the statute, to 
preempt that field of regulation, but mere 
difference in penalty provisions of a stat-
ute and ordinance, except in felony catego-
ries, does not necessarily establish an im-
permissible conflict between the two. 
5. Municipal Corporations <§=?592(l) 
Mere enactment of a state statute does 
not constitute a preemption by the state of 
the matter regulated. 
6. Municipal Corporations €=?592(3) 
Difference in penalty provisions be-
tween municipal assault and battery ordi-
nance, which provided for a maximum fine 
rit t^nn r\r 4nr imnriennment not to exceed 
K. LesCarbeau v. Rodrigues, 286 A.2d 246 (R.I. 1972). 
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4. Abatement and Revival <$=>7I 




Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 
Jan. 20, 1972. 
Appeal by plaintiff motorist from an 
order of the Superior Court, Providence 
and Bristol Counties, Cochran, J., granting 
dismissal of his action against out-of-state 
owner of automobile involved in intersec-
tional collision with plaintiff's vehicle. 
The Supreme Court, Kelleher, J., held that 
where plaintiff failed to initiate probate 
proceedings in such other state to have ad-
ministrator appointed who could be substi-
tuted in place of owner who died after in-
stitution of suit, order granting dismissal 
unless plaintiff, within six months, ob-
tained appointment of an administrator 
was proper. 
Appeal denied and dismissed. 
1. Attorney and Client <S»76(2) 
Death of a client terminates attorney's 
authority to act. 
2. Attorney and Client @=>I4 
Courts can pass upon questions raised 
and listen to suggestions as to their dispos-
al from attorney who is officer of court. 
3. Abatement and Revival <§=>74(l) 
Where plaintiff motorist, after insti-
tuting suit against out-of-state owner of 
automobile involved in intersectional colli-
sion with plaintiff's vehicle, failed to initi-
ate probate proceedings in such other state 
to have administrator appointed who could 
be substituted in place of owner who died 
after institution of suit, order granting dis-
missal unless plaintiff, within six months, 
obtained appointment of an administrator 
was proper. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
If a party dies before verdict or deci-
sion is rendered in action against him, such 
action abates as to him and must be dis-
missed unless it is revived by substituting 
his personal representative. 
5. Abatement and Revival <§=>7I 
Where there is no attempt to revive 
action against party who dies before judg-
ment is rendered in action against him, 
court lacks jurisdiction to enter any judg-
ment against deceased. 
Kenneth M. Beaver, Providence, for 
plaintiff. 




On October 27, 1965, the plaintiff 
(LesCarbeau), a resident of East Provi-
dence, owned and operated a motor vehicle 
which was involved in an intersectional 
collision with another motor vehicle owned 
by Morelo Rodrigues (Rodrigues) and 
driven by his wife, Alice Rodrigues. The 
collision occurred on a public highway lo-
cated in the city of Providence. The Rod-
rigueses lived in Seeko/ik, Massachusetts. 
LesCarbeau instituted this suit in April 
1966 against Rodrigues pursuant to the 
substitute service provisions of G.L.1956, 
chap. 7 of title 31. Service was made upon 
the Registrar of Motor Vehicles and notice 
of such service and a copy of the process 
was duly sent to Rodrigues at his Seekonk 
address. The case was answered by a 
Rhode Island counsel. The record shows 
that the litigants took advantage of the 
discovery processes available under the 
new Rules of Civil Procedure of the Supe-
rior Court. Interrogatories and replies 
thereto were filed by both parties. 
Rodrigues died on August 9, 1969. A 
d i e u » jjo\f **. 
record by his counsel on November 5, 1969 
and a copy of this notice was furnished to 
LesCarbeau's attorney. On November 24, 
1969, plaintiff's attorney wrote to Rod-
rig^s* daughter. She lived at home with 
her parents. The daughter was informed 
that, unless she took steps to have an ad-
ministrator appointed in her father's estate 
and have the administrator join the Rhode 
Island action, steps would be taken to have 
"some 3rd part> appointed as administra-
tor." 
The Rodngues family (the mother and 
daughter) have evidenced no desire to in-
stitute probate proceedings. In March 
1971, a motion was filed by a Rhode Island 
counsel asking that this action be dismissed 
because of LesCarbeau's failure to have an 
administrator appointed who could be sub-
stituted in place of the deceased. A hear-
ing on the motion was held before a Supe-
rior Court justice and thereafter an order 
was entered which granted the motion un-
less LesCarbeau, within the ensuing six 
months, had obtained the appointment of 
an administrator or executor who could be 
substituted as the party defendant. 
This appeal is governed by SuperJR.Civ. 
j * 25(a) (1). It reads as follows: 
"If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may or-
der substitution of the proper parties. 
The motion for substitution may be made 
by any party or by the successors or rep-
resentatives of the deceased party and, 
together with the notice of hearing, shall 
be served on the parties as provided by 
Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in 
the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons If no motion for 
substitution is made the action shall be 
subject to dismissal under Rule 41(b)." 
LesCarbeau first stresses that portion of 
the rule which states that a motion for 
substitution may be made b> a successor or 
representatne of the deceased litigant and 
he then points out that Rodngues' death 
terminated the authont) of his local coun-
sel to file the March 1971 motion for dis-
missal. Consequent^, he urges us to va-
cate the dismissal order. In making this 
contention, he refers us to Rende v. Ka>, 
134 U.S.App.D C. 403, 415 F.2d 983 (1969). 
There, as here, the suggestion of death and 
the subsequent motion were made b> the 
attorney who had been retained by the de-
ceased to defend the action. The Court of 
Appeals ruled that the attorne> was not a 
"representative" of the deceased part) 
within the contemplation of FedRCn.P 
25(a) (1) and refused to invoke the rule 
unless those wrho represent or inherit 
from the deceased when they suggest the 
litigants death, at the same time identify 
the representative who ma> be substituted 
as a part) in place of the deceased We 
have no quarrel with the court's finding 
relative to the termination of the attorneys 
agenc). We do believe, however, that the 
conclusion reached in Rende stems from a 
provision present in Federal Rule 25(a) 
(1) which is not found in our rule. The 
Federal proviso specifically states that un-
less a motion for substitution is made not 
later than 90 da)s after the suggestion of 
death has been made, the action shall be 
dismissed as to the deceased party. Su-
per.R.Qv.P. 25(a) (1) does not contain 
any such trigger. 
[1,2] A suggestion of death made in 
the Superior Court triggers nothing except 
to alert the court that rigor mortis may be 
setting in on a case which has a pending 
status. Even though the proposition that 
the death of a client terminates the attor-
ney's authority to act is absolutely correct, 
in the circumstances of the case at bar it is 
a technicality which overlooks the fact that 
courts can pass upon questions raised and 
listen to suggestions as to their disposal 
from an attorne) who is an officer of the 
court. LeBaron v. Mom, 53 R I 385, 167 
A. 108 (1933) 
[3] The trial justice could not close his 
e)es to the fact that LesCarbeau, despite 
his letter to the deceased's daughter, has 
done absolutel) nothing to initiate probate 
proceedings in Massachusetts. At oral ar-
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gument, his counsel put this appeal in its 
proper focus when he asked why should 
his client be forced to go to Massachusetts 
and expend the funds necessary to com-
mence probate proceedings. This is truly a 
rhetorical question. 
[4,5] Rule 25(a) (1) speaks of dismis-
sal. The only individual who is injured by 
a dismissal is a plaintiff. It is of no mo-
ment to the deceased defendant or his heirs 
or successors. Neither the estate nor the 
heirs are under any obligation to take any 
positive steps in the premises. There is no 
reason why the Rodrigues' family should 
incur the expense of a probate proceeding 
which would benefit only LesCarbeau. It 
is a basic common-law principle that if a 
party dies before a verdict or decision is 
rendered in an action against him, the ac-
tion abates as to him and must be dis-
missed unless it is revived by substituting 
his personal representative. Anderson v. 
Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L. 
Ed. 436 (1947); Iovino v. Waterson, 274 
F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Estate of 
Einstoss, 26 N.Y.2d 181, 309 N.Y.S.2d 184, 
257 N.E.2d 637 (1970). When, however, 
there is no attempt to revive the action, the 
court lacks jurisdiction to enter any judg-
ment against the deceased. See Pendleton 
v. Russell, 144 U.S. 640, 12 S.Ct. 743, 36 
L.Ed. 574 (1892). It should be noted that 
procedure for revival of an action by sub-
stitution of the personal representatives is 
not a mere technicality but rather it is the 
sole means by which the court obtains ju-
risdiction over the personal representative. 
Rule 25(a) (1) requires that service of no-
tice of the motion upon the newly substi-
tuted party be made "in the manner pro-
vided in Rule 4 for the service of a sum-
mons." 
LesCarbeau's reluctance to spend money 
for the appointment of an administrator is 
understandable. However, in this day of 
interstate travel, there can be no guarantee 
that a Rhode Island motorist will be in-
volved in a collision with only Rhode Is-
landers. The law cannot assure a penu-
rious plaintiff of an all-expense paid trip 
through the judicial processes. The record 
shows that LesCarbeau claims damages for 
pain and suffering together with some 
$400 in special damages. If he does not 
wish to expend a modest sum to further 
his claim, that is his business. However, 
once the action is filed, it becomes the 
court's business. We have said it before 
but it bears repeating. The common goal 
of litigants, bar, and bench must be the 
prompt and expeditious disposition of liti-
gation. Home Insurance Co. v. Sormanti 
Realty Corp., 102 RJ. 187, 229 A.2d 296 
(1967). Cases cannot be filed and then 
permitted to stay in a perpetual state of 
limbo. The record shows that, despite the 
death of Rodrigues and LesCarbeau's in-
transigent attitude, the case at bar now 
stands assigned to the jury trial calendar 
for February 1, 1972. This comes about 
because in January 1971 local counsel for 
the deceased made a motion that the case 
be assigned to the jury calendar for Febru-
ary 1, 1972 and the plaintiffs counsel made 
no effort to oppose this motion. Such 
cluttering of a calendar only underscores 
the urgency for a willingness on the part 
of all to make every effort to follow 
through on litigation so that it can be ter-
minated. Only then can dockets be cleared 
for those cases which are truly in a ready 
status. 
The plaintiffs appeal is denied and dis-
missed. 
L. Mullis v. Bone, 238 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977). 
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the Undersigned, or any of them, for pay-
ment of any qf the Obligations, whether or 
not the Bank shall have resorted to or 
brought suit against . . . the Princi-
pal [NHA], or any other party primarily or 
secondarily liable on any of the Obligations, 
and whether or not the Bank shall have 
exhausted its rights or remedies against 
any of the foregoing." Furthermore, UCC 
§ 3—416(1) provides that a guarantor of 
payment "engages that if the instrument is 
not paid when due he will pay it according 
to its tenor without resort by the holder to 
any other party." Ga.L.1962, pp. 156, 263 
(Code Ann. § 109A-3-416(l)). Thus, it is 
clear that there was no compelling reason 
to join NHA and that "complete relief" 
could be afforded the original parties to the 
suit without the joinder of NHA. Ga.L. 
1972, pp. 689, 694 (Code Ann. § 81A-119(a)). 
Peoples Bank of LaGrange v. No. Car. Na-
tional Bank, 230 Ga. 389, 197 S.E.2d 352. 
The fact that the guarantors may have a 
cause of action against NHA after the con-
clusion of this action does not demand oth-
erwise. Id., p. 392, 197 S.E.2d 352. 
[2] 2. Appellants contend that the 
grant of summary judgment was error be-
cause issues of fact remained as to their 
defense that the bank had altered the notes 
signed by NHA. We disagree. An officer 
of the bank testified that "certain adminis-
trative information was added to the back 
of the forms marked Tor Bank Use Only/ 
but no changes have been made to the faces 
of the notes themselves." The notes, as 
introduced, confirm that the bank made 
only administrative notations and did not 
change "the contract of any party thereto 
in any respect." UCC § 3-407(1) (Code 
Ann. § 109A-3-407(l)). The bank having 
pierced appellants' pleadings as to that de-
fense, it became appellants' burden to intro-
duce admissible evidence showing a factual 
dispute existed on the issue of alteration. 
Appellants failed to do so. Since the bank 
carried its burden as to that defense and 
since no genuine issue existed as to any 
err in granting summary judgment for the 
bank. 
Judgment affirmed 
BELL, C. J., and McMURRAY, J., concur. 
fo | KEYNUMB£RSrSUM> 
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J. L. MULLIS 
v. 
Morine S. BONE et al. 
No. 54415. 
Court of Appeals of Georgia, 
Division No. 2. 
Oct. 4, 1977. 
Action was brought for specific per-
formance of a written contract for the sale 
of real estate or for damages in lieu there-
of. Following the death of the defendant, 
plaintiff moved for substitution of his exec^ 
utrix as a party defendant and executrix 
and deceased defendant's widow moved id 
dismiss. The Superior Court, Bibb County, 
C. Cloud Morgan, J., dismissed and plaintiff 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Shulman, 
J., held that: (1) a statement of the fact of 
the defendant's death, ^hich included the 
name of the deceased and the date of death, 
was a sufficient suggestion of death to trig-
ger the 180-day period allowed for filing a 
motion for substitution and (2) the deceased 
defendant's attorney had the duty to report 
the defendant's death to the court and 
there was no requirement that the sugges-
tion of death be filed by a party to the suit 
or a successor or representative of the de-
ceased. 
Affirmed. 
1. Courts G=*97(1) 
Decisions of federal courts are per-
MULLIS 
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2. Abatement and Revival <s=>74(l) 
Statement of fact of death which in-
cluded name of deceased and date of death 
was sufficient suggestion of death to trig-
ger 180-day period allowed by statute for 
filing motion for substitution. Code, 
§ 81A-125(a)(l). 
3. Abatement and Revival <§=>70 
Attorney retained by deceased litigant 
had duty to report death of litigant to court 
and there was no requirement that sugges-
tion of death be filed by another party to 
the suit or successor or representative of 
deceased. Code, § 81A-125(aXl). 
L Appeal and Errojv<3=>366 
Where order in multiparty action did 
not settle all issues as to all parties, it was 
not appealable, absent express determina-
tion that there was no just reason for delay 
and express direction for entry of judg-
ment. Code, § 81A-154(b). 
Bush & Crowley, J. Wayne Crowley, Ma-
con, for appellant. 
J. Sewell Elliott, Mincey & Kenmore, 
David L. Mincey, Jr., Macon, for appellees. 
SHULMAN, Judge. 
. This appeal presents for the first time in 
Georgia the question of the sufficiency of a 
suggestion of death of a party. Mullis 
brought suit for specific performance of a 
written contract for the sale of real estate, 
or for damages in lieu thereof. Paul Bone 
was made a defendant because he executed 
the contract and held title to the land. 
Mrs. Bone was included as a defendant be-
cause she was asserting an interest in the 
land based on a pending divorce action. 
Mrs. Bone filed an answer, a counterclaim 
and a motion to dismiss. Paul Bone filed 
nothing and allowed the suit to go into 
default. Mullis survived the motion to dis-
miss and successfully opposed Paul Bone's 
motion to open the default. The order de-
nying Mrs. Bone's motion stated that her 
divorce action had been dismissed by opera-
tion of law and that she had no valid claim 
to the property. Mullis subsequently 
v. BONE oa.
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amended his complaint to seek reformation 
of the sales contract and allowed Paul Bone 
to file defensive pleadings, opening the de-
fault. A little over a year later, in Novem-
ber, 1975, Paul Bone died. Two and one-
half months after his death, on January 22, 
1976, the attorney who represented him 
filed and properly served on the parties a 
notice giving the date of Bone's death. 
Some four months later, in May, 1976, Mrs. 
Bone filed an amendment to her pleadings 
stating a new basis for her claim to the 
property which was the subject of the con-
tract and the suit. In August, 1976, the 
executrix of Paul Bone's will filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint as to Paul Bone for 
failure to move to substitute a personal 
representative for Bone within the 180 days 
allowed by Code Ann. § 81A-125(aXl). In 
September, Mrs. Bone filed a similar mo-
tion. Seven days later, September 15,1976, 
Mullis moved for the substitution of the 
executrix as a party defendant. Those mo-
tions and an oral motion by Mrs. Bone to 
dismiss as to her were considered at one 
hearing. The resulting order, from which 
this appeal is taken, granted all the motions 
to dismiss and denied Mullis' motion for 
substitution. We affirm. 
1. Code Ann. § 81A-125(aXl) provides 
for the substitution of ". . . the proper 
parties" for a party who dies during the 
pendency of a suit. The last sentence of 
that subsection establishes the time period 
during which a motion for substitution 
must be made: "Unless the motion for sub-
stitution is made not later than 180 days 
after the death is suggested upon the rec-
ord by service of a statement of the fact of 
the death as provided herein for the service 
of the motion, the action shall be dismissed 
as to the deceased party." Appellant con-
tends that there was no sufficient sugges-
tion of death in this case for two reasons: 
(1) the notice did not name the proper party 
to be substituted for Bone and (2) the notice 
was signed by the attorney who had repre-
sented Bone, in his capacity as Bone's coun-
sel. 
[1] Appellant's attack on the notice is 
based largely on the authority of Rende v. 
750 Ga. 238 SOUTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Kay, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 415 F.2d 983 
(1969). That case involved Rule 25(a)(1) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which 
is substantially the same as Code Ann. 
§ 81A-125(a)(l) except that the time period 
in the Georgia statute is 180 days, as op-
posed to 90 days under the Federal Rule. 
The court in that case held that a ". . . 
suggestion of death, which was neither filed 
by nor identified a successor or representa-
tive of the deceased, such as an executor or 
administrator, was ineffective to trigger 
the running of the 90-day period provided 
by the Rule." Id. at 984. The suggestion 
of death involved here exactly fits the de-
scription of the suggestion in Rende v. Kay. 
It read, "Notice is hereby given that Paul 
Bone, Defendant in the above-styled action, 
died on November 2,1975/' The title under 
the signature of the lawyer who filed the 
notice read, "Attorney for Defendant Paul 
Bone, Deceased." If Rende were control-
ling authority in this jurisdiction, we would 
be required to reverse the lower court. 
However, decisions of federal courts 'are 
persuasive authority only (Munn v< Munn, 
116 Ga.App. 297, 298,157 S.E.2d 77), and we 
are not persuaded by Rende v. Kay, supra. 
[2] Our statute refers to the suggestion 
of death without detailing the form in 
which it must be filed,1 except that it be 
44
. . . a statement of the fact of the 
death . . . " Code Ann. § 81A-
125(aXl). Appellant would not only have 
us engraft into this statute a requirement 
that the suggestion of death include an 
identification of the successor or represent-
ative of the deceased who may be substitut-
ed therefor but a requirement that the per-
son filing notice be a party to the action or 
a successor or representative of a deceased 
party. This writer is opposed, generally, to 
the accretion of procedural requirements by 
judicial fiat. That is not to say that courts 
may not impose, in cases where a statute is 
1. (1.) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vide in Form 30 a model for a suggestion of 
death: "A B. [described as a party, or as exec-
utor, administrator, or other representative or 
successor of C. D., the deceased party] sug-
gests upon the record, pursuant to Rule 
silent as to details, procedures necessary to 
the preservation of justice and fair play. 
Compare Cherry v. Gilbert, 124 Ga.App 
847(3), 186 S.E.2d 319 (1971) with Code 
Ann. § 81A-103. This, however, is not such 
a case. 
The basic rationale advanced by the court 
in Rende v. Kay for imposing on the person 
who files the suggestion a greater burden 
than is imposed by the language of the 
statute is fairness. The court was con-
cerned that a literal construction of the 
statute would ". . . open the door to a 
tactical maneuver to place upon the plain-
tiff the burden of locating the represent* 
tive of the estate within 90 days." Id. at 
986. Appellant here urges that same rai 
tionale, but we reject it. In the first plaice, 
our statute provides twice as much time aa 
Federal Rule 25(aXl). Secondly, the pro\$ 
sions of Code Ann. § 81A-106(b), allowing 
extensions of time, alleviate the burden a 
literal construction places on the party whtf 
desires the substitution. The court in 
Rende discussed the analogous Federal Rule 
6(b) but did not consider its application'tn 
this situation. 
Although our legal tradition places a pre-
mium on fairness, litigation still involves m 
adversary system. The burden of ^as-
certaining the proper party to be substitut-
ed for a deceased litigant is properly placed 
on the party who would effect the substitu-
tion. We hold, therefore, that ". ,:.- a 
statement of the fact of'the death . .* 
which includes the name of the deceased" 
and the date of death is a sufficient suggest 
tion of death as contemplated by Code Ann,1 
§ 81A-125(a)(l) to trigger the 180-day peri-' 
od allowed by that statute for filing a mo-*' 
tion for substitution. 
[3] Appellant's second attack on the suf-
ficiency of the suggestion of death filed in 
this case is directed to the question of by 
whom must the suggestion be filed. Appel-
during the pendency of this action." Although 
it would appear from the language in brackets 
that the drafters of Federal Rule 25(a)(1) ex-
pected that the suggestion would identify the 
proper party to be substituted, it must be noted 
that our legislature chose not to adopt that ' 
MUL.L1S 
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lant insists it must be filed by a "proper 
party/' i.e., someone already a party to the 
suit or a successor or representative of the 
deceased. The statute, however, imposes no 
such requirement. The reference to a 
"proper party" in the statute is concerned 
with who may be substituted for the de-
ceased. While the statute provides that the 
motion for substitution may be made by 
". . any party or by the successors or 
representatives of the deceased party 
. . .," it is silent as to the identity of 
the appropriate person to. suggest the death 
on the record. Appellee cites, in support of 
the position that the attorney retained by 
the deceased is empowered to suggest the 
death, the duty e\ved by an attorney to 
report to the court the death of a client who 
is a party to pending litigation. Appellant 
responds with the principle that an agency 
relationship is dissolved upon the death of 
the principal. While that, as a general 
proposition, is true, we agree with appel-
lee's view of the duty owed to the court by 
the attorney of a deceased litigant. We 
hold that the suggestion here was properly 
filed. Further support for this position is 
found in Jernigan v. Collier, 134 Ga.App. 
£37, 213 S.E.2d 495, affd 234 Ga. 837, 218 
j5rE.2d 556. Although the sufficiency of the 
suggestion of death apparently was not 
questioned in that case, this court noted 
that it was filed by the attorney for the 
deceased defendant and went on to affirm 
an order granting a motion to dismiss under 
Code Ann. § 81A-125(aXl). 
The rationale of Rende v. Kay, supra, has 
been rejected by the Supreme Court of Col-
orado also. That state has adopted the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with mod-
ifications, as has Georgia. In Farmers Ins. 
v. Dist. Court, 181 Colo. 85, 507 P.2d 865, 
the court held: "We decline to be per-
suaded by the rationale of Rendz. In our 
view, an attorney for a deceased defendant 
has a duty to notify the court and the other 
parties in the action that his client has died; 
and further, we see nothing in our rules 
which could reasonably be a basis for re-
quiring that notification of death of a de-
fendant should include the identity of the 
deceased defendant's executor, administra-
V. m / n r i 
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tor, or representative. It seems quite basic 
and reasonable that a plaintiffs attorney 
who receives notification of the defendant's 
death has the responsibility to promptly 
initiate the necessary inquiries to determine 
the identity of a person to be substituted 
for the deceased defendant, and to file a 
motion for substitution in accordance with 
our Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. 181 Colo, 
at 90, 507 P.2d at 867. 
The notice of death in this case, filed 
January 22, 1976, was in all respects suffi-
cient to start the running of the 180-day 
period in which a motion to substitute may 
be made. As no motion for substitution 
was made within that period, the trial court 
was correct in granting the motion of the 
executrix to dismiss as to Paul Bone. 
2. One of appellant's enumerations of 
error is directed to the court's denial of his 
motion to substitute the executrix of Paul 
Bone's will. The motion for substitution 
was made 237 days after the filing of the 
suggestion of death, 57 days late. Two 
motions to dismiss had already been filed. 
Appellant made no request for an extension 
of time during the period and made no 
allegations of excusable neglect to justify 
an extension after the period. The time for 
making the motion having passed, the trial 
court was correct in denying the motion to 
substitute. 
[4] 3. Appellant complains that appel-
lee, Mrs. Bone, had no standing to move for 
dismissal as to Paul Bone because of a prior 
order holding that she had no claim to the 
property at issue. That argument must 
fail. This case is a multi-party action. For 
an order to be final in such a case, when it 
does not settle all the issues as to all the 
parties, there must be ". . an ex-
press determination that there is no just 
reason for delay and . . . an express 
direction for the entry of judgment." Code 
Ann. § 81A-154(b). There was no such 
determination and direction, and the order 
was ". subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties." Id. The order 
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not being final, Mrs. Bone was still a party 
and was entitled to make any proper mo-
tion. 
4. Appellant's final complaint is that the 
court erred in granting Mrs. Bone's oral 
motion to dismiss the complaint as to her. 
His argument, based on standing, was the 
same as in Division 3 of this opinion and is 
disposed of with the same response. Appel-
lant's remaining argument against the 
granting of Mrs. Bone's motion presupposes 
the reversal of the portion of the order 
granting the motion to dismiss filed by the 
executrix. Since we affirmed that grant, 
this argument fails. 
The order granting the motions to dismiss 
and denying the motion to substitute was 
proper in all respects. 
Judgment affirmed. 
QUILLIAN, P. J., and BANKE, J., con-
cur. 





Court of Appeals of Georgia, 
Division No. 2. 
Oct. 4, 1977. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Superior Court, Dougherty County, Asa D. 
Kelley, Jr., J., of criminal attempt to com-
mit armed robbery and possession of a fire-
arm during commission of a crime, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Banke, J., 
held that: (1) evidence established suffi-
cient connection between defendant and at-
tempted robbery to support his conviction 
firearm was involved in attempted commis-
sion of armed robbery, its possession be-
came a lesser included offense in armed 
robbery, and defendant could not be con-
victed of both offenses, and his conviction 
for possession of firearm during commission 
of a crime would accordingly be reversed. 
Judgment affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. 
1. Robbery <^24.1(4) 
Evidence, which included testimony 
that defendant entered store only seconds 
before a masked gunman, who announced 
"This is a holdup and we want all of your 
money," at time when no one else was 
present in store, that cashier heard defends 
ant and gunman engage in a barely audible 
conversation, that after cashier obtained 
pistol, all three were wounded in ensuing 
gunfire, that upon finding defendant lying 
in parking lot a few moments later, defend-
ant allegedly told cashier not to shoot him 
any more and that "we didn't mean to hurt 
you/' established sufficient connection be-
tween defendant and attempted robbery to 
support his conviction for criminal attempt 
to commit armed robbery. Code, § 26-
801(bX3). 
2. Criminal Law <s=>29 
Where only one firearm was involved 
in attempted commission of armed robbery, 
its possession became a lesser included of-
fense in armed robbery and defendant could 
not be convicted of both criminal attempt to 
commit armed robbery and possession of a 
firearm during commission of a crime, and 
his conviction on latter charge would ac-
cording!} be reversed. Code, § 26-506. 
Clayton Jones, Jr., George W. Woodall, 
Albany, for appellant. 
William S. Lee, Dist. Atty., Hobart M. 
Hind, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albany, for appel-
lor 
M. Holmes v. Arbeitman, 857 S.W.2d 442 (MoApp.E.D. 1993). 
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due 30 days from the date the loan was 
made. The note specifically gave plaintiff 
the right to demand immediate payment 
upon default. The one-year stay of execu-
tion served as an extension of time for 
repayment and therefore was a material 
alteration. This material alteration was 
granted without the knowledge or consent 
of defendant, thereby, extinguishing any 
guarantor liability of defendant. Plain-
tiffs second point is denied. 
We affirm the trial court's ruling grant-
ing defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. 
CRANE and CRAHAN, JJ., concur. 






Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Eastern District, 
Division Three. 
June 8, 1993. 
Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to 
Supreme Court Denied July 14, 1993. 
Application to Transfer Denied 
Aug. 17, 1993. 
In action for money had and received, 
the Circuit Court, St. Louis County, George 
R. Gerhard, J., granted defendant's motion 
for directed verdict. Plaintiffs appealed 
and, more than 90 days after defendant's 
counsel filed suggestion of death, plaintiffs 
moved to substitute defendant's estate for 
substitution after 90 days from suggestion 
of death. 
Appeal dismissed. 
1. Judgment <3=>7 
Courts have jurisdiction to render 
judgments for or against viable entities 
only. 
2. Judgment <3=>12 
Dead person is by definition not "via-
ble entity," and, thus, court may not render 
judgment for or against such person. 
V.A.M.R. 52.13(a)(1). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and, 
definitions. 
3. Appeal and Error @=>1109 
Appellate court decision issued aft&i$ 
death of party to appeal has no legal effect; 
in absence of substitution of partfeft 
V.A.M.R. 52.13(a)(1). 
4. Appeal and Error <£»334(7) 
On appeal of suit for money had and 
received, court lacked authority to allow; 
substitution of defendant's estate for de-' 
fendant after 90 days from suggestion of 
death. V.A.M.R. 52.13(a)(1). 
Mark D. Pasewark, Virginia G. Pase^ 
wark, St Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants^ 
Peter B. Hoffman, Robert E. Tuctoe^ 
Kortenhof & Ely, P.C., St. Louis, for defen-
dant-respondent. 
SMITH, Judge. 
Plaintiffs appeal from the action of thi 
trial court in granting defendant's motion 
for directed verdict in plaintiffs' suit for 
money had and received. We dismiss the 
appeal. 
Notice of appeal was filed on May 7, 
1992. On August 18, 1992, counsel for the; 
sole defendant filed in this court a sugges-
tion of death of defendant on August 9^ 
1992. Notice of that suggestion of death 
was maDed to counsel for plaintiffs on that 
day. On October 2 this court wrote to 
Cite as 857 S.W.2d 442 
opened and a personal representative ap-
pointed. It was further suggested that if 
so a motion for substitution would be ap-
propriate. Copy of that letter was sent to 
counsel for plaintiffs. On October 7 an 
attorney in Springfield, Illinois sent a letter 
to this court advising that the St Louis 
County Circuit Court had granted letters 
testamentary on September 10 to Mark Ra-
bin, whose address was listed and to First 
National Bank of Springfield whose ad-
dress was also listed. The letter further 
advised that first publication of notice of 
granting letters testamentary had occurred 
on September 15 in the St. Louis Countian. 
JP°Py of that letter was sent to counsel for 
defendant but no copy is indicated to coun-
sel for the plaintiffs^ On December 28 the 
personal representatives, utilizing Arbeit-
man's attorneys, filed a motion for substi-
tution to make the personal representatives 
the successors to Harold Arbeitman. That 
amotion specifically stated that it was made 
**to permit the prosecution of this Appeal 
and by doing so Respondent does not waive 
its argument that Appellant has failed to 
comply with Rule 52.13(a)(1) of the Mis-
souri Rules of Civil Procedure.'' On Janu-
ary 4,1993, appellants filed their "Adoption 
of Motion for Substitution by Appellants, 
Jerry < and Martha Ann Holmes" in which 
they sought the substitution of the Estate 
of Harold Arbeitman for Harold Arbeit-
man, and requested that the motion be 
allowed "out of time". On January 6, the 
Chief Judge granted the plaintiffs' motion 
to adopt. Respondent raises as the first 
Pjoint in the brief that the substitution was 
untimely and this court has no jurisdiction 
to proceed. We agree. 
Rule 52.13(a)(1) provides: 
If a party dies and the claim is not there-
by extinguished, the court may, upon 
motion, order substitution of the proper 
parties. Suggestion of death may be 
made by any party or person in interest 
by the service of a statement of the fact 
of the death as provided herein for the 
service of a motion. A motion for substi-
tution may be made by any party or by 
the successor or representative of the 
deceased party. Such motion, together 
with notice of hearing shall be served 
(MOJipp. C~V, I 7 7 j ; 
upon the parties as provided in Rule 43.-
01, and upon persons not parties in the 
manner provided for the service of a 
summons. Unless a motion for substitu-
tion is served within 90 days after a 
suggestion of death is filed, the action 
shall be dismissed as to the deceased 
party without prejudice. 
Rule 52.13(a)(1). (Emphasis supplied). 
[1-4] Courts have jurisdiction to render 
judgments for or against viable entities 
only. A dead person is by definition not a 
viable entity. An appellate court decision 
issued after the death of a party to an 
appeal has no legal effect in the absence of 
a substitution of parties. Gardner v. Mer-
cantile Bank of Memphis, 764 S.W.2d 166 
(Mo.App.1989) [3-5]. The time limitations 
contained in the Rule are "in the nature of 
a statute of limitation". Id. at [6-8]; Hart-
vedt v. Maurer, 359 Mo. 16, 220 S.W.2d 55 
(1949) [2]. Rule 52.13 is applicable to ap-
pellate proceedings. Metropolitan .St 
Louis Sewer District v. Holloran, 751 
S.W.2d 749 (Mo. banc 1988) [I.e. 751]; 
Gardner, supra. Rule 44.01(b) authoriz-
ing enlargement of time for actions re-
quired by the Rules specifically provides 
that the court may not extend the time for 
taking any action under Rule 52.13. We 
lacked the authority therefore to allow the 
substitution after the 90 days from the 
suggestion of death and to the extent the 
order of January 6 purported to allow the 
out-of-time substitution it was beyond our 
jurisdiction. The 90 day limitation was 
clearly exceeded here. The service difficul-
ty involved in the Holloran case is not 
present here. 
Plaintiffs, relying upon federal cases typ-
ified by Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 
(D.C.Cir.1969), assert that decedent's coun-
sel lacked the standing to file the sugges-
tion of death and that it was ineffective 
because it did not identify the representa-
tive of the estate who could be substituted 
for defendant. We note that the federal 
rules upon which the federal decisions are 
based differ from those of Missouri. See 
Rule 6 and 25 Fed.R.Civ.P. Notably the 
federal rules authorize extensions of time 
to comply with the substitution rule and in 
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that respect appear to be more lenient than 
the Missouri rules. Further the federal 
rules specify with particularity who may 
make the suggestion of death, limiting 
those persons to "any party or . . . the 
successors or representatives of the de-
ceased party . . ." Our rule authorizes the 
suggestion of death to be made by "any 
party or person in interest". Because an 
attorney's representation of his client ter-
minates upon the client's death, the attor-
ney is not a successor or representative
 0f 
the deceased party under the federal rules. 
But an attorney is a "person in interest" 
under the Missouri rule. The attorney j s 
still listed as the representative of the 
client in the court records and until the 
suggestion of death is filed is held account-
able by the court to meet court deadlines 
and represent the cheat The attorney is a 
person with an interest in advising the 
court of the death of his client and the 
change in his status and obligations to the 
court. Further the practical reason for 
requiring the suggestion of death and the 
substitution is so the court may proceed 
with its business and not be held in a state 
of judicial impotence. Gardner, supra at 
[3-5]. The most logical person to advise 
the court of the death of the party is the 
attorney representing him. We are unable 
to conclude that the Rule is intended to 
preclude the suggestion of death being 
made by the most logical person to mak^ it 
Plaintiffs' other contention is that the 
suggestion of death does not advise the 
court or the plaintiffs of the identity of the 
person to 6e substituted. This seemecf to 
be a concern of the Rende v. Kay coiirt. 
The short answer is that the rule does hot 
require such information. Such suggestion 
may be made by "a statement of the fact of 
death". The representatives of the dece-
dent here have no interest or incentive j n 
the continuation of this appeal because the 
decedent won in the trial court. Plaintiffs 
have a great deal of interest and incentive 
for the appeal to continue. In an adver-
sary system the burden of continuing the 
jurisdiction of the appellate court shouid 
rest upon the party whose interest j s 
apparent belief of the Rende v. Kay court 
that the burden should be differently 
placed. The suggestion of death was filed 
on August 18 and by October 9 the file of 
this court contained the information neces-
sary to make the substitution required. 
Plaintiffs' counsel was notified of our re-^  
quest for this information on or about Oc-
tober 3. Plaintiffs still had 38 days after 
October 9 to make the substitution and did 
not do so. This is not to suggest that 
absence of such information tolls the 90 
day limitation but is mentioned only 'to 
demonstrate that no difficulty of obtaining 
information was involved here. The re-' 
quirements of Rule 52.13 were not met and 
the rule directs that the action be dis^ 
missed. 
Appeal is dismissed. 
GARY M. GAERTNER, P.J, and 
STEPHAN, J., concur. 
Darrick BARBER, Movant/Appeilant, 
• . 
STATE of Missouri, Respondent 
No. 62679. 
Missouri Court of Appeals, 
Eastern District, 
Division One. 
June 8, 1993. 
Motion for Rehearing ancf/br IVansfer to 
Supreme Court Denied July 14, 1993. 
Application to Transfer Denied 
Aug. 17, 1993. 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St 
Louis County; Bernhardt C. Drumm, 
Judge. 
Dave Hemingway, St Louis, for movant, 
appellant 
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., 
Joan F. Gummels, Asst Atty. Gen., Jeffer-
son City, for respondent. 
N. Brown v. Wheeler, 437 So.2d 521 (Ala. 1983). 
BROWN v. 
Citeas437So.2d 
ty notary public, so presumably the parties 
executed it there. The indemnity agree-
ment refers to the bonds, so they were in 
existence when the agreement was exe-
cuted in 1978. Morrison refers to C & G 
Coal's failure to reclaim the land as occur-
ring after the dissolution of the corporation, 
so presumably the cause of action arose in 
1979 or thereafter. Thus, for all the record 
shows, the last business done between C & 
G Coal and Morrison took place in Marion 
County. 
[3] In some cases, a continuing agree-
ment executed in the forum county might 
be a proper b^sis for venue. In this case, 
however, although C & G Coal had done 
some business in Jefferson County, its con-
nection to that forum is too attenuated, and 
the instances of doing business there are too 
remote, for venue to be proper there. The 
trial court committed no error in granting 
the motion to transfer, so the writ of man-
damus is denied. 
WRIT DENIED. 
, TORBERT, CJ., and FAULKNER, EM-




Malcolm L. WHEELER, Administrator of 
Estate of WUliam V. Phifer, Deceased. 
Maiy Gail BROWN 
v. 
Malcolm L WHEELER, Administrator of 
Estate of William V. Phifer, Deceased. 
82-80, 82-81. 
Supreme Court of Alabama. 
Aug. 26, 1983. 
In suit arising out of an automobile 
accident, the Jefferson County Circuit 
WHEELER Ala. 521 
521 (Ala. 1983) 
Court, Josh Mullins, J., set aside the ap-
pointment of administrator ad litem for de-
ceased defendant's estate, dismissed the 
claims against that defendant, and plain-
tiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Ad-
ams, J., held that: (1) it was proper for 
attorney who represented the defendant to 
suggest his death upon the record, and (2) 
the suggestion of death on the record was 
sufficient to trigger the running of six-
month period for filing a motion for substi-
tution despite failure to include name of 
successor or representative in the sugges-
tion, and plaintiffs' failure to make motion 
within six months warranted dismissal of 
claim. 
Affirmed. 
1. Parties «=>60 
Suggestion of death filed by attorney 
for deceased party to litigation initiates 
running of period for filing motion for sub-
stitution if suggestion is otherwise properly 
made. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 25(aXl). 
2. Attorney and Client *=»76(2) 
Notwithstanding general rule that at-
torney's authority to act on behalf of client 
ceases on death of that client, attorney for 
a party continues to have duty to the court 
after demise of client and, in discharge of 
that duty, must inform court and other 
parties to litigation of the death. 
3. Abatement and Revival $=>70 
Parties <*=>60 
Although attorney for deceased party 
to litigation may be in best position to know 
who representative of estate is, that is not 
sufficient basis for requiring attorney to 
identify entity in suggestion of death, and 
statement of fact of death which includes 
name of deceased and date of death is suffi-
cient suggestion of death to trigger period 
allowed for filing motion for substitution. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 25(aXl). 
4. Abatement and Revival $=>70 
Executors and Administrators *=>22(3) 
Suggestion of death filed by deceased 
defendant's attorney was proper even 
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though it did not contain name of a succes-
sor or representative of decedent's estate; 
the suggestion of death triggered running 
of six-month period for filing a motion for 
substitution and, accordingly, plaintiffs' ap-
plication for appointment of an administra-
tor ad litem for decedent's estate was ap-
propriate, but untimely, where not filed un-
til one year after the suggestion of death. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 25(aXl). 
Larry W. Harper and J. Mark Naftel of 
Porterfield, Scholl, Bainbridge, Mims & 
Harper, Birmingham, for appellants. 
Thomas R. Elliott, Jr. of London, Yancey, 
Clark & Allen, Birmingham, for appellee. 
ADAMS, Justice. 
These appeals are 6y Dane Brown and 
Mary Gail Brown from an order of the trial 
court setting aside the appointment of an 
administrator ad litem and dismissing the 
claims against William V. Phifer, a de-
ceased defendant. 
The issues on appeal are as follows: 
1. Was it proper under Rule 25(a)(1) 
of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure* 
for the attorney who represented defend-
ant Phifer to suggest his death upon the 
record? 
2. Was the suggestion of death suffi-
cient to trigger the running of the six-
month period for filing a motion for sub-
stitution under Rule 25(aXl), A.R.Civ.P., 
despite a failure to include the name of a 
successor or representative of Phifer's es-
tate? 
We answer these questions favorably to 
the estate of Phifer and affirm the trial 
court's order dismissing the claim against 
Phifer and setting aside the appointment of 
an administrator ad litem. 
The facts of the case are as follows: 
1. "If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished, the court may order substitution 
of the proper parties. The motion for substitu-
tion may be made by any party or by the 
successors or representatives of the deceased 
party and, together with the notice of hearing, 
In May 1980, appellants separately filed 
; complaints in the Circuit Court of Jefferson 
I County, Alabama, against Phifer and Har-
r bert Construction Company. The suits 
• arose out of an automobile accident that 
" occurred in November 1979. 
] On March 1, 1981, Phifer died. Ten days 
later, Thomas R. Elliot, Jr., "as Attorney 
for William V. Phifer," filed a suggestion of 
death in the circuit court. He did not in-
clude in the suggestion the name of a suc-
^ cessor or representative of the deceased's 
' estate, since one had not been appointed. 
In fact, there were no assets in the estate, 
» On March 10, 1982, appellants' attorney 
• filed an application for appointment of an 
administrator ad litem to represent Phifer's 
estate in the lawsuit. The court appointed 
' Malcolm L. Wheeler, the General Adminis-
' trator for Jefferson County. 
On March 15, Elliot, "as former attorney 
for William V. Phifer/' filed a motion to 
dismiss the claim against Phifer because the 
appellants had failed to file a motion for 
appointment of an administrator ad litem 
1
 within six months after the suggestion of 
death upon the record, as prescribed by 
Rule 25(aXl), A.R.Civ.P. The motion to 
dismiss was granted. Subsequently, how-
ever, the trial court set aside the order 
granting the motion, denied the revival of 
the claim against Phifer, and dismissed that 
claim. On October 13, 1982* this order was 
made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R. 
Civ.R 
Appellants have conceded that if the sug-
gestion of death was properly made under 
Rule 25, then the claim against Phifer was 
due to be dismissed. However, they rely on 
the authority of Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 
(D.C.Cir.1969), for an attack on the sugges-
tion of death filed by Elliot. In Rende, the 
court considered whether the suggestion of 
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a 
summons, and may be served in any county. 
Unless the motion for substitution is made not 
later than six months after the death is suggest-
ed upon the record by service of a statement of 
the fact of the death as provided herein for the 
BROWN v. 
Cfteas437So.2d 
the death of a defendant, filed by defend-
ant's counsel without identification of a 
successor or representative of the deceased, 
was sufficient to initiate the running of the 
90-day period for filing a motion for substi-
tution pursuant to Rule 25(aXl) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The court 
held that "the suggestion of death, which 
was neither filed by, nor identified a succes-
sor or representative of the deceased, such 
as an executor or administrator, was inef-
fective to trigger the running of the 90-day 
period provided by the Rule/' Rende v. 
Kay, 415 F.2d at 984. 
In support of its holding, the court in 
Rende cited a oortion of the Committee 
Notes for the Inderal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,2 and also the form for suggestion of 
death recommended by the Advisory Com-
mittee,8 On the basis of these sources, the 
court concluded that the Advisory Commit-
tee 
. . . plainly contemplated that the sug-
gestion emanating from the side of the 
deceased would identify a representative 
of the estate, such as an executor or 
administrator, who could be substituted 
for the deceased as a party, with the 
action continued in the name of the rep-
resentative [And,] [although the 
attorney for the defendant was retained 
to "represent" the deceased as his coun-
sel, he is not a person who could be made 
a party, and is not a "representative of 
the deceased party" in the sense contem-
plated by Rule 25(aXl). 
415 F.2d at 985. For the reasons that fol-
low, we are not persuaded that this authori-
ty should control our construction of Rule 
2. "Present Rule 25(a)(1), together with present 
Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible requirement 
that an action be dismissed as to a deceased 
party if substitution is not carried out within a 
fixed period measured from the .time of death. 
The hardships and inequities of this unyielding 
requirement plainly appear from the cases. * * 
The amended rule establishes a time limit for 
the motion to substitute based not upon the 
time of the death, but rather upon the time 
information of the death is provided by means 
of a suggestion of death upon the record. * * 
A motion to substitute may be made by any 
party or by the representative of the deceased 
party without awaiting the suggestion of death. 
Indeed, the motion will usually be so made. If 
W JtlEiCtLiEjIV 
521 (Ala. 1983) 
25(aXl) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
[1,2] In contrast with the federal Com-
mittee Notes, neither the plain language of 
Rule 25(aXl), A.R.Civ.R, nor the Commit-
tee Comments to the rule indicate who may 
properly suggest upon the record the death 
of a party. Moreover, Frank W. Donaldson, 
a member of this court's Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Practice and Procedure, has 
noted that in drafting Rule 25, A.R.Civ.P., 
"[t]here was no question whatsoever but 
that an objective of the Committee was to 
reveal and make plain that there is a duty 
of an attorney to suggest the death of his 
client upon the record." Donaldson, 4 
Cum.-Sam.L.Rev. 210, 227 (1973). This ob-
jective of the Committee reflected a wide-
spread concern regarding defense counsel's 
strategic failure to notify the court and 
opposing parties of a client's death. We 
approve the objective, and concur with 
those jurisdictions that have held that a 
suggestion of death filed by the attorney 
for a deceased party initiates the running of 
the period for filing a motion for substitu-
tion under Rule 25(aXl), if the suggestion is 
otherwise properly made. See Farmers In-
surance Group v. District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, 181 Colo. 85, 507 
?2d 865 (1973); Mullis v. Bone, 143 Ga. 
App. 407, 238 S.E.2d 748 (CtApp.1977); 
King v. Tyree's of Tampa, Inc., 315 So.2d 
538 (Fla.DistCt.App.1975). And, notwith-
standing the general rule that an attorney's 
authority to act on behalf of a client ceases 
on the death of that client, we adhere to the 
view that the attorney for a party continues 
a party or the representative of the deceased 
party desires to limit the time within which 
another may make the motion, he may do so by 
suggesting the death upon the record. (Em-
phasis added.)" 415 F.2d at 985. 
3. "A.B. [described as a party, or as executor, 
administrator, or other representative or sue-
cessor of CD., the deceased party] suggests 
upon the record, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), the 
death of CD. [describe as party] during the 
pendency of this action. Added Jan. 21, 1963, 
eff. July 1, 1963. (Emphasis added)" 415 F.2d 
at 985. 
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to have a duty to the court after the demise 
of that client and, in discharge of that duty, 
must inform the court and other parties of 
the death. See Farmers Insurance Group v. 
District Court of the Second Judicial Dis-
trict, supra; Mullis v. Bone, supra. 
[3,4] We now address appellants' argu-
ment that Elliot's suggestion of death was 
not proper because it did not contain the 
name of a successor or representative of 
Phifer's estate. Appellants would have us 
adopt the Rende court's position that it is 
not correct to saddle a plaintiff with the 
responsibility of identifying the successor or 
representative of the estate of a deceased 
defendant See 415 F.2d at 986. We de-
cline to do so. Although the attorney for 
the deceased may be in the best position to 
know who the representative of the estate 
is, that is not a sufficient basis for requiring 
the attorney to identify that entity in a 
suggestion of death. We agree with the 
Georgia Court of Appeals, which said: 
Although our legal tradition places a 
premium on fairness, litigation still in-
volves an adversary system. The burden 
of ascertaining the proper party to be 
substituted for a deceased litigant is 
properly placed on the party who would 
effect the substitution. We hold, there-
fore, that " . . . a statement of the fact of 
the death . . . " which includes the name 
of the deceased and the date of death is a 
sufficient suggestion of death . . . to trig-
ger the 180-day period allowed . . . for 
filing a motion for substitution. 
Mullis v. Bone, 143 Ga.App. at 410, 238 
S.E.2d at 750. Therefore, having found no 
defect in the contents of Ellfot's suggestion 
of death, we hold that it was the appellants' 
responsibility to seek substitution for Phifer 
prior to the expiration of the 6-month peri-
od which commenced upon the filing of the 
suggestion of death. Appellants' applica-
tion for the appointment of an administra-
tor ad litem was appropriate under the cir-
cumstances of this case, but untimely, for 
[i]t seems quite basic and reasonable that 
a plaintiff's attorney who receives notifi-
cation of the defendant's death has the 
necessary inquiries to determine the iden-
tity of a person to be substituted for the 
deceased defendant, and to file a motion 
for substitution in accordance with our 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Farmers Insurance Group v. District Court 
of the Second Judicial District, 181 Colo, at 
90, 507 P.2d at 867-68. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
trial court's order dismissing the claim 
against defendant Phifer. 
AFFIRMED. 
TORBERT, C.J, and FAULKNER, AL-
MON and EMBRY, JJ., concur. 
O I KEYNUMBERSYSTEM 
Mary M. LAND 
v. 
Forest F. BOWYER, et aL 
82-77. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama. 
Aug. 12, 1983. 
Case in which widow ha£ claimed dow-
er interest in husband's land was removed 
from probate court to circuit court, where 
suit was subsequently commenced on peti-
tion for sale for division of land owned by 
decedent at the time of his death. The 
Circuit Court, Russell County, Paul S. Mil-
ler, Jr., J., entered judgment dismissing 
widow as party plaintiff, and widow appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Adams, J., held 
that: (1) holding in Hall v. McBride invali-
dating as unconstitutional statute govern-
ing claim of dower by widow where de-
ceased husband left will precluded widow 
from claiming dower interest in realty 
owned by her deceased husband, and (2) 
trial court properly allowed defendants to 
O. King v. Tyree's of Tampa, Inc., 315 So.2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
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nership. Thereafter, the capital, if any, 
of the General Partners shall be repaid to 
them, and subsequently the profits, if any, 
of the limited partnership shall be distrib-
uted. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 
We find that, except for the conduct of 
Faye Hurley, P & H had at some point in 
time prior to the filing of suit adequate re-
sources to reimburse Faye Hurley, per 
agreement, thereby entitling Carl Paul and 
A. B. Hurley to delivery of the assign-
ment. 
To put it another way, Carl Paul and A. 
B. Hurley were entitled to delivery of the 
assignment as soon as the improper dis-
bursements of the partnership capital to-
taled $55,000, because these are funds 
which should have been used in contempla-
tion of the parties to repay Faye Hurley. 
[2] Carl Paul and A. B. Hurley can be 
excused for the failure of P & H Seawall 
to pay these funds to Faye Hurley because 
it was prevented by her (and her adviser-
husband, Ray Hurley) from performing. 
The basic premise for our decision is the 
principle found in 7 Fla.Jur., Contracts, § 
145 (1956): 
"Where a party contracts for another to 
do a certain thing, he thereby impliedly 
promises that he will do nothing which 
will hinder or obstruct that other in 
doing the agreed thing." 
7 Fla.Jur., Contracts § 148 (1956); 5 Wil-
liston on Contracts, Excuses for Non-Per-
formance, §§ 676, 677 (1961); Casale v. 
Carrigan and Boland, Inc., 288 So.2d 299 
(4th DCA Fla.1974). 
If the assignment had been delivered, the 
interests held by Carl Paul and A. B. Hur-
ley would have been 49^% each (with 1% 
still held by Robert E. Rogers). 
Going on, the trial court has found that 
$100,000 was improperly disbursed. How-
ever, there has been no detailed and specif-
ic accounting made of the partnership as-
sets, income and disbursements to support 
It is impossible with the state of the rec-
ord for us to adjudicate the issues and 
bring finality. We respectfully remand for 
a new trial in accordance with the views 
here expressed and these instructions: 
(1) A determination should be made as 
to when the assignment should have been 
delivered by Faye Hurley; 
(2) Based upon that decision there 
should be an accounting as to the entitle-
ment of the parties to the partnership as-
sets. 
Reversed and remanded with directions. 
OWEN, C. J., and MORIARITY, W. 
HERBERT, Associate Judge, concur. 
O I KEY NUNBII SYSTEM> 
Ear! KING, Appellant, 
v. 
TYREE'S OF TAMPA, INC., d/b/a Tyree's 
Inc., a corporation, et al., Appellees. 
No. 74-1169. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Second District 
July 2, 1975. 
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1975. 
Action arising from automobile acci-
dent. The Circuit Court, Hillsborough 
County, Walter N. Burnside, Jr., J., dis-
missed action, and plaintiff appealed. The 
District Court of Appeal, Scheb, J., held 
that where no motion for substitution was 
filed within 90-day period after filing of 
suggestion of death of plaintiff, it did not 
appear that plaintiff's counsel had attempt-
ed to obtain any extension of time, and 
there was no showing of any difficulties in 
securing appointment of personal repre-
sentative which may have caused delay in 
filing motion for substitution, action was 
subject to dismissal on plaintiffs motion. 
00& 
Parties <§=>60 
Where no motion for substitution was 
filed within 90-day period after filing of 
suggestion of death of plaintiff, it did not 
appear that plaintiffs counsel had attempt-
ed to obtain any extension of time, and 
securing appointment of personal repre-
sentative which may have caused delay in 
there was no showing of any difficulties in 
filing motion for substitution, action was 
subject to dismissal on plaintiffs motion. 
30 West's F.S.A. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rule 1.260(a)(1). 
2. Parties <S»63 
Rule authorizing petition to relieve 
party or his legal representative from ef-
fect of judgment where there has in fact 
been excusable neglect was available to 
plaintiff whose action was dismissed for 
; failure timely to seek substitution follow-
ing suggestion of death. FeARules Civ. 
Proc. rule 6(b), 28 U.S.C.A.; 30 & 31 
West's F.S.A. Rules of Civil Procedure, 
rules 1.090, 1.540, 1.540(b)(1). 
KING v. TYREE'S OF TAMrA, m u . 
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been filed within the 90-day period after 
the filing of the suggestion as required by 
RCP 1.260(a)(1). On August 22, 1974, 
Lee Hubbard was appointed administratrix 
of the estate of the deceased plaintiff, and 
on August 28, 1974, filed her motion for 
substitution through the same attorney who 
had filed the suggestion. Thereafter, the 
trial court granted the defendants' motion 
and dismissed plaintiffs cause of action. 
William A. Seacrest of Peterson, Carr, 
Harris & Seacrest, Lakeland, for appellant. 
M. W. Graybill and Ted R. Manry, III, 
of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, 
Tampa, for appellees. 
SCHEB, Judge. 
[1] This appeal is from dismissal of 
the appellant/plaintiffs suit and focuses on 
the applicability of RCP 1.260(a)(1) as re-
lates to the time for substitution of a suc-
cessor for a deceased party plaintiff. 
In 1971 the plaintiff sued the 
appellees/defendants on a cause of action 
arising out of an automobile accident. The 
plaintiff died on February 9, 1974, during 
the pendency of the litigation and on May 
3, 1974, his attorney, pursuant to RCP 1.-
260(a)(1), filed a suggestion of death with 
the trial court. On August 5, 1974, the de-
fendants moved for dismissal on the 
ground that no motion for substitution had 
We hold that under the circumstances of 
this case, failure to file the motion for 
substitution within the time prescribed by 
RCP 1.260(a)(1) subjected the plaintiffs 
cause to dismissal. Therefore, we affirm. 
Rule 1.260(a)(1) provides: 
If a party dies and the claim is not 
thereby extinguished, the court may order 
substitution of the proper parties. The 
motion for substitution may be made by 
any party or by the successors or repre-
sentatives of the deceased party and, to-
gether with the notice of hearing, shall 
be served on all parties as provided in 
Rule 1,080 and upon persons not parties 
in the manner provided for the service 
of a summons. Unless the motion for 
substitution is made within 90 days after 
the death is suggested upon the record 
by service of a statement of the fact of 
the death in the manner provided for the 
service of the motion, the action shall be 
dismissed as to the deceased party. 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that since the 
suggestion of death did not specify the 
name of a person who was eligible to be 
appointed as successor, the trial court's dis-
missal should be reversed on authority of 
Rende v. Kay, 1969, 134 U.S.App.D.C 403, 
415 F.2d 983, which construed Rule 25 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
rule identical to RCP 1.260. True, in 
Rende the court held that a suggestion of 
death does not trigger the running of the 
90-day period unless it specifies the person 
available to be substituted. In Rende it 
was the defendant who filed the suggestion 
and also sought the dismissal. There the 
plaintiffs counsel, upon returning to prac-
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tice following an injury, learned of the 
motion to dismiss whereupon he filed a 
motion to extend the time for filing under 
Federal Rule 6(b) along with a motion for 
substitution under Rule 25. 
In the case sub judice it was the plain-
tiffs counsel who set in motion the time 
requirements under RCP 1.260(a)(1) and 
the defendant who then sought dismissal. 
Even then the plaintiffs counsel did not 
seek an enlargement of time as may have 
been available under RCP 1.090(b). 
In Farmers Insurance Group v. District 
Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Colo. 
1973, 507 P.2d 865, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado rejected Rende in construing its 
substitution rule which is identical to Fed-
eral Rule 25 and RCP 1.260. Likewise, we 
are not impressed with the Rende view nor 
the logic of applying it to the case sub ju-
dice. To accept Rende as authority for re-
versal of the trial court would require us 
to engraft an exception to RCP 1.260. 
In Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 2nd Cir. 
1966, 359 F.2d 292, the court allowed a 
substitution to be filed two days late under 
Federal Rule 25 because of difficulties in 
obtaining appointment of a personal repre-
sentative. The court in Staggers found 
the defendant suffered no prejudice from 
the tardy filing. 
In Yonofsky v. Wernick, S.D.N.Y.1973, 
362 F.Supp. 1005, the plaintiff, Yonofsky, 
died on October 26, 1970. A suggestion of 
plaintiffs death was filed by the defendant 
on October 28; and 118 days later the ex-
ecutor of plaintiffs estate moved to be 
substituted. In justification for late filing 
of the motion for substitution, the executor 
contended there were significant difficul-
ties encountered in bringing about his ap-
pointment as a personal representative of 
the deceased plaintiffs estate. The trial 
court, upon finding the plaintiffs had made 
the required showing of excusable neglect 
and since there was no showing of preju-
dice to the defendant, held the plaintiff 
Federal Rule 6(b) and allowed the motion 
for substitution. 
[2] In the case sub judice the record 
does not reflect any attempt on the part of 
the plaintiffs counsel who filed the sug-
gestion to obtain any extension of time au-
thorized under RCP 1.090. Nor is there 
any showing in the record of any difficul-
ties in securing appointment of a personal 
representative which may have caused the 
delay in filing the motion for substitution. 
We recognize, however, the possibility that 
some unusual delay may have been encoun-
tered in obtaining appointment of a person-
al representative since the deceased died 
intestate. Therefore, we point out that 
RCP 1.540(b)(1) furnishes a basis for a 
party to petition the trial court to relieve 
him or his legal representative from the 
effect of a judgment where there has, in 
fact, been excusable neglect., 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court, 
without prejudice to the plaintiffs right to 
file a motion under RCP L540 should ap-
propriate grounds therefor exist. 
HOBSON, A. C. J., and GRIMES, J., 
concur. 
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John M. BEASLEY, Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Florida, Appellee. 
No. 73-940. 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Second District. 
July 2, 1975. 
Defendant was convicted in the Cir-
cuit Court for Hillsborough County, Rob-
ert W. Rawlins, Jr., J., of second-degree 
murder in the shooting death of his wife, 
